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In this thesis, we investigate the challenge of corporate innovation in China from three aspects: 
industry competition, government subsidies, and political turnover. Our study enriches the 
related literature on innovation in the Chinese context by using a large panel of industrial firms. 
In chapter 2, we investigate the effect of industry competition on corporate innovation. Using 
a panel of 555,124 industrial firms over the period from 1998 to 2007, we find that firm-level 
innovation is negatively associated with industry competition, and the negative relation is 
stronger in industries that are more dependent on external finance. Further evidence shows that 
financing constraints tighten the negative effect of competition on innovation. Our study 
provides clear identification of a causal effect of competition on innovation by using a 
difference-in-differences (DID) approach that relies on a plausibly exogenous shift in industrial 
openness to foreign investment and employing instrumental variables (IV) approach that relies 
on a time-varying instrument for industry competition. 
In chapter 3, we explore the impact of government subsidies on corporate innovation. Using a 
panel of 663,699 industrial firms over the period from 1998 to 2008, we find that government 
subsidies have a positive direct effect on corporate innovation. I confirm the causal effect of 
subsidies on innovation by using an IV estimation and a DID specification. The positive direct 
effect is more pronounced for private firms, financially constrained firms, firms in industries 
with low external finance dependence (EFD) or high-tech intensiveness, and firms located in 
cities with low financial development or low foreign direct investment. Furthermore, subsidies 
have a greater positive indirect effect on innovation activities for firms without subsidies than 
firms with subsidies. The paper sheds light on the implications of subsidies in innovation. 
In chapter 4, we focus on the influence of political turnover on the finance-innovation nexus. 
Using a panel of 739,672 industrial firms across 305 cities over the period from 2003 to 2014, 
we find that local political uncertainty arising from local political turnover decreases the 
positive effect of city-level financial development on corporate innovation while local political 
turnover alone promotes corporate innovation. The results are robust to the use of various 
estimation methods. Further evidence shows that the moderating effect played by local 
political turnover is various across turnover types, political connections and financial 
constraints. Our findings shed light on how both political and financial systems influence 
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Innovation is a crucial instrument for business firms to establish competitive 
advantages and for a country to ensure long-term economic growth (Solow, 1957; Romer, 1990; 
Porter, 1991; Aghion & Howitt, 1992). However, information problems and high uncertainty 
risk tend to discourage firms from innovating (Holmstrom, 1989; Aboody & Lev, 2000; 
Harhoff, 2000). 1  Given these difficulties, scholars tend to explore the ways to promote 
innovation effectively from various perspectives (Romer, 1990; Aghion & Howitt, 1992; 
Brown et al., 2009; Acharya & Xu, 2017; Rong et al., 2017). Considering that at this stage 
China is facing a big assignment to drive its economic development from the type of ‘Made in 
China’ to ‘Created in China’, innovation is becoming an increasingly vital role in the current 
strategic transition period, the thesis explores some mechanism (industry competition, 
government subsidies and political turnovers) through which how corporate innovation in 
China is affected. 
Following approximately 40 years of the reform and open-up, especially after the WTO 
entrance in 2001, the Chinese economy has transformed in almost every aspect. It has gone 
from being one of the most closed and isolated economies in the world of little relevance to the 
global economy, and become both highly globalized and the world’s second-largest economy. 
According to the statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s nominal Gross 
                                                             
1 ‘Information problems’ is an information imbalance in characters of R&D activities between innovators and 
outside investors (Holmstrom, 1989). Firms with innovation activities own more information than outside 
investors on the probability of success and the expected return of these projects since firms are reluctant to fully 
disclose their innovation plans to avoid competitors’ imitation and expropriation (Anton & Yao, 2002). Second, 
Aboody and Lev (2000) suggest that the accounting rules on R&D expenditure also leads to information 
asymmetry since R&D expenses are charged to expense when incurred, which makes it difficult for external 
investors to predict the changeable costs and assessment value of innovation activities. The information 





Domestic Product (GDP) was 14.723 trillion US dollars, which has a significant lead over all 
countries around the world except the US (20..933 trillion US dollars).2 China’s nominal GDP 
also has maintained a high growth rate of around 10% per annum from 1978 to 2017, higher 
than that of the major economies around the world.3 However, the fast growth of China’s 
economy is mainly driven by an extensive economy mode with huge investments, which 
displays some shortcomings such as low quality, low profits, and high pollution. A large 
number of firms grow up by making opportunistic strategies and focusing on a short-term 
horizon. Innovation investments are less attractive to them than pursuing short-term profits 
such as diversifying in unrelated industries (Rong et al., 2017). Because of rising costs of 
production factors and serious environmental pollution, China has to explore a new economic 
growth model. Additionally, there is a concern about China’s slowing economic growth. 
China’s GDP growth has slowed below 7% per annum since 2014. To change the old extensive 
economy and sustain the high growth in the future, in recent years, the importance of innovation 
has been recognized and innovation-driven (rather than investment-driven) growth type has 
been emphasized in China. The report of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party 
of China (CPC) clearly states that China should implement the strategy of innovation-driven 
growth type and adhere to the path of independent innovation with Chinese characteristics. The 
Chinese government has launched many top-down innovation-related policies over the past 
few decades (Chen & Naughton, 2016). For instance, the State Council of China puts forward 
the policy of ‘National Program for Long- and Medium-Term Scientific and Technological 
Development’ in 2006. To fight against the slowing economic growth rate, the Chinese central 
                                                             
2  The data is collected from the World Economic Outlook Database, April 2021: 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2021/03/23/world-economic-outlook-april-2021. 
3 According to the China Statistical Yearbook 2020 (http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2020/indexch.htm), China’s 





government puts forward the strategy of ‘Made in China 2025’ in 2015 to further promote 
innovation, especially indigenous innovation.  
Because of these incentive policies supported by governments, China’s research and 
development (R&D) has also made tremendous improvement over the past few decades 
alongside the rapid development of China’s economy. For example, according to the report of 
‘US Science and Engineering Indicators 2020’ released by the US National Science Foundation, 
China is the world’s second-largest R&D country after the US.4 China has ranked second in 
the world in some key indicators such as R&D investment, output of scientific and 
technological papers and added value of high-tech manufacturing. Additionally, the report 
shows the gap between China and the US in R&D spending is closing fast. From 2000 to 2017, 
R&D spending of the US grew at an average annual rate of 4.3%, while China’s R&D spending 
grew at an average annual rate of more than 17% over the same period. In 2017, China 
accounted for 23% of the total global R&D spending of $2.2 trillion, which is only behind the 
US (25%). According to the China Statistical Yearbook 2020 issued by the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS) of China, China’s R&D spending in 2019 was 2.21 trillion CNY, which 
accounted for 2.23% of GDP increased by 56.27% from the spending of 1.42 trillion CNY in 
2015. The number of invention patents granted in China (452,804) also ranked 1st in the world. 
These continuous R&D endeavour makes that China’s innovation ability is moving from a 
quantitative accumulation to a qualitative leap. Specifically, in the latest report of ‘Global 
Innovation Index 2020’ published by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
China ranked 14th of the innovation capability index in 2020.5 A country that ranks among the 
                                                             
4 The report of ‘US Science and Engineering Indicators 2020’ could be browsed through the website address: 
https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20201. 






top 15 in the innovation capability index is generally considered to be an innovative country 
and China is the only middle-income economy in the top 30.  
Although China’s innovation has made many achievements over the past few decades, 
it still faces many shortcomings such as a weak input-output efficiency, a lack of basic research 
and an overwhelming dependence on foreign technology. Specifically, first, the transformation 
rate of scientific and technological achievements in China is only around 20%, which is far 
lower than the 40% rate of developed countries.6 Second, the China Statistical Yearbook 2020 
shows that in 2019, the R&D spending in basic research is 133.56 billion CNY, which only 
occupies approximately 6.03% of the total R&D spending (2.21 trillion CNY). However, the 
US spends about 20% of its total R&D on basic research. As the main body of R&D activities, 
the innovation ability of enterprises represents national competitiveness. The R&D intensity of 
‘above-scale’ industrial enterprises in China is only 0.76%, which is still far behind developed 
countries whose level is from 2.5% to 4%. The low R&D intensity of Chinese enterprises 
reflects their participation in innovation is not high. Third, facing criticism for its lack of initial 
innovation ability, China is often portrayed as a land of copycats, where the protection of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) are poorly enforced (Allen et al., 2005 Ang et al., 2014). For 
example, until the end of 2020, the US has taken six ‘Section 301 investigations’ to target 
China and nearly all of them as well as Trump’s China tariffs starting from 2018 involve the 
field of China’s intellectual property protection. The phrase ‘Made in China’ is often thought 
of as cheap, low-quality and counterfeit goods. Overall, the necessity of understanding the 
obstacles behind China’s innovation represents a compelling study.  
Meanwhile, the ‘reform and opening up’ of more than 40 years makes that China 
changed dramatically in the past few decades, no matter in its economic development, financial 
                                                             






system or political system. Specifically, China has changed to the second-largest economy, 
constructed its financial system and abolished its ‘life tenure for leaders’ system. However, as 
the largest emerging market and the largest communist country, China still owns some 
disadvantages (or characters) which are significantly different from western countries, such as 
an imbalance in economic development, a ‘lending discrimination’ in the financial market, and 
a unique appointment system for local officials.7 Considering that innovation is the key driver 
of long-term economic growth and China’ innovation still faces some shortcomings in its 
unique financial system and political system, we would like to discuss the mechanisms of 
corporate innovation in China from the three aspects of industry competition, government 
subsidies and political turnover, which could be beneficial to China’s innovation activities in 
the future. 
 
1.2. The motivation of this thesis 
 Innovation is a very important factor in economic development. Although China’s 
innovation has made an impressive development with the big surge of China’ economy over 
the past few decades, China’s innovation still faces some challenges. First, China is still an 
underdeveloped market although China has become the second-largest economy and the largest 
manufacturing entity around the world. China’s market still has some limitations, such as the 
                                                             
7 China’s economic development faces a regional imbalance. Compared to the central and western regions, the 
Eastern (Costal) region plays a key role in China’s economy. For example,  according to the China Statistical 
Yearbook 2020 (http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2020/indexch.htm), in 2019 the GDP of the coastal region 
(53.607 trillion CNY) is about 54.230% of the whole national GDP (99.087 trillion CNY). In addition, because 
the unique financial system in China is controlled by the state capitals, compared to other types of enterprises such 
as private firms or foreign firms, state-owned enterprises are more likely to obtain funds from the banking system 
controlled by the state capitals. As China is a nation governed by the communist party, the local leaders in China 
must be members of the CPC and their appointment must be decided by higher CPC committees, which is distinct 





‘lending discrimination’ in the financial market and unbalanced economic development. At 
this stage, China’s economy is facing big pressure from its gradually slowing GDP growth rate 
caused by higher costs of production factors, the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic and 
increasing global trade protectionism. How to stimulate corporate innovation to drive the 
economy during China’s economic transformation period from a type of producing low-value 
goods to a type of making high-value goods is very important. Second, although China’ market 
has changed dramatically as China has enjoyed 40 years of benefits from the policy of ‘reform 
and open-up’, China’s financial market and the political system are still distinct from those in 
western countries but can largely affect firms’ decisions into innovation investments. Thus, 
investigating the effect of some economic factors from China’s unique financial system and 
political system on corporate innovation is crucial. Third, although substantial previous studies 
have deeply explored the factors related to innovation, the majority of them tend to prefer 
western economies (Acharya & Subramanian, 2009; Brown et al., 2009; Aghion et al., 2013; 
Acharya and Xu, 2017; Acemoglu et al., 2018). The studies which focus on emerging markets, 
especially China, are still not completely consolidated. These motivations enable us to 
investigate China’s innovation. 
Specifically, first, during the past 40 years of ‘reform and open-up’, China maintained 
a very high growth rate in terms of GDP and attracted more capitals (including domestic and 
foreign) into China’s market. Thus, there has been a tremendous surge of enterprises in China’s 
market to compete for profits and China’s market is characterized by fierce competition than 
ever before. Since Schumpeter (1911) began to explore the impact of competition on 
innovation, many studies have investigated it (Scherer, 1967; Nickell, 1996; Blundell et al., 
1999; Aghion et al., 2005; Hashmi, 2013). Schumpeter (1943) proposes the ‘Schumpeterian 
effect’ theory that predicts a typically negative correlation between competition and innovation 





competition and innovation (Levin et al., 1985; Aghion et al., 2005; Tingvall & Poldahl, 2006; 
Hashmi, 2013). However, the previous papers focus on developed economies and the research 
focus on China is still sparse, which leads us to explore what is the role of competition on 
innovation in China under the background of the big change in China’s market competition 
caused by the ‘reform and open-up’. It deserves more in-depth studies to test whether the 
‘Schumpeterian effect’ theory or the U-inverted shape applies to China. 
Second, although China has claimed that it gradually from the old planned economic 
system to a new market economic system, governments still play a key role in the financial 
market and significantly affect firms’ behaviours including innovation investments. As one of 
the four most important financing sources for firms in China (Allen et al.,2005) and one 
important economic intervention tool implemented by governments, subsidies have a large 
impact on firms’ innovation activities. Thus, it is worth investigating the role of subsidies on 
the big improvement of China’s innovation over recent decades, especially considering that 
there is a global debate about whether subsidies allocated by governments could give an unfair 
advantage to Chinese firms to compete with their foreign counterparts (Godement et al., 2011; 
Hormats, 2011; Fang & Walsh, 2018). 
Third, since China is the largest communist country in the world, China’s political 
system is significantly different from that in western countries whose political government 
leaders usually come from various political parties and are democratically elected by voters 
(the ‘electorate’). The Communist Party of China (CPC) has absolute power at any time to 
assign its members to local governments as local government leaders for specific targets. Thus, 
it motivates us to explore what is the effect of local political turnovers on corporate innovation 
in China’s unique political system. Additionally, considering that China’s financial market has 





the banking system are important to firms’ innovation funds, it is interesting to explore the 
effect of local political turnover on the finance-innovation nexus in the Chinese context. 
 
1.3. The purpose of this thesis 
 Due to China’s unique financial system and political system, the thesis explores the 
effect of industry competition, government subsidies and political turnover on corporate 
innovation in China based on a large panel of industrial firms over the period from 1998 to 
2014. The understanding of the impact of industry competition, government subsidies and 
political turnover on corporate innovation is an important issue from both management and 
academic perspectives. Specifically, first, since China is now facing severe competition, 
understanding the impact of competition on corporate innovation in China not only can provide 
some policy implications to governments to efficiently regulate the market to boost innovation 
investments, but also complementary to the literature on competition and innovation. Second, 
understanding the impact of government subsidies on corporate innovation in China can lead 
policymakers to reasonably use subsidy tools to encourage firms to innovate, which also can 
inspire other emerging markets to how to adopt government tools to stimulate corporate 
innovation. Third, considering that China’s economy can change dramatically from a laggard 
to a leader in a few short decades with a unique political system that is distinct from that in 
western countries, understanding the impact of political turnover on finance and innovation 
nexus in China can enrich the literature on political uncertainty and innovation, which also 
shows China’s unique political mechanism through which how corporate innovation is affected. 
The main firm-level data I used in the thesis is mainly from the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS) of China which is an official administration department directly controlled by 





comprehensive dataset of Chinese firms. Specifically, The dataset records the information on 
all ‘above-scale’ enterprises which have annual sales of more than 5 million CNY, including 
financial data, establishment years, registration type, etc. From 1998 to 2014, the raw dataset 
records the information on more than 4.5 million observations covering about 1.1 million firms. 
In the dataset, approximately 95% of firms are unlisted and only 5% are listed. Using the 
microeconomic-level data provided by the dataset has many advantages. First, aggregation 
problems in estimation results can be eliminated. Second, since the NBS is the central 
department to carry out the national statistics, the potential manipulation by local authorities 
could be avoided. Third, firm heterogeneity can be considered by using a large sample of firms 
across the whole nation. We also collect the related data used in the thesis from the State 
Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), the Chinese Research Data Services (CRDS), the China 
Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR), the China Statistical Yearbook, the China 
City Statistical Yearbook, etc. 
The structure of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 explores whether firms’ 
innovation activities is affected by increased industry competition in China. Chapter 3 
investigates the role of government subsidies in firms’ innovation activities in China. Chapter 
4 tests how local political turnovers affect the finance and innovation nexus in China. Chapter 
5 concludes. 
Chapter 2 





China’s innovation hurdle: competition and finance 
 
Using a panel of 555,124 industrila firms from 1998 to 2007, this study investigates the extent 
to which industry competition affects firms’ innovation activities in China. We find that firm-
level innovation is negatively related to industry competition, and the negative relation is 
stronger in higher external finance dependence (EFD) industries. Further evidence shows that 
the enhanced negative effect in higher EFD industries is more pronounced for financially 
constrained firms compared to financially healthier counterparts. To mitigate endogeneity 
concerns and identify the causality between innovation and competition, we exploit the 
exogenous shift on industrial openness for foreign investments in a difference-in-differences 
(DID) setting due to China’s WTO accession in 2001. Our findings suggest that firms in 
industries with a reduction in foreign investment restrictions are less likely to innovate. The 
results are robust to the use of various specifications and estimation methods. Our paper 













China’s economic rise in the past thirty years has been mainly driven by investment 
and a global trade surplus, displaying some shortcomings, such as low quality, low profits, and 
high pollution. A large number of firms have grown up by following opportunistic strategies 
and focusing on short-term profits, such as diversifying into unrelated industries, which 
discourages their innovation investment (Rong et al., 2017). There is now concern about 
China’s sustainable economic growth. Moving into an innovation-driven growth model has 
been prioritizing. China has launched many top-down innovation-related policies (Chen & 
Naughton, 2016).8  While innovation in China has made tremendous strides,9  it still faces 
various challenges to catch up with developed countries in respect of core technologies. For 
example, statistics show that in 2015 the number of researchers per 1,000 employees in China 
was only 2.09. This figure is lower than the average value (8.29) of all members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and that of most 
developing economies such as Argentina (2.93), Poland (3.61), and Latvia (4.07). Regarding 
its number of triadic patent families, in 2015 China had 2,889 and was far behind most of the 
developed economies such as the EU (13,599), the US (14,886), and Japan (17,360).10 To shed 
light on the understanding of China’s innovation challenge, in this study, we investigate the 
                                                             
8 For instance, the State Council of China put forward a ‘National Program for Long- and Medium-Term Scientific 
and Technological Development’ in 2006. To fight against the slowing economic growth rate, the Chinese 
government adopted a ‘Made in China 2025’ strategy in 2015 to promote innovation. Innovation is later 
emphasized as the key engine for China’s sustained economic growth in the 13th Five-Year Plan in March 2016. 
9 According to OECD reports (2018), China’s gross spending on research and development (R&D) increased from 
0.725% of GDP (1991) to 1.445% (2008) and even to 2.118% (2016). China’s total gross spending on R&D in 
2016 is 411,993 million US dollars, which is higher than that of most of the developed economies, including the 
EU (350,297 million US dollars) but only lower than that of the US (464,324 million US dollars). In addition, the 
OECD (2017) shows that China’s business enterprise R&D expenditure dramatically increased from 19,030 
million US dollars (2000) to 305,501 million US dollars (2015).  
10 These disadvantages suggest a low return on R&D spending in China and a weak input-output efficiency of 
China’s innovation activities. 
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extent to which industry competition affects firms’ innovation activities.11 Furthermore, we 
explore two important financial channels [industry-level external finance dependence (EFD) 
and firm-level financing constraints] through which industry competition challenges firms’ 
innovation activities. 
Dating back to at least as far as Schumpeter (1943), the literature documents that 
competition is one of the crucial factors that drive innovation (e.g., Blundell et al., 1999; 
Hashmi, 2013). However, the relationship between innovation and competition seems to be 
contradicted by empirical evidence.  Aghion et al. (2005) argue that the relationship between 
innovation and competition depends on the level of competition. Specifically, they show the 
two effects operating step by step. At the first step, in ‘neck-and-neck’ sectors when market 
competition is not severe, the ‘escape-competition effect’ dominates. Thus, innovation rises 
with more competition. In the second step, in ‘laggard-and-laggard’ (or ‘less neck-and-neck’) 
sectors when market competition is intense, the ‘selection effect’ or ‘Schumpeterian effect’ 
dominates. Therefore, more competition decreases innovation. 
 In China, there has been a considerable change in the intensity of industrial competition. 
Before 1978, Chinese firms faced less market competition due to the domination of the state-
owned capital market, the mandatory planning economy, and the seclusion policy. Many 
central policies had been issued over time, including the policy of ‘reform and opening-up’ in 
1978, and the State Council guidelines in 2005 and 2010, not only greatly spurred China’s 
economic development but also increased competition by promoting different types of 
ownership structures e.g., the “Hybrid Sector” firms (Allen et al., 2015). 12  Increased 
competition is also a result of low barriers to entry (Allen et al., 2015). Allen et al. (2005) show 
                                                             
11 A growing body of literature has explored the factors driving innovation from various perspectives, e.g. the role 
of finance, law and governance (Acharya & Subramanian 2009; Acharya & Xu, 2017; Shen & Zhang, 2018). 
12 According to Allen et al. (2015), the hybrid sector includes all non-state and non-listed firms. 
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that there exist shadow methods for new firms to reduce barriers to entry in China. Djankov et 
al. (2002) point out that China is a counter-example to most of the literature, which suggests 
that countries with less democratic and more government control are likely to have onerous 
regulations of entry for new firms. However, China has much lower entry barriers compared 
to other countries with similar stages of development. As a result, a surge in private and foreign 
ownership, and the ownership stake of local governments dramatically increased the intensity 
of market competition in China’s manufacturing sector. 13  According to our data sample, 
China’s average degree of industry competition measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index 
(HHI) during the sample period from 1998 to 2007 is 98.48%, while the corresponding value 
in the US during the approximately same period 1997-2008 is only 77.9% (Hoberg et al., 2014). 
Hashmi (2013) finds that a median value for competitive intensity measured by the Lerner 
Index (LI) based on a sample of UK firms from 1976 to 2007 is 76%, while the corresponding 
value for our data sample from 1998 to 2007 is 94.92%. Therefore, given the excessive 
competition faced by Chinese firms, it is vital to explore the extent to which industry 
competition affects corporate innovation in China. 
To date, most of the studies on the relationship between competition and innovation 
mainly focus on western developed countries (Blundell et al., 1999; Aghion et al., 2005; 
Hashmi, 2013) while little is known about China. Will the relationship between competition 
and innovation in China be different from those in western countries? Answering this question 
might help develop a better understanding of barriers to China’s innovation. Given the 
                                                             
13  The increased intensity of China’s market competition can be reflected by a big rise in the number of 
corporations. For instance, according to the statistics of the National Bureau Statistics of China 
(http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01&zb=A010401&sj=2005), the number of corporate units 
increased sharply from 6,517,670 in 2010 to 18,097,682 in 2017 and the number of private corporate units 
increased from 5,126,438 in 2010 to 16,204,143 in 2017.  
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important role of innovation in shaping growth strategies in emerging markets and the dramatic 
change in market competition in China, this issue deserves in-depth investigation. 
In this study, we focus on a large dataset over the period 1998-2007 compiled by the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China. This sizeable and unbalanced panel of 1,957,772 
observations covers 555,124 Chinese firms in all 39 manufacturing, mining, and public utility 
sectors in 31 provinces (or province-equivalent municipalities). To measure firms’ innovation 
activities, we use the ratio of firms’ new product output values to their total assets. To compute 
the intensity of industry competition we use four measures: the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI), the Entropy Index (EI), the Lerner Index (LI)/Profit-Cost Margin (PCM), and the 
natural logarithm of the number of firms (FI). We find that firms’ innovation activities are 
discouraged in sectors where competition becomes more intense. Specifically, our main 
regressions show that a 10% increase in industry competition reduces the probability that a 
firm innovates by between 0.12% and 3.49% and reduces innovation output by between 0.03% 
and 0.92% for innovative firms, depending on which measure of competition we use. 
Unlike western developed countries, which are characterized by a well-developed 
financial system, imperfections in China’s capital market might further jeopardize China’s rise 
in innovation by restricting funding on firms’ research and development (R&D). In this study, 
we further exploit two important financial channels through which industry competition deters 
corporate innovation: industry-level external finance dependence and firm-level financing 
constraints. We find that the negative effect of competition on innovation is significantly 
stronger for firms in more externally dependent industries. Furthermore, we find that the 
moderating effect played by EFD is more pronounced for financially constrained firms: private 
firms, small firms, young firms, firms without state shares, and firms in the central and western 
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regions. Financially constrained firms rely more on internal finance to fund their innovation 
activities and exhibit a higher sensitivity of R&D investment to cash flow. 
A major challenge in the innovation literature is that innovation is likely endogenous 
with companies and local market conditions due to reverse causality, omitted variables, and 
potential measurement errors in empirical research. For example, the firms’ decision to enter 
an industry and invest in innovation could be endogenous and deterred by a high technology 
gap, and/or the risks and the costs associated with innovation activities. Thus, a correlation 
between competition and innovation might not prove highly informative about a causal link 
running from the former to the latter. In the absence of clear identification, the results of prior 
research are difficult to reach a consensus of the causality. To overcome the endogeneity 
concerns as mentioned above and gain a clearer understanding of this issue, we improve the 
identification strategy by exploiting an exogenous shock to competitive intensity. After China’s 
accession into (WTO) in December 2001, the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) of China revised its ‘Catalog for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries’ (the 
Catalog) in 2002 to comply with the WTO regulations (the commitments of industrial openness 
to foreign investment). The catalogue revision is plausibly exogenous to industry competition 
by encouraging/restricting foreign investment. In this quasi-natural experiment, we find that in 
response to the catalogue revision in 2002, firms in sectors where restrictions on foreign 
investment were lifted (the treatment group) reduced their innovation output more than firms 
in sectors with unchanged or more restrictions on foreign investment (the control group). This 
finding confirms our hypothesis according to which more competition (associated with a lifting 
of restrictions on foreign investment) decreases firms’ innovation output. The magnitudes of 
our difference-in-differences (DID) results suggest that firms in the automobile manufacturing 
sector (the treatment group) were about 6.64% less likely to innovate than firms in the metal 
ship manufacturing sector (the control group) from the pre- to post-revision periods. Besides, 
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innovation output for the former was about 3.04% lower than the latter following the exogenous 
catalogue revision in 2002, which was associated with a shift in industry competitive intensity. 
Further tests show that the impact is enhanced in industries that are more dependent on external 
finance. 
Still, we further address endogeneity concerns by employing an instrumental variable 
(IV) approach. We construct a time-varying industry-specific instrument for industry 
competition and investigate its impact on R&D activities. Specifically, using the number of 
application procedures that a firm has to go through to enter a particular four-digit sector as the 
instrumental variable for the intensity of industry competition, we confirm a causal and 
negative effect of industry competition on innovation activities.14 
Our results are also robust to the use of various specifications and estimation methods. 
First, to control for potential measurement errors of innovation, we use the number of firms’ 
patent applications and the ratio of firms’ R&D expenditure to their total assets as alternative 
measures of firms’ innovation activities in estimations. Second, to mitigate concerns about 
omitted factors that may explain firms’ innovation activities, we include contemporaneous 
terms of independent variables in the main regression equations to estimate again. Third, using 
aggregate industry-level data, we extend our sample period covering from 2001 to 2016 and 
also find a negative relationship between industry competition and industry-level innovation. 
Fourth, we re-examine the nonlinearity between competition and innovation in China. We do 
not find any evidence for the inverted-U relationship as in Aghion et al. (2005). Indeed, China’s 
manufacturing sector is dominated by laggard firms with high competition. Fifth, we break 
down the national market into eight regional markets classified by the Chinese government in 
                                                             
14  As defined by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, there are four levels in the China Industry 
Classification System (GB/T). 
Chapter 2 
China’ innovation hurdle: competition and finance 
31 
 
estimations to account for the influence of local protectionism. Finally, we find that the results 
are qualitatively unchanged when we use the random-effects Probit model, measure 
competitive intensity based on the two-digit or three-digit sector codes, balance our sample 
data, cluster standard errors by industries rather than firms, use time-series industry-level EFD 
and firm-level EFD. 
Our paper has the contributions as follows. First, our paper contributes to the literature 
that study industry competition and corporate innovation. The majority of empirical studies 
find a positive relationship between competition and innovation based on Western developed 
countries, such as the US context (Schumpeter, 1943; Blundell et al., 1999) and the UK context 
(Nickell, 1996). Additionally, Aghion et al. (2005) show that there is an inverted-U relationship 
between competition and innovation in the UK market. Hashmi (2013) re-examines the 
inverted-U in the US market and finds a significantly negative relationship between 
competition and innovation, while the magnitude of the relationship is small. He attributes the 
mildly negative relationship to that US manufacturing firms are technologically less ‘neck-and-
neck’ than their UK counterparts. Unlike prior research, our project adds to this literature by 
providing empirical support for the ‘Schumpeterian effect’ (‘laggard-and-laggard’) that 
dominates in the largest emerging market economy around the world, namely China. 
Second, unlike most of the aforementioned papers, our paper is the first to use a large 
number of industrial firms which are mainly unlisted to explore the impact of competition on 
innovation. It is distinct from but also complementary to previous literature, which focuses on 
listed firms (Blundell et al., 1999; Aghion et al., 2005; Hashmi, 2013). Yet, a relatively small 
number of listed firms are not representative and are likely to suffer from serious sample 
selection bias, which may overlook the impact of competition on innovation. Besides, listed 
firms are less likely to have financing constraints compared to small and medium-sized 
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enterprises (SMEs), which is also neglected by previous studies. Based on a large panel which 
consists largely of SMEs and unlisted firms (approximately 95%), we provide new evidence 
that there is a negative relationship between competition and innovation given by the 
increasingly severe competition that characterizes the fast growth of emerging economies’ 
manufacturing industries. Additionally, we explore the heterogeneous effect of competition on 
innovation across different firms’ characteristics including ownership, size, age, state shares, 
and location. Such analysis could not only provide researchers microeconomic evidence for the 
debate on the competition-finance-growth nexus but also can help corporations and 
policymakers fully understand the economic consequences of competition and finance and then 
provide more guidance on how to stimulate innovation in an emerging market economy. 
Third, the paper also enriches the literature on firm innovation in China. Prior research 
has been explored various factors in the context of innovation in China, such as institutional 
ownership (Rong et al., 2017), R&D subsidies (Boeing, 2016), total factor productivity (Boeing 
et al., 2016), and intellectual property rights protections (Fang, et al., 2017). Our paper, 
however, suggests that intense competition and capital market imperfections also jeopardize 
China’s rise in innovation. We believe that these are important factors that have been 
overlooked by prior research.   
Fourth, our study contributes to the literature by providing evidence on a link between 
the real economy and the financial sector and offering insights into the real effects of 
competition and finance on innovation. For the first time in the Chinese context, we extend the 
existing research by investigating two important financial channels (industry-level external 
finance dependence and firm-level financing constraints) through which industry competition 
deters corporate innovation. Given the significant capital market imperfections characterizing 
it, China’s financial system has limitations to promote economic growth, which could be a 
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challenge to China’s innovation. This research contributes to the understanding of China’s 
unconventional growth path. Additionally, our paper complements the literature on how 
financial conditions affect firms’ investment decisions (Fazzari et al., 1988; Rajan & Zingales, 
1998). 
Fifth, our study provides clear identification of a causal effect of competition on 
innovation by setting up a quasi-experiment based on a plausibly exogenous shift in industrial 
openness to foreign investment and using a time-varying industry-specific instrument for 
industry competition. Based on our empirical findings, we push the causality debate one step 
further by finding evidence for channels through which competition and finance affect 
innovation. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we develop testable 
hypotheses. In Section 2.3 we construct our key variables. In Section 2.4 we describe our 
dataset and report summary statistics. In Section 2.5 we illustrate our model specifications. In 
Section 2.6 we discuss our main empirical results. In Sections 2.7 and 2.8 we show further 
robustness tests and extensions. In Section 2.9 we conclude. 
 
2.2. Developing hypotheses 
In this section, we develop three testable hypotheses based on economic theories and 
empirical findings. First, we examine whether there is a relationship between industry 
competition and firms’ innovation activities in China. As industry competition increases, do 
firms’ innovation activities decrease or increase? Second, we test the extent to which industry 
external finance dependence affects the relationship between competition and innovation. 
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Third, we study whether firms’ financing constraints influence the effect of competition on 
their innovation activities in China.  
2.2.1. General industry competition hypothesis 
Over 40 years of economic reform and rapid expansion of a market economy in China, 
there has been a tremendous surge in the number of corporations (especially a “Hybrid Sector”) 
aggressively competing for profits because of lower entry barriers for new firms (Allen et al., 
2015). Therefore, the Chinese market has been characterized by intense competition (Wu, 
2012). According to the ‘Schumpeterian effect,’ excessive competition decreases firms’ short-
term profits from catching up with the leader, which imposes short-term pressure on managers 
and negatively affects the internal finance available for innovation investment. Due to short-
termism and myopic investment behaviour (Bushee, 1998), firms in competitive industries 
prefer investments that can generate short-term earnings to long-term and uncertain 
investments such as R&D activities (Aghion et al., 2013). Furthermore, according to Bernanke 
and Gertler (1989), a decrease in the short-run profits reduces firms’ value, e.g., net asset value. 
Net asset value is inversely related to the external finance premium that firms face since net 
assets are perceived as collateral to guarantee future loan payments. Thus, when market 
competition becomes intense firms may have to forego long-term innovation investment as 
managers have to face higher costs of external financing (Holmstrom, 1989; Brown et al., 2009). 
Firms in competitive industries, e.g., in the manufacturing sector, have to innovate less because 
of a lack of internal and external capital available for their R&D investments. We, therefore, 
hypothesize as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Industry competition is negatively related to firms’ innovation activities in China.  
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2.2.2. Industry external finance dependence hypothesis 
According to Hypothesis 1, severe competition in China’s market adversely affects both 
internal and external finance for firms’ innovation activities. Such an impact could differ for 
firms with different needs for external finance. Firms in industries with higher EFD may 
become more vulnerable for two reasons. First, these firms have insufficient internal capital 
and rely more on external capital to fund their R&D activities. These firms tend to have higher 
gearing ratios because of their large demand for external finance, even if they face a higher 
premium of external finance caused by increased competition. According to the trade-off 
theory, higher gearing ratios can lead to high potential bankruptcy and monitoring risks, which 
undermines these firms’ value and further increases their borrowing costs of external funds 
(Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Campbell & Kelly, 1994). Additionally, banks may 
impose pressure on firms with higher gearing ratios, which limits corporate innovation. Second, 
R&D investment opportunities in industries with higher EFD are accompanied by sparse 
information (Hsu et al., 2014). It is more difficult for banks to evaluate these firms’ innovative 
projects due to information problems. This accompanied by insufficient internal capital to 
service debt (Brown et al. 2012) means that banks might refuse to finance innovation 
investments of firms in industries with higher EFD. Consequently, as industry competition 
increases, firms in industries with higher EFD have to reduce investment in long-term and 
uncertain projects such as R&D. In contrast, firms in industries with lower EFD suffer less 
since they do not rely more on external capital. The financial advantage of depending on 
internal capital for firms in industries with lower EFD can alleviate the negative effect of higher 
external finance premiums caused by increased competition. Therefore, we put forward our 
second hypothesis as follows: 
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Hypothesis 2: The negative effect of competition on innovation increases with the degree of 
dependence on external finance.  
2.2.3. Firms’ financing constraints hypothesis 
In principle, firms can choose to finance R&D investment using either internal or 
external finance. Yet, when they are financially constrained, they might not be able to obtain 
credit for investments in innovation. Specifically, financing constraints can cause information 
asymmetries that are associated with innovation and impose financial pressure on firms’ 
managers when it comes to R&D investments. As competition increases, short-termism and 
cost premiums may force financially constrained firms to reduce their R&D investments. To 
smooth R&D investments, R&D-intensive firms with financing constraints may have to rely 
more on their limited internal finance than on external finance, making R&D investment 
sensitive to cash flow. For instance, Lyandres and Palazzo (2016) emphasize the importance 
of financing constraints in explaining the relation between innovative firms’ cash holdings and 
the expected intensity of competition. In contrast, financially healthier firms might have better 
access to bank loans or other forms of external finance for R&D investments. This financing 
advantage can alleviate the negative impact of increased competition on innovation. 
Consequently, financially healthier firms in competitive EFD industries can innovate more than 
financially constrained firms. Therefore, we propose our third hypothesis as follows:    
Hypothesis 3: Financing constraints will tighten the negative impact of competition on 
innovation in industries with greater EFD.   
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2.3. Variable measures 
2.3.1. Measuring innovation 
In this study, we define a firm’s innovation activities as the ratio of new product output 
values to total assets.15 Compared to R&D expenditure, new product output value has two 
advantages. First, it is believed to be a better measure of innovation output and the level of 
efficiency of innovation activities compared to R&D expenditure, which is merely a measure 
of innovation input (Criscuolo et al., 2010). Second, data on R&D expenditure in the sample 
dataset is only available from 2001 to 2007, while data on new product output value is available 
from 1998 to 2007.16 However, we also use the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets and 
the number of patent applications for robustness tests.17 
2.3.2. Measuring competition 
In this study, we construct four measures of industry competitive intensity: the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), the Entropy Index (EI), the Lerner Index (LI)/Profit-Cost 
                                                             
15 In the China Statistical Yearbook (2006), new products are defined as “those new to the Chinese market which 
either adopt completely new significant principles, technologies or designs, or are substantially improved in 
comparison with existing products in terms of performance and functionality, through significant changes in 
structure, materials, design or manufacturing process.” 
16 Data on both new product output values and R&D expenditure are missing for 2004. The results remain 
qualitatively unchanged if we use the average of the values in 2003 and 2005 to impute for these missing data. 
17 Patent applications might not fully reflect the development level of firms’ innovation output in China because 
of the two reasons. First, due to the relatively weak intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection in China and the 
relatively long, complicated, and expensive patenting process, many SMEs might decide not to apply for patents 
to cut costs. Therefore, the percentage of firms filing patent applications is lower (3.24% for our data sample) than 
the percentage of firms with a positive new product output value (6.63% for our data sample). Second, the share 
of invention patents is low (26.52%) compared to those of design patents and utility model patents, although the 
former is better to proxy innovation with novelty.   
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Margin (PCM) and the natural logarithm of the number of firms (FI). These four measures are 
based on GB/T four-digit sector codes. 
2.3.2.1. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
Our first measure of industry competition is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 
which is well-grounded in industrial organization theory, competition law, and antitrust and 
technology management. Specifically, following Nickell (1996) and Cai and Liu (2009), we 
compute the competitive intensity in industry 𝑗 by using one minus the sum of the squares of 
all firms’ market shares in the industry. We define the HHI industry competitive intensity as 
follows: 
                       𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡  [𝐻𝐻𝐼] = 1 − ∑ 𝑆𝑖.𝑗,𝑡
2𝑁𝑗
𝑖=1,𝑖∈𝑗





𝑖=1,𝑖∈𝑗              (2.1) 
where subscript 𝑖 indexes firms, 𝑗 industries, and 𝑡 years (𝑡 = 1998-2007). Thus, 𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
is the market share of firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 in year 𝑡. Market shares are computed based on firms’ 
main business product sales (Cornaggia et al., 2015).18 𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 represents the value of the main 
business product sales of firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 in year 𝑡, and 𝑋𝑗,𝑡 represents the main business 
product sales of all firms in industry j in year t. To build a positive indicator of industry 
competition, we subtract the industry HHI from one. Thus, the HHI index industry competition 
(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡  [𝐻𝐻𝐼]) takes a value between 0 and 1. 0 suggests perfect monopoly (no 
competition) and 1 indicates perfect competition (no monopoly). A higher value of 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡 [𝐻𝐻𝐼] represents a higher degree of industry competition. 
                                                             
18 We also use firms’ total assets to calculate their market shares (Giroud & Mueller, 2010) for a robustness test. 
The estimation results are not reported for brevity but remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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2.3.2.2. Entropy Index (EI) 
Our second measure of industry competition is the Entropy index (EI). Like the HHI, 
the EI is also computed by using firms’ market shares. Compared to the HHI, the EI has three 
unique features. First, it gives more weight to small businesses, and so it sensitively reflects 
the influence of changes in small-scale enterprises in the market. By contrast, the HHI is more 
influenced by large firms (Haushalter et al., 2007). Second, the HHI is an inverse indicator of 
industry competitive intensity, while an industry with a higher value of the EI can be 
understood to be more highly competitive. Third, the distribution range of the HHI is from 0 
to 1, while the EI has no numerical distribution limit. The EI industry competitive intensity is 
calculated as: 
                       𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡  [𝐸𝐼] = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(
1
𝐸






)]                   (2.2) 
2.3.2.3. Lerner Index (LI) or Profit-Cost Margin (PCM) 
Our third measure of industry competition is the Lerner Index (LI) or the Profit-Cost 
Margin (PCM). A firm’s LI is defined as its product’s price minus its marginal costs and then 
divided by the price (Nickell, 1996; Aghion et al., 2005). Following Cai and Liu (2009) and 
Peress (2010), we use the ratio of main operation profits to main operation sales (Profit-Cost 
Margin – PCM) to construct the firm-level 𝐿𝐼 (𝑃𝐶𝑀)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡:        




𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 − 𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
     (2.3) 
To account for the impact of firm size, we subsequently compute the industry-level LI 
(PCM) from the value-weighted (based on market share) average LI (PCM) across firms in an 
industry (Peress, 2010). A higher level of an industry’s LI (PCM) indicates that it has stronger 
market power or a higher concentration ratio (a weaker degree of competition). As with the 
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HHI, to build a positive indicator of industry competitive intensity, we use one minus the 
industry-level LI (PCM) to construct the 𝐿𝐼 (𝑃𝐶𝑀) industry competitive intensity as:19 
                            𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡  [𝐿𝐼 (𝑃𝐶𝑀)] = 1 − ∑ [𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  
𝑁𝑗
𝑖=1,𝑖∈𝑗
∗  𝐿𝐼 (𝑃𝐶𝑀)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡]                (2.4) 
2.3.2.4. Natural logarithm of the number of firms (FI) 
Our fourth measure of industry competition is based on the number of firms in an 
industry (Dixit & Stiglitz, 1977; Cai & Liu, 2009). Specifically, we use the natural logarithm 
of the number of firms to measure the FI industry competitive intensity as: 
                                                                     𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡 [𝐹𝐼] = log (𝑁𝑗,𝑡)                                          (2.5) 
Where 𝑁𝑗,𝑡 is the number of all firms in industry 𝑗 in year 𝑡. Like the EI, the FI also has no 
absolute numerical limit. A higher value of 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡  [𝐹𝐼]  means higher industry 
competitive intensity. 
2.3.3. Measuring industry external finance dependence (EFD) 
Firms in an industry with higher EFD rely more on external funds to finance the tangible 
and intangible investments they desire, including innovation activities. Previous studies show 
that the degree of external finance dependence varies across industries (Rajan & Zingales, 
1998). For example, industries such as electrical machinery are more externally dependent, 
while industries such as tobacco have fewer needs for external funds. To construct industry 𝑗’s 
dependence on external finance (EFD), following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we first compute 
                                                             
19 To assess the robustness of our empirical results, we also divide 1 by the number of firms in an industry and 
then multiply the sum of the LI (PCM) of all firms in the industry to get an equally weighted concentration ratio. 
We subsequently subtract this ratio from 1 to obtain the value of industry competitive intensity (Aghion et al., 
2005). The results are qualitatively the same as those of value-weighted indexes.  
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each firm’s external finance dependence as the fraction of its capital expenditure that is not 
financed through its internal cash flow.20 Next, we construct the median value of the external 
finance dependence for all the firms in industry 𝑗 in year 𝑡 to create a time series of industry 
𝑗’s external finance dependence. Finally, we measure industry 𝑗’s dependence on external 
finance (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗) as the median value of its time series of external finance dependence 
over the period 1998-2007. Like the measures of industry competitive intensity, the calculation 
of industry level of external finance dependence is also based on GB/T four-digit sector codes.  
2.3.4. Measuring financing constraints 
According to the financial constraints hypothesis proposed by Fazzari et al. (1988), the 
high sensitivity of investment to internal funds can be seen as a measure of financing 
constraints. In their influential paper, Fazzari et al. (1988) find that cash flow has a stronger 
impact on investments by low-dividend firms than that by high-dividend firms. They interpret 
this fact as supporting the financing constraints hypothesis since firms that pay low dividends 
are typically smaller and younger, and it is generally difficult or expensive for these firms to 
obtain external financing. Therefore, if cash flow declines for these firms, the investments will 
go down as well. In addition to investigating the link between financing constraints and fixed 
investment, many scholars also extend this method to test for the presence of financial 
constraints on firms’ innovation activities (Brown et al., 2012; Guariglia & Liu, 2014). 
According to this view, R&D investments tend to be constrained by the availability of internal 
finance due to limited collateral and uncertain risk characterizing innovation. Therefore, to test 
Hypotheses 3 about financial constraints, we use the sensitivity of innovation to cash flow to 
                                                             
20 Following Acharya and Xu (2017), we also include R&D expenditure as part of capital expenditure to compute 
an industry’s dependence on external finance for a robustness test. The results (not reported) are qualitatively the 
same as our main findings.  
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measure the degree of financial constraints faced by firms’ innovation activities. Besides, we 
separate firms into different groups based on their a priori likelihood of facing financial 
constraints in the Chinese context. 
First, we differentiate firms through ownership types. We compare state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and private firms since the latter is subject to more financial constraints 
than the former. It could be interpreted as follows. First, in China, the government has much 
control over the allocation of financial resources. Therefore, SOEs can enjoy a preferential 
status when seeking bank loans and other key inputs (Guariglia & Yang, 2016). Second, guanxi 
(political affiliation) is a central idea in every aspect of Chinese society.21 Compared to private 
firms, SOEs are more likely to benefit from guanxi, such as by obtaining tax incentives for 
innovation spending and direct grants, which provides them with more funds to innovate 
(Guariglia & Mateut, 2016). Third, banks in China are mainly controlled by state capital, which 
causes a ‘lending bias’ and ‘institutional discrimination’. Since the late 1990s, the Chinese 
government has used bank credit as a political instrument to support SOEs, which thus absorbs 
three-quarters of bank lending and crowd out private firms’ access to formal bank loans.  
Therefore, in China, given the unique state-dominated financial system, SOEs can gain more 
financing advantages over their private counterparts. Huang (2003) describes this phenomenon 
as a ‘political pecking order’ in China. Compared to SOEs, private firms generally face more 
financial constraints. 
Second, we measure financing constraints by using firms’ size and age. Size and age 
have been commonly used as proxies for financing constraints on R&D investments. First, 
small and young firms are typically characterized by high idiosyncratic risk and high 
                                                             
21 Guanxi means a web of connections in personal or business relations and describes the fundamental dynamic in 
personalized networks of influence. As a crucial informal governance mechanism, guanxi allows firms to make 
more profits. 
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bankruptcy costs, which makes their access to external finance costlier (Guariglia & Yang, 
2016). Second, compared to large and mature firms that enjoy the benefits of economies of 
scale, small and young firms do not have enough physical assets to use as collateral or a 
sufficiently long track record (Coad et al., 2016). Therefore, small and young firms are more 
vulnerable to information asymmetry and not only systematically discriminated by the state-
owned banks but also by other types of formal financing (Ayyagari et al., 2010).  
Third, we measure financing constraints by using firms’ state shares. Firms with more 
state shares are more likely to have connections with governments. For this reason, it is easier 
for these firms with high political affiliation to obtain credit from state-owned banks (Khwaja 
& Mian, 2005; Guariglia et al., 2011). Therefore, firms without state shares are more likely to 
face financing constraints than firms with state shares. 
Last, we investigate this issue by using firms’ locations, as China’s regional financial 
development level is largely unbalanced. Since China’s coastal regions are more financially 
developed than China’s central and western regions, firms in coastal regions can benefit by 
easily obtaining more bank loans and facing fewer financial constraints than ones in central 
and western regions (World Bank, 2006).  
2.4. Data and summary statistics 
2.4.1. Data 
This study uses firm-level production data drawn from the annual accounting reports 
collected and compiled by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) covering the period 
1998-2007.22 The census dataset provides financial information on all ‘above-scale’ Chinese 
                                                             
22 The data up to 2007 are more widely used in research (Guariglia et al., 2011; Brandt et al., 2012; Liu & Qiu, 
2016). The reasons why we only use the data until 2007 are as follows. First, there are some key variables missing 
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industrial enterprises with all types of ownership. The criterion for inclusion in the dataset is 
an annual total main business income (i.e., sales) of more than five million Chinese yuan 
(CNY), nearly 750,000 US dollars. The NBS dataset designates each firm with a legal identifier 
known as the legal person code, which can be used to construct a panel. Approximately 95% 
of the firms in the dataset are unlisted firms, and public firms only account for about 5%.23 
There are four advantages of using the microeconomic-level data provided by this database. 
First, aggregation problems in estimation results can be eliminated. Second, accounting of 
national income from these firms is done by the central NBS, which is advantageous as it can 
avoid potential manipulation by local authorities. Third, we can take firm heterogeneity into 
account using this very large sample of firms. Fourth, the dataset covers more than 90% of all 
Chinese industrial firms’ sales, which can provide a better measure of the degree of industry 
competition in China than the data only on listed firms.  
The original sample contains 2,222,061 observations. To minimize the potential 
influence of outliers, we process the data as follows. First, in 2002 the Chinese central 
government revised its industry classification following the 2001 WTO regulations. 24 
Following the new classification, we match the industry codes and exclude those that 
disappeared or transferred to other non-manufacturing sectors after 2002.25 The firms in the 
                                                             
after 2007. For example, the current-year depreciation is missing from 2008 to 2010 while we need this to calculate 
the corresponding values for cash flow. Second, the threshold for inclusion of ‘above-scale’ enterprises is changed 
by China’s NBS in 2011 from annual sales of more than 5 million to more than 20 million Chinese yuan. Third, 
the financial crisis in the period 2008-2010 could also lead to a potential estimation bias if we add the data of this 
three years. 
23 The NBS dataset does not allow us to separate listed firms from unlisted ones.  
24 For example, some industries are broken down into different industries, while others are merged. A description 
of the 2002 industry classification is available: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgz/tjdt/200207/t20020711_16330.html. 
25 For example, the ‘logging operation industry’ with two-digit code ‘12’ was moved out of mining industries 
after the year 2002. However, the proportion of disappeared or transferred industries is quite low (only 
approximately 0.17% of the sample). 
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final sample operate in 39 GB/T two-digit manufacturing, mining, or public utility sectors and 
across all 31 Chinese provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities.26 Second, following 
Cai and Liu (2009), we delete observations of firms whose main business income is below five 
million Chinese yuan to fit the criterion of ‘above-scale,’ which constitute around 11.0% of the 
sample.27 Third, we drop observations with negative values of sales, total assets minus total 
fixed assets, total assets minus liquid assets, total sales and accumulated depreciation minus 
current depreciation, and also observations without a record of the industry code, ownership 
type or location information, which constitute approximately 0.90%. Fourth, we trim 
observations in the one per cent tails of each of firm-level continuous variables in our main 
regressions to mitigate the potential influence of outliers.28 These processes lead to a final 
unbalanced panel of 1,957,772 firm-level observations covering 555,124 Chinese firms 
between 1998 and 2007.29  All the variables are deflated using the provincial-level gross 
domestic product (GDP) deflators produced by the Chinese NBS.30 
Fig. 2.1 shows time series plots of the mean innovation rates and the average 
competitive intensity measured by the HHI based on GB/T four-digit sector codes over the 
period from 1998 to 2007.31 First, we find that the innovation rate for the full sample is 
                                                             
26 Our data sample does not include firms in Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan. 
27 After 1998, the dataset records non-SOEs with annual sales of more than five million Chinese yuan (all ‘above-
scale’ non-SOEs) and all SOEs. In other words, SOEs that are not ‘above-scale’ are also included. 
28 For new product output value and R&D expenditure, we only trim the tail at 99% because these variables are 
left-censored at zero. Since the number of patent applications is a discrete variable and the share of firms having 
patent applications is quite low (3.24%), we do not trim the number of firms’ patent applications. 
29 Appendix A shows details of the structure of the unbalanced panel.  
30 See Appendix D for the complete definitions of all the variables in this study. All variables (except tangible 
fixed assets) are deflated using the provincial ex-factory producer price indices (a price deflator for fixed capital 
formation), which is obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China. Information on the province-
level GDP deflators can be viewed on the NBS website (http://data.stats.gov.cn/). 
31 The innovation rate is defined as the percentage of firms which have a positive new product output value. The 
rate for 2004 cannot be calculated since there is no record of new product output value for that year. 
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relatively low (an average value of 8.69%). Specifically, it drops from approximately 8.80% in 
1998 to 6.68% in 2003, increases to 10.0% in 2006 and again decreases to 8.54% in 2007.32 
Second, we find that there is an increasing trend in industry competitive intensity from 1998 to 
2007. Specifically, China’s average competitive intensity slightly declines from 1998 to 2000, 
which may have been caused by the 1997 Asian economic crisis, and then starts to increase, 
especially after 2002, which is possibly explained by China’s accession into the WTO in late 
2001. Third, we also find that there is an approximately negative relationship between the 
innovation rate and average competitive intensity, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
[Insert Fig. 2.1 here] 
Next, we find that innovation rates vary substantially between SOEs and private firms. 
SOEs have higher innovation rates than private firms over the whole sample period. A possible 
reason for this is that the former enjoy the privilege of cheap bank loans for innovation input. 
However, we find that private firms have an increasing trend in their innovation rates during 
the sample period, especially after 2003, which may be explained by the rapid growth of 
Chinese private firms with more enthusiasm for innovation. In contrast, SOEs show a 
downward trend in their innovation rates. Therefore, the difference in mean innovation rates 
between SOEs and private firms declines from around 10.93% in 1998 to 3.20% in 2007.  
Fig. 2.2 shows snapshots of the annual innovation rates across different Chinese 
prefecture-level administrative divisions in 1998 and 2007. First, it shows that administrative 
divisions in the central and western regions have higher innovation participation rates.33 This 
                                                             
32 The Dotcom bubble in the late 1990s and the 2007 financial crisis may account for the decrease in innovation, 
and the implementation of government innovation incentive policies in 2003 may explain the short recovery after 
2003. 
33 See Appendix D for details of the region classification and Appendix C for details of the prefecture-level 
innovation distribution in 1998 and 2007. 
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finding is contrary to the conventional view that firms in the eastern regions are more likely to 
innovate. However, the finding is consistent with Hypothesis 1 that more competition 
discourages firms’ innovation activities since the firms in the coastal regions are exposed to 
tougher competition than those located in the central and western regions. Second, we also find 
that innovation rates in most administrative divisions decrease from 1998 to 2007. As Fig. 2.2 
shows, there are 217 prefecture-level administrative divisions, showing decreasing innovation 
rates during this period and only 114 prefecture-level administrative divisions with increased 
rates. This finding is also consistent with Hypothesis 1 that there is a negative relationship 
between competition and innovation since the reduction in innovation rates may be explained 
by an upward trend in industry competitive intensity in China from 1998 to 2007.   
[Insert Fig. 2.2 here] 
Fig. 2.3 presents a plot of annual innovation rates against the four different measures 
of industry competitive intensity based on GB/T four-digit sector codes. We find that there is 
a notable decreasing tendency in innovation rates as competition increases. There is a 
significant and negative association between innovation rates and competition at the 1% level, 
regardless of the measure of competition.34 The finding is in line with Hypothesis 1, according 
to which innovation drops with an increase in competition.  
[Insert Fig. 2.3 here] 
                                                             
34 We also find a significantly negative relationship between innovation rates and competitive intensity based on 
GB/T two-digit codes and three-digit codes, which is not reported for brevity. See Appendix B for details of mean 
innovation rates and competitive intensity across GB/T Two-digit industries. 
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2.4.2. Summary statistics 
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics (sample means and medians) of the main 
variables for the full sample, firms with/without innovation activities (with/without positive 
new product output values), SOEs, and private firms. 35  The number of observations of 
innovative firms (60,255) is around one-tenth that of non-innovative firms (633,493), which 
suggests a low level of innovation participation for firms in China. Besides, there are 260,919 
private firm-year observations compared to 66,978 SOE firm-year observations.  
[Insert Table 2.1 here] 
It is clear that firms with positive new product output values have a greater number of 
patent applications and a higher ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets. Non-innovative firms 
face stiffer competition than innovative firms regardless of the measure of industry competition. 
Specifically, the four measures of industry competition for firms without innovation output are 
HHI 98.52%, EI 5.81, LI (PCM) 94.95% and FI 6.89, which are significantly greater than the 
levels for firms with innovation output [HHI 98.05%, EI 5.46, LI (PCM) 94.64% and FI 6.60]. 
This finding is in line with Hypothesis 1. The lower values of industry external finance 
dependence and the cash flow to total assets ratio for innovative firms (averages of 57.13% and 
7.91%, respectively) may be explained by the fact that innovative firms in China spend more 
internal finance and rely less on external finance to support their capital expenditure.  
For the different measures of financial constraints, we observe that innovative firms 
generally are larger (with average total assets of 365.13 million yuan), more mature (with an 
average age of 17.52 years) and have a greater percentage of state shares (16.46%) than non-
                                                             
35 We summarize the number of observations estimated into regressions. This is the reason that the number of 
total observations is 693,748 in Table 2.1 for 289,738 firms. If we summarize the number of all observations in 
the panel (1,957,772) for 555,124 firms, the findings keep qualitatively consistent. 
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innovative firms (whose corresponding figures are 83.68 million yuan, 11.70 years and 9.08%). 
These differences can be partly explained by the fact that large firms, mature firms, and firms 
with more state shares tend to face fewer financial constraints and so have more resources to 
invest in innovation. Our findings are consistent with Ayyagari et al. (2011) that large and 
mature firms with sufficient resources invest more in innovation that is long-term and has high 
uncertainty.  
In Table 2.1, we also show the differences between SOEs and private firms. Generally, 
private firms have a higher ratio of new product output value (2.89%) and a lower ratio of R&D 
expenditure to total assets (0.09%) compared to SOEs, for which the corresponding values are 
2.68% and 0.11%, respectively. This finding shows that SOEs have a relatively lower 
innovation input-output efficiency compared to private firms. The statistic that the number of 
private firms’ patent applications (0.026) is lower than that of SOEs (0.037) may be explained 
by that the patenting process is long and, which might discourage relatively small private firms 
from patenting their innovation. For the different measures of industry competition, we find 
that private firms are more likely to operate in industries with more competitive intensity while 
SOEs tend to operate in less competitive industries. Regarding industry external finance 
dependence, SOEs have higher EFD (65.24%) than private firms (58.46%), which suggests 
that SOEs rely more on external funds to finance their investments. This is possibly due to their 
privilege of being able to obtain cheap loans from state-owned banks.  
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2.5. Model specifications and estimation methodology 
2.5.1. Baseline model specification 
To test the impact of industry competition on firms’ innovation activities, following 
Bond and Meghir (1994), Bond et al. (2003), Brown et al. (2009), we estimate a dynamic Euler 
equation model.36 The structural model “captures the influence of current expectations of future 
profitability on current investment decisions” (Bond et al., 2003), which is less likely to be 
biased by the misspecification due to investment opportunities not properly accounted for in 
investment regressions. We denote a firm’s new product output values to total assets ratio as 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, its sales to total assets ratio as 𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, its cash flow to total assets ratio as 𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 and its 
ratio of new long-term debt to total assets as 𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 .
37 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡 represents industry 
competitive intensity. The equation regressed is: 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +
                              𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 +  𝑉𝑖 + 𝑉𝑡 + 𝑉𝑜 + 𝑉𝑗 + 𝑉𝑟 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡   ,                      (2.6) 
where the subscript i indexes firms, j industries, o ownership, r region and t time (where 
t = 1998-2007). The error terms in Eq. (2.6) are made up of six components. 𝑉𝑖 is a firm fixed 
effect. 𝑉𝑡 is a year fixed effect, which we control by including year dummies capturing time-
varying movements in the aggregate interest cost and the business cycle. 𝑉𝑜 is a set of five 
dummy variables to control for firm ownership status, with an SOE dummy being the 
benchmark (Cai & Liu, 2009).38 To capture the industry effect and the location effect, we also 
                                                             
36 This Euler equation model is a modified version of the fixed investment specification used by Whited (1992) 
and Bond et al. (2003).  
37 New long-term debt is the difference between long-term debt in the current year and the previous year.  
38 Firm ownership categories are defined according to the majority (at least 50%) of a firm’s total capital paid in 
by six different types of agents. Specifically, we partition our firms into state-owned enterprises (SOEs); foreign 
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construct an industry-specific component (𝑉𝑗 )
39  and a location-specific component (𝑉𝑟 )
40 . 
Finally, 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term.  
According to Hypothesis 1, the marginal effect of industry competitive intensity (𝛽6) 
should be negative. A significant and negative 𝛽6  suggests that industry competition will 
discourage innovation. As regards the other variables, the structural model implies that the 
marginal effect of 𝛽1 should be positive, and under the assumption of quadratic adjustment 
costs in the Euler equation, the marginal effect of 𝛽2 should be negative. The marginal effect 
of the lagged sales-to-total assets ratio (𝛽3) should be negative under perfect competition.
41  
Besides, under the assumption that cash flow does not pick up investment opportunities, if there 
is an indicator of the presence of internal financing constraints 𝛽4 should be positive (Fazzari 
et al., 1988). Specifically, 𝛽4 should be greater for firms facing more financial constraints than 
for firms facing fewer financial constraints. 𝛽5  should be insignificant, or its magnitude should 
be lower than that of cash flow because firms prefer internal finance to external finance.  
                                                             
firms; Hong Kong, Macao & Taiwan firms (HMT firms); private firms; collective firms; and mixed-ownership 
firms.  
39 We use GB/T two-digit sector codes rather than four-digit sector codes as industry dummy variables to control 
for industry fixed effects. This is because of the limitation of statistical software packages when we estimate a 
random-effects Tobit model for such a large sample of approximately 700,000 observations. However, we find 
the results are quantitatively similar and qualitatively consistent if we use a pooled Tobit estimator based on the 
three-digit and four-digit sector codes.  
40 The location dummy variables are based on eight economic regions administered by the State Council of China: 
Northern Coastal (Shandong, Hebei, Beijing, and Tianjin), Southern Coastal (Guangdong, Fujian, and Hainan), 
Eastern Coastal (Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang), North Eastern (Liaoning, Heilongjiang, and Jilin), Mid-
Yangtze Range (Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Anhui), Mid-Huanghe Range (Shaanxi, Henan, Shanxi and Inner 
Mongolia), South Western (Guangxi, Yunnan, Sichuan, Chongqing, and Guizhou) and North Western (Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang). 
41 Our results are robust to using sales growth instead of the sales-to-total assets ratio to proxy for investment 
opportunities.  
Chapter 2 
China’ innovation hurdle: competition and finance 
52 
 
2.5.2. Specification with industry external finance dependence (EFD) 
To test Hypothesis 2, following Hsu et al. (2014) and Acharya and Xu (2017), we 
augment Eq. (2.6) by including the interaction term between the industry EFD variable 
(𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗) and the competition variable (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1) to get Eq. (2.7) as follows:
42  
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 
           𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 + 
                                 𝛽8𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 + 𝑉𝑖 + 𝑉𝑡 + 𝑉𝑜 + 𝑉𝑗 + 𝑉𝑟 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡                                (2.7)                              
In accordance with Hypothesis 2, the marginal effect of 𝛽7  should be significant and 
negative. A significant and negative 𝛽7 suggests that the negative effect of competition on 
innovation increases with the degree of dependence on external finance. We expect that 
increased industry competition can discourage firms’ innovation activities more in industries 
with higher EFD because these firms’ demand for external capital cannot be satisfied.  
2.5.3. Estimation methodology 
One significant feature of the data is that a large number of firms do not have a positive 
new product output value. Thus the dependent variable in our study is censored at zero. To 
consider this censored distribution and yield consistent results, we use the Tobit estimator and 
report marginal effects (percentage change effects) rather than coefficients. Positive marginal 
effects suggest an increase in the probability that a firm will innovate and an increase in the 
                                                             
42 Theoretically, if we control for an industry effect (𝑉𝑗) we cannot include the single term of the EFD variable 
(𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗) in Eq. (2.7) because otherwise, it would cause a collinearity bias. However, since we choose the 
GB/T two-digit sector codes instead of the GB/T four-digit sector codes as industry dummy variables, we can 
have the single term (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗) in our regressions.  
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new product output value. There are three types of marginal effects in the Tobit model.43 
Because the sign and significance of the three types of marginal effects are all consistent, we 
only report marginal effects in the quantity of truncated data to show the effect of a unit change 
in industry competition on innovation for firms with a positive new product output value. 
Furthermore, to account for firm heterogeneity, we use the random-effects Tobit estimator in 
the regressions to remove any unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level. Standard errors are 
also robust to heteroscedasticity, and we cluster them at the firm level.44  
 
2.6. Empirical results 
2.6.1. Competition and innovation 
To test Hypothesis 1, columns (1) to (4) in Table 2.2 show the estimation results using 
the baseline Eq. (2.6) with the random-effects Tobit estimator. Columns (1) to (4) correspond 
to the different measures of industry competition, i.e., the HHI, the EI, the LI (PCM) and, the 
FI. We find that the marginal effects (quantity effects) associated with the variable 
(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1) are all negative [HHI -9.157%, EI -0.322%, LI (PCM) -4.952% and FI -
0.266%] and significant at the 1% level, regardless of which measure of industry competition 
is used. These results suggest that an increase in industry competition decreases firms’ new 
                                                             
43 The first is a probability effect that is the marginal effect of the explanatory variables on the probability that a 
firm will have a positive new product output value. The second is a quantity effect that is the marginal effect of 
the independent variables on a firm’s expected new product output value, given that the observations are truncated, 
which excludes the observations without a positive new product output value. The third is a quantity effect that is 
the marginal effect of the independent variables on a firm’s expected new product output value, given that the 
observations are censored, which include all observations with/without a positive new product output value.  
44 We also use the Pooled Tobit estimator for a robustness test, and the results are consistent with our main 
empirical findings. For brevity, we do not report them. 
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product output values. To be precise, a 1% increase in 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 is associated with a 
decrease of 0.092% (HHI), 0.003% (EI), 0.050% (LI) and 0.003% (FI) in 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 for innovative 
firms. As regards the probability effects (not reported), an increase in industry competition 
significantly decreases the probability that a firm innovates. Specifically, a 1% increase in 
industry competition leads to a decrease of 0.349% (HHI), 0.014% (EI), 0.319% (LI), and 0.012% 
(FI) in the probability that a firm will have a positive new product output value. These results 
confirm Hypothesis 1, according to which increased competition in Chinese manufacturing 
sectors has a ‘Schumpeterian effect’ that leads to a reduction in firms’ innovation activities.  
[Insert Table 2.2 here] 
Our results show that the marginal effects associated with 𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1  are significantly 
positive at the 1% level. Specifically, the marginal effect of 𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1  is 1.934%, 1.929%, 
1.869%, and 1.927% in columns (1) to (4), respectively, suggesting that Chinese firms’ 
innovation outputs are constrained by the availability of internal cash flow. This finding reveals 
that Chinese firms rely significantly on internal capital to smooth innovation, given the limited 
collateral value and the high uncertainty risk characterizing innovation.  
For the other control variables, we observe that the marginal effects of 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1  are 
significantly positive at the 1% level. The magnitudes of the marginal effects are close to 50%, 
reflecting the persistence of Chinese firms’ innovation activities given the long-term cycle and 
high adjustment costs of innovation. The marginal effects associated with 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
2  are 
significantly negative at the 1% level, remaining consistent with the theoretical equation. The 
negative signs of the marginal effects of 𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1  show that Chinese firms are less likely to 
innovate as their market shares expand. This finding may indicate that Chinese firms have 
short-sighted behaviour. Next, the marginal effects of 𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1  are poorly determined, 
Chapter 2 
China’ innovation hurdle: competition and finance 
55 
 
showing that long-term debt is not a preferred financial channel for Chinese firms’ innovation 
activities. 
2.6.2. Industry external finance dependence 
To test Hypothesis 2, columns (5) to (8) of Table 2.2 present the random-effects Tobit 
estimates of Eq. (2.7), which includes the interaction term ( 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 ). Regardless of the measure of industry competition, we observe that the 
estimated marginal effects of the interaction term are significantly negative: HHI -2.487%, EI 
-0.474%, LI (PCM) -2.241%, and FI -0.437%. These results mean that 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 increases 
the negative impact of  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1  on 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 . Specifically, a rise of one standard 
deviation in 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 is associated with an increase of HHI 0.313%, EI 0.060%, LI (PCM) 
0.281%, and FI 0.055% in the negative marginal effect of 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1  on 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 .
45 
Alternatively, for competition measured by the HHI, if the value of EFD increases from its 25th 
percentile (47.9%) to its 75th percentile (69.0%), the marginal effect of 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1   on 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 increases by 0.525% [=2.487% * (69.0% - 47.9%)].
46 The estimation results support 
Hypothesis 2 according to which an increase in industry competition restrains innovation 
activities more in industries with higher EFD. Additionally, we find that the marginal effects 
of the single term 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1  become less significant, which is not particularly 
                                                             
45 For example, if industry competitive intensity is measured with the HHI, when 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 increases by one 
standard deviation (12.6%), the negative marginal effect of 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 on 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  rises by 0.313% (=12.6% 
* 2.487%).  
46 As regards to probability effects (not reported), marginal effects of the interaction term are also significantly 
negative: HHI -4.061%, EI -0.772%, LI (PCM) -3.662%, and FI -0.710%, suggesting that 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 increases 
the negative effect of competition on the probability that a firm will innovate. 
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interesting given that the main effect of 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 only applies when 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 
equals zero. The same applies to the single term of 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗. 
The estimates of the other variables are similar to those in columns (1) to (4). The 
marginal effects of 𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 are significantly positive and the marginal effects of 𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 are 
insignificant. These results indicate that firms’ innovation activities are constrained by the 
availability of internal finance rather than external finance, and internal finance is the preferred 
source for supporting Chinese firms’ innovation investments. 
2.6.3. Effects of ownership and heterogeneity on firms’ financing constraints  
Given the capital market imperfections characterizing China, Chinese firms generally 
face a high premium for external finance. For instance, private firms, small and young firms 
face a high degree of financing constraints due to the ‘lending bias’ problem in China. To 
smooth R&D investment, these firms have to rely extensively on internal finance for R&D 
investments.  
To test Hypothesis 3, we first compare SOEs with private firms because in China 
private firms are likely to face more financial constraints than SOEs. Table 2.3 presents the 
estimates of Eq. (2.7) for SOEs and private firms. We find that the marginal effects of the 
interaction term (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗) are significantly negative for both SOEs 
and private firms, while their magnitudes are greater for private firms than for SOEs, regardless 
of the measure of competition.47 Specifically, in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8), the marginal 
effect of the interaction term for private firms is HHI -3.327%, EI -0.514%, LI (PCM) -3.017% 
                                                             
47 In unreported results using the baseline Eq. (2.6) (without the interaction term), we also find that the marginal 
effect of 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1  on 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is more pronounced for private firms and financial constrained firms, i.e. 
private firms, small firms, young firms, firms without state shares, and firms in the central and western regions. 
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and FI -0.441%, while in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) the corresponding figures for SOEs are 
HHI -2.157%, EI -0.495%, LI (PCM) -1.643% and FI -0.404%. We also conduct tests for the 
equality of the means of the interaction term between the two groups of firms, showing all the 
differences are significant at the 1% level. These results confirm Hypothesis 3 according to 
which in industries with higher EFD the negative effect of 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1  on 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  is 
stronger for private firms than for SOEs. These results also suggest that more financial 
constraints faced by private firms further reinforce the negative impact of competition on 
innovation output in China.  
[Insert Table 2.3 here] 
The estimated marginal effects of 𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1  are significant and positive. This finding 
suggests that Chinese manufacturing firms face financing constraints. However, the 
magnitudes of our results suggest that the marginal effect of 𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1   for private firms is 
significantly greater than that for SOEs. Specifically, we find that the marginal effects of 
𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 for private firms range from 2.132% to 2.225% in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8), while 
those for SOEs range from 1.246% to 1.473% in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7). T-tests show the 
differences in 𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 between SOEs and private firms are significant at the 1% level. These 
results suggest that the innovation activities of private firms are likely to face more financing 
constraints than those of SOEs. Due to the ‘lending bias’ and ‘political pecking order’ in 
China’s financial market, private firms face more political obstacles to access external finance 
despite their higher efficiency and faster growth. In contrast, SOEs enjoy more financing 
advantages to alleviate financing constraints.  
Next, we conduct additional tests for Hypothesis 3 by taking firm heterogeneity in the 
degree of financial constraints into account. Specifically, we re-estimate Eq. (2.7) splitting 
firms into sub-samples based on their size, age, state shares, and regions. The criteria for our 
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classification are presented in Appendix D. Table 2.4 shows the corresponding estimation 
results. For brevity, we only report the results with industry competition computed using the 
HHI.48 
[Insert Table 2.4 here]  
Columns (1) to (4) in Table 2.4 present the estimation results based on firms’ size and 
firms’ age. As expected, the magnitudes of the marginal effects of the interaction term 
(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗) for small and young firms are significantly larger (-3.615% 
and -2.602% respectively) than those for large and mature firms (-2.492% and -2.416% 
respectively). Besides, the magnitude of the marginal effects of 𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 is 1.404% for small 
firms and 2.255% for young firms, which are factually greater than the corresponding 
magnitudes for large (1.030%) and mature firms (1.623%). These results are in line with 
Hypothesis 3, suggesting that industry competition reduces innovation activities more for small 
and young firms in industries with higher EFD. Small or young firms are indeed more 
constrained by the availability of internal finance than large or mature firms.49  
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.4 report the results based on firms’ state shares. We 
observe that the magnitude of the marginal effect of the interaction term (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗) for firms without state shares (-2.634%) is significantly greater than that for 
firms with state shares (-1.601%). Moreover, the positive marginal effect of 𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 for firms 
without state shares (1.846%) is significantly larger compared to their counterparts (0.896%), 
                                                             
48 The estimation results are qualitatively the same when industry competition is quantified using the EI, the LI 
(PCM), and the FI separately.  
49 It is also worth noting that the magnitudes of the marginal effects of 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 for small firms (52.184%) and 
young firms (49.224%) are greater than those for large firms (44.866%) and mature firms (46.319%), showing 
more persistence in small and young firms’ innovation activities. 
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suggesting that the availability of internal finance represents a binding constraint for firms 
without state shares. These findings can be interpreted as firms without state shares are more 
likely to face financial constraints. They tend to reduce innovation output more when they face 
greater industry competition in higher EFD industries. By contrast, firms with more state shares 
can ease their financial constraints for their innovation activities by using their political 
connections through e.g. better borrowing conditions, waivers of import tariffs, tax reductions 
(Guariglia et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2013).  
Finally, in columns (7) and (8) of Table 2.4, we further explore the difference between 
firms in the coastal regions and firms in the central and western regions. The magnitude of the 
marginal effect of the interaction term (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗) for firms in the 
central and western regions is significantly larger (-2.648%) than that for firms in the coastal 
regions (-2.229%). Besides, the marginal effect of  𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 is positively higher for firms in the 
central and western regions (1.952%) than for their counterparts in the coastal regions (1.348%). 
These results suggest that the R&D activities of firms in the central and western regions face 
more financing constraints, which tightens the negative impact of competition on innovation. 
These findings may result from the imperfect system of financial development in the central 
and western provinces compared to the relatively well-developed system of financial 
development in coastal provinces. Therefore, firms in the central and western regions have 
difficulties obtaining external loans and face more financial constraints on innovation.  
 
2.7. Endogeneity and robustness tests 
While the above estimation results provide strong support for our hypotheses, there 
might be potential endogeneity issues due to reverse causality, potential measurement errors, 
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and omitted variables. For example, industry competition could be endogenous if firms in an 
industry are inclined to engage in innovation, which might discourage other firms from entering 
the industry due to a high technology gap. In this case, more innovation will lead to less 
industry competition. Although in our baseline regressions we have lagged our independent 
variables, e.g., industry competition, to alleviate the simultaneity issue, in this section, we 
further proceed with several robustness tests to identify the causal relationship between 
industry competition and corporate innovation to mitigate endogeneity concerns.  
2.7.1. Quasi-natural experiment  
To provide clear identification of the causal effect of competition on innovation, we 
further use a quasi-natural experiment by exploiting plausible exogenous shocks to the intensity 
of industry competition in China. In the 1970s, China initiated market-oriented reforms and 
adopted a ‘step-by-step’ approach to opening industry to foreign investments. In 1995, the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of China issued the first version of 
the ‘Catalog of Industries to Guide Foreign Investment.’ As a guide for foreign investment, the 
catalogue specifies sectors with more restrictions on foreign investment and those with fewer 
restrictions. There are four categories of sectors specified in the catalogue: ‘encouraged, 
‘permitted,’ ‘restricted’ and ‘prohibited.’ In 2002, the NDRC of China revised the catalogue in 
compliance with the regulations on China’s WTO accession in December 2001.50 Specifically, 
the number of ‘encouraged’ sectors increased from 186 to 262, and the number of ‘restricted’ 
ones decreased from 112 to 75, which provides exogenous changes to industry competition.51  
This plausible exogenous policy (the revision of the catalogue in 2002) offers us an 
ideal quasi-natural experimental setting because of the shift in competitive intensity for several 
                                                             
50 Fig. 2.1 shows that competitive intensity started to increase dramatically after 2002. 
51 The detailed 2002 revised catalogue can be found at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgsf/chn/kj/zyxx/t38777.htm. 
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industries. We hypothesize that it enhanced industry competition for firms in the sectors with 
a lifting of foreign investment restrictions, as opposed to those in the sectors with unchanged 
or increased restrictions on foreign investment. For example, before 2002 foreign investment 
in automobile manufacturing in China was restricted while after the catalogue revision, it 
became encouraged (although the Company Law still relatively limited the capital contribution 
of foreign partners). As a result, the number of firms in the automobile manufacturing industry 
increases by 170%  from 190 to 516. We choose the automobile manufacturing industry (GB/T 
four-digit code: 3721) as the treatment group, and the metal ship manufacturing industry (GB/T 
four-digit code: 3751) as the control group since foreign investment in this industry remains 
unchanged. Another reason for choosing the metal ship manufacturing sector as the control 
group is that the two sectors share the same two-digit code (37 – manufacture of transport 
equipment), which can address potential confounding effects. We expect a reduction in new 
product output value in the treatment group (automobile manufacturing) and an increase in new 
product output value in the control group (metal ship manufacturing) following the catalogue 
revision in 2002. 
Specifically, we use a difference-in-differences (DID) approach, which allows us to 
examine the extent to which there were changes in the innovation activities of the firms in the 
two groups. We construct a dummy variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 that equals 1 for the treatment group and 0 
for the control group, which captures the difference in 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 before the revision. To control 
for common trends, we define 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 as a time dummy variable that equals one after 2002 and 
0 otherwise, which captures aggregate factors that could cause changes in 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  even in the 
absence of the revision in 2002.52 To identify the causal effect of competition on innovation, 
                                                             
52 To be consistent with our baseline regressions, we lag the time dummy variable (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) to create the variable 
(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1). 
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we construct an interaction term (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1), which captures double differences in 
firms’ innovation output between the treatment group and the control group and between the 
pre-treatment and post-treatment periods. We then revise our baseline Eq. (2.6) by including 
the dummy variable (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡), the time dummy variable (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1) and the interaction term 
(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 ), which produces the following equation:
53  
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 
                                 𝛽6𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑖 + 𝑉𝑜 + 𝑉𝑟 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡    (2.8) 
Table 2.5 gives the results of the DID approach, which are estimates of Eq. (2.8) using 
the random-effect Tobit estimator. Our focus is on the interaction term (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1) 
because it captures the difference-in-differences effect on the changes over time (before and 
after the catalogue revision) in new product output value between firms in the treatment group 
and the control group. Our results in column (1) show that the marginal effect of the interaction 
term (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1) is significantly negative (-3.042%). This means that in response to the 
catalogue revision in 2002, firms in the automobile manufacturing sector reduced their 
innovation output by about 3.042% more than firms in the metal ship manufacturing sector. 
The unreported probability effects of the interaction term ( 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 ) is also 
significantly negative (-6.636%), suggesting that the change in the probability of having 
innovation output from the pre- to post-revision periods was 6.636% lower for firms in the 
automobile manufacturing sector than those in the metal ship manufacturing sector. In line with 
Hypothesis 1, these results suggest that after the catalogue revision in 2002, automobile 
manufacturing firms (the treatment group) had a greater reduction in innovation output than 
                                                             
53 In the regressions, we do not include the year dummy variable (𝑉𝑡) or the industry dummy variable (𝑉𝑗) because 
of collinearity. 
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metal ship manufacturing firms (the control group). This is because of the lifting of foreign 
investment restrictions in the automobile manufacturing sector, which led to greater industry 
competition in the treatment group.  
[Insert Table 2.5 here] 
The results in column (1) also reveal a significantly positive relationship between 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 and between 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1. These results suggest that before the revision, 
automobile manufacturing firms (the treatment group) were more likely to innovate than metal 
ship manufacturing firms (the control group). There is a significant improvement in firms’ 
innovation output over time from the pre- to post-revision periods, even in the absence of the 
revision in 2002. 
The key assumption for the consistency of the DID method is that of parallel trends. 
Economically, this assumption means that in the absence of the treatment, the average change 
in outcomes for both the treatment and control groups should be the same. To this end, in Fig. 
2.4, we plot the average treatment and control response outcomes (innovation rates) from the 
pre- to post-revision periods. Specifically, first, it shows that the treatment group (automobile 
manufacturing, 3721) has higher average outcomes (innovation rates) than the control group 
(metal ship manufacturing, 3751). Second, both groups showed a similar trend in outcomes 
before the revision in 2002. However, after the onset of the catalogue revision in 2002, the 
innovation rate of the control group increased markedly, while that of the treatment group 
substantially decreased. Fig. 2.4 illustrates that our DID method satisfies the parallel trend 
assumption. These results provide more confidence that our DID estimates reflect a real causal 
effect of industry competition on corporate innovation.  
[Insert Fig. 2.4 here] 
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To check internal validity, we also employ a falsification test in which we repeat the 
DID analysis on the pre-revision years. We change the onset year of treatment by defining 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 from 2002 to 2001 to 2000 in Eq. (2.8). In unreported results, we find the estimated 
marginal effects of the interaction term ( 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 ) are no longer statistically 
significant. The falsification test confirms that our estimated DID effect is due to the treatment 
as opposed to some alternative force. 
In column (2) of Table 2.5, we re-estimate Eq. (2.8) for the full sample. We manually 
split the sample into the treatment group (sectors with restrictions on foreign investment lifted 
after 2002) and the control group (sectors with unchanged or more restrictions after 2002). 
Specifically, after 2002 foreign investment restrictions were lifted for 66 GB/T four-digit 
sectors with 296,277 observations. We choose these 66 sectors as the treatment group and the 
other sectors as the control group. To further test Hypothesis 2, in column (3), we include the 
triple interaction term (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 * 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 * 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗) in Eq. (2.8).  
As expected, we find that the marginal effect of the interaction term (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1)  
remains significantly negative (-0.402%) in column (2). This result again shows that firms in 
the treatment group significantly reduced their innovation output compared to those in the 
control group in response to an increase in industry competition due to a lifting of restrictions 
on foreign investments after 2002. Furthermore, in column (3) the marginal effect of the triple 
interaction term (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗) is statistically significant and negative (-
1.945%), suggesting that the catalogue revision in 2002 reduced the innovation output of firms 
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in industries with higher EFD more in the treatment group.54 These results lend credence to 
Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
In summary, our results indicate that following the exogenous policy shock in 2002, 
there was an increase in industry competition and an accompanying reduction in innovation, 
which was, however, restricted to the firms affected (the treatment group). Furthermore, the 
fall in innovation output affected firms in industries with higher EFD more than their 
counterparts in less EFD industries. The most important appeal of our DID approach is that it 
circumvents endogeneity issues by providing a plausible quasi-natural experimental setting. 
First, by providing a comparison with a control group, this approach rules out time-invariant 
unobserved factors in our innovation model, such as investment opportunities. Second, by 
providing a comparison between the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods, this approach 
rules out any common trends affecting both the treatment and control groups. 
2.7.2. Instrumental variable (IV) method  
In this section, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach with the Tobit 
estimator for baseline Eqs. (2.6) and (2.7). The instrumental variable for industry competition 
is the number of application procedures that a firm in China has to go through to enter a GB/T 
four-digit sector (𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃𝑗,𝑡) each year (Cai & Liu, 2009).
55 This instrumental variable (𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃𝑗,𝑡) 
measures the entry barriers in a GB/T four-digit sector imposed by the Chinese government 
each year. The more application procedures that a firm has to go through to enter a sector, the 
                                                             
54 The probability effects of the interaction term (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1) in column (2) is -0.660% and the probability 
effects of the triple interaction term (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗) in column (3) is -3.200%. Both effects 
are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
55 Special thanks go to Yupeng Shi at the Central University of Finance and Economics for providing information 
about the number of application procedures that a firm in China has to go through in order to enter a GB/T four-
digit sector. 
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less competition that the sector faces. This instrumental variable (𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃𝑗,𝑡) can be seen as an 
exogenous regulation of China’s openness for different industries, which is negatively related 
to industry competitive intensity (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡) while it is unlikely to be correlated with 
other variables influencing firms’ innovation activities. Therefore, it satisfies the relevance and 
exclusion conditions. Specifically, we lag 𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃𝑗,𝑡 by one year (𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1) as an instrument for 
industry competitive intensity (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1) in Eqs. (2.6) and (2.7).
56         
Panel A of Table 2.6 shows the IV Tobit estimation results. In columns (1) to (4), we 
instrument for industry competition (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1) with 𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 in Eq. (2.6). We find 
that the results are similar to our baseline findings, although the magnitudes are somewhat 
larger. The marginal effects of the instrumented industry competitive intensity are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In columns (5) to (8), we re-estimate Eq. (2.7) by 
instrumenting for both the competition variable (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1) and the interaction term 
(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 ). In line with Hypothesis 2, we find a significant and 
negative marginal effect of the instrumented interaction term ( 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗) on firms’ innovation activities. We also obtain qualitatively similar results by 
using the IV approach when we test Hypothesis 3, but for brevity, we do not report them. In 
short, using an instrumental variable (𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1) for industry competition (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1) 
confirms our main conclusion that industry competition discourages innovation activities. 
[Insert Table 2.6 here] 
To evaluate the validity of the instrument, in unreported results we also find that there 
is a significantly negative relationship between 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 and 𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 in our first-
                                                             
56 For the IV approach, we use GB/T four-digit sector codes as industry dummies in Eqs. (2.6) and (2.7) because 
the number of application procedures is based on GB/T four-digit codes.  
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stage regressions, suggesting the relevance condition is satisfied. The statistical first-stage F-
values are significantly larger than the rule of thumb of 10, suggesting that the instrumental 
variable (𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1) is valid and does not suffer from a possible weak instrument bias (Stock 
and Yogo, 2005). To test the exclusion condition that the only role that the instrument 
𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1 plays in influencing innovation activities is through its effect on 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1, 
we also conduct a Wald test of exogeneity and an Anderson-Rubin test. Specifically, the Wald 
test measures whether the residuals from the reduced-form equation for the endogenous 
variables are correlated with error terms in the structural equation. Significant p-value statistics 
suggest that the regressors are not exogenous. The Anderson-Rubin (AR) test is a joint test of 
the structural parameter and the exogeneity of the instruments. The null hypothesis of the AR 
test is that all the regressors are exogenous, and the minimum canonical correlation is zero. 
Significant p-value statistics lower than 0.05 suggest that our model is identified and/or our 
instruments are valid. Additionally, we also conduct a Hausman test and a Smith-Blundell test 
to confirm the existence of (an) endogenous variable(s).  
Furthermore, we assume that the other control variables are potentially endogenous. 
We re-estimate Eqs. (2.6) and (2.7) by instrumenting all the control variables. Specifically, we 
instrument the competition variable (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1) with lagged values of the number of 
application procedures (𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1) and instrument the other control variables with their values 
lagged by two years. Panel B of Table 2.6 reports the corresponding estimation results, which 
remain consistent with our main regression results. All the instrument variables pass the 
validity tests too. 
2.7.3. Alternative measurements of firms’ innovation activities 
A potential measurement error for firms’ innovation activities and industry competition 
might yield biased and inconsistent estimates. In our main empirical analysis, we have used 
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four proxies of industry competitive intensity to alleviate potential measurement errors of 
competition. In this section, we proceed with a robustness test using the number of patent 
applications and the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets as alternative measures of firms’ 
innovation output and innovation input. Specifically, we use the SIPO patent dataset processed 
by He et al. (2018) to merge with the NBS firm-level data through firms’ legal person codes 
and then calculate the number of patent applications per firm. We then re-estimate Eqs. (2.6) 
and (2.7) by replacing  𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  with the natural logarithm of the number of patent applications 
plus one [𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 1)] and the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets (𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) for 
firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 in year 𝑡.57 
Table 2.7 presents the corresponding estimation results in which innovation is measured 
by the number of patent applications in Panel A and R&D expenditure in Panel B respectively. 
In columns (1) to (4), the marginal effects of industry competition on innovation are 
significantly negative at the 1% level, regardless of how we measure industry competition. 
Furthermore, in columns (5) to (8), five out of eight interaction terms (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗) are significantly negative. In short, these findings are in line with Hypotheses 
1 and 2.  
[Insert Table 2.7 here] 
2.7.4. Augmented specifications with contemporaneous terms 
An important caveat to our main results is that if omitted variables are related to the 
regressors, it can make correct statistical inferences hard to draw. To address this concern, 
following Brown et al. (2009), we add the contemporaneous terms of the right-hand side 
                                                             
57 The estimation results are qualitatively the same when we estimate by Poisson or negative binomial models 
using patent counts as the dependent variable.  
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variables to Eqs. (2.6) and (2.7) to control for potential omitted variables that might drive 
innovation or the relationship between competition and innovation. Specifically, we include 
the contemporaneous competition variable (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡) and its interaction term with the 
EFD variable ( 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 ). As additional control variables for firm 
demand, we also add contemporaneous cash flow (𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡), sales (𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) and new long-term debt 
issues (𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) in the regressions.  
Table 2.8 shows the estimation results. We find that the results remain qualitatively 
unchanged: the sums of the marginal effects of industry competition and the interaction terms 
are significantly negative. Specifically, in columns (1) to (4), the lagged competition variable 
(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1) has a more negative effect on 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 (the marginal effects range from -
0.195% to -6.868%) than the contemporaneous competition variable (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡) (the 
marginal effects range from -0.079% to -4.036%). About the interaction term in columns (5) 
to (8), we find that the marginal effects of the interaction between the lagged competition 
variable and the EFD variable (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗) are significantly negative 
(HHI -2.125%, EI -0.468%, LI (PCM) -2.035% and FI -0.379%). In contrast, the marginal 
effects of the interaction between the contemporaneous competition variable and the EFD 
variable (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑗) are insignificant. These results indicate that lagged 
industry competition has a more negative influence on firms’ innovation activities than 
contemporaneous industry competition, even in industries with higher EFD. The finding can 
be explained by the fact that R&D projects are investments with a long-term return cycle, so 
industry competition has a lagged effect on innovation.  
[Insert Table 2.8 here] 
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2.7.5. Market redefinition 
In our main regression results, we define industries based on GB/T four-digit sector 
codes specified by the NBS in the national market, while it may be that not all enterprises 
compete nationwide. Young (2000) points out that China’s regional protectionism and 
incremental reform process contribute to domestic market fragmentation. However, we believe 
that the problem could be alleviated in our main analysis for the following reasons. First, the 
sample data we choose is from 1998 to 2007. During this period, China was continually 
widening and deepening its market-oriented reforms, especially in manufacturing sectors (Holz, 
2009), which may somewhat have relieved its regional protectionism. Second, the firms in our 
dataset are all ‘above-scale’ enterprises, which tend to operate and compete in the national 
market. Third, we include location dummies in all our regressions to control for uneven 
developments across regions.  
However, to control for market fragmentation, following Cai and Liu (2009), we divide 
China into the eight market regions regulated by the State Council of China. We calculate 
competition intensity based on these eight economic regions. Using this new market definition, 
we re-estimate Eqs. (2.6) and (2.7) and find similar results, which are reported in Table 2.9.58 
Taking into account domestic market fragmentation, our main conclusions remain unchanged. 
[Insert Table 2.9 here] 
2.7.6. Other robustness tests 
Besides the above tests, we also conduct other robustness analyses. First, we perform 
robustness tests using the random-effects Probit model in which the dependent variable is a 
                                                             
58 Since we calculate the explanatory variable (competition intensity) based on the eight economic regions, we use 
31 province-level administrative regions as the location dummy variables (𝑉𝑝) instead. 
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binary variable taking one if a firm has a positive new product output value, and zero otherwise. 
The estimation results are shown in Table 2.10. Second, to take account of domestic market 
fragmentation, we recalculate industry competition based on the eight regional markets defined 
by China’s central government. Third, we compute industry competitive intensity by using 
either the GB/T two-digit codes or the GB/T three-digit codes. Fourth, we cluster industries 
rather than firms. Fifth, we re-estimate our model by using a balanced sample to avoid our 
results being driven by the entry/exit of new/old firms. Sixth, we deal with the lack of data on 
the innovation variable for 2004 by using the average of the values for 2003 and 2005. We also 
ignore 2004 in our panel data and treat 2003 and 2005 as two consecutive years. Seventh, for 
external finance dependence, to control for the time effect on EFD and firm heterogeneity, we 
re-construct EFD by using the time series industry-level EFD (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡) and firm-level 
EFD (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) . The unreported results of all these robustness tests remain 
qualitatively the same.  
[Insert Table 2.10 here] 
2.8. Other extensions 
2.8.1. Aggregate industry-level data on the period from 2001 to 2016 
The NBS data used in our main regressions stops in 2007 because some key variables 
are not available after that. The 2017 FIND Report on City and Industrial Innovation in China 
provides the industry innovation index (𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡) based on two-digit sector codes, which 
covers the years from 2001 to 2016 (Kou & Liu, 2017).59  We merge the innovation index with 
the aggregate industry competition from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research 
                                                             
59 The detailed information of industry innovation indexes are explained in the report, which can be retrieved from: 
http://imgcdn.yicai.com/uppics/files/2018/01/636507587751508252.pdf. 
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(CSMAR) Database. The first competition index is the industry Herfindahl index 
(𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎ℎ𝑙𝑗,𝑡), which is the sum of squared ratios of each listed firms’ operating sales in one 
industry to all listed firms’ operating sales in the industry. The second competition index is the 
industry Lerner index (𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡), which is the weighted sum of each listed firms’ Lerner index. 
To be specific, the firms’ Lerner index is the ratio of each firms’ operating profits to operation 
sales and the weight is the ratio of each firms’ operating sales to all firms’ operating sales in 
the industry. We use 1 minus the two indexes to build positive indicators of industry 
competition (1 − 𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎ℎ𝑙𝑗,𝑡 and 1 − 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡). 
The results are shown in Table 2.11. In columns (1) and (2) 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 refers to 
the Herfindahl Index (1 − 𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎ℎ𝑙𝑗,𝑡), whilst in columns (3) and (4) 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1  
corresponds to the Lerner Index (1 − 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑗,𝑡). We include industry and year fixed-effects to 
mitigate the time-invariant industry-specific effects and time-specific effects. In columns (1) 
and (3) we only include aggregate industry competition variable in the regressions, the 
coefficients of 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1  are significant and negative (-110.970 and -63.273), 
suggesting a negative relationship between competition and innovation based on industry-level. 
In columns (2) and (4), we add more industry-level control variables as in Eq. (2.6), which are 
total sales, total cash flows, and total new long-term debts.60 All financial variables are scaled 
by industry-level total assets. The coefficients of 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 have the expected negative 
sign (-118.062 and -70.016) and are statistically significant. In summary, based on an industry-
level innovation index from the year 2001 to 2016, the estimation results confirm Hypothesis 
1 again, according to which industry competition hurts innovation in China.   
                                                             
60 In columns (3) and (4), we do not include lagged and squared terms of the industry innovation index because 
of the high collinearity (99.83%) between the lagged innovation variable and the contemporaneous innovation 
variable. 
Chapter 2 
China’ innovation hurdle: competition and finance 
73 
 
[Insert Table 2.11 here] 
2.8.2. Exploring the inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation 
Prior studies have explored the non-linear relationship between competition and 
innovation (Levin et al., 1985; Aghion et al., 2005) based on developed markets. We further 
address the concern of nonlinearity and test whether the inverted-U relationship can hold in 
China’s market by including the squared term of competition variable (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1) into baseline Eq. (2.6). 
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 2.12 correspond to four different measures of competitive 
intensity. We find that only the estimation result of competition measured by the HHI in 
column (1) shows an explicit inverted-U relationship. Specifically, in column (1) the marginal 
effect of competition variable (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1) is significantly positive and the squared 
competition variable ( 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ) is significantly negative. 
However, based on the magnitudes of the competition variables (the HHI), we find that the 
turning point of the inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation (i.e., the 
quadratic graph goes from having an upward slope to a downward slope) is around 92.97%.61 
Given that the average value of the HHI is 98.48%, we find that approximately 96.97% of 
industries in our data sample have higher levels of competitive intensity than 92.97%. In other 
words, these results suggest that for the majority of industries in China, competitive intensity 
(the HHI) lies on the right- hand side of the quadratic graph, passing right through the turning 
                                                             
61 Based on the magnitudes of the marginal effects of the competition variable (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1) (370.53%) and 
the squared competition variable ( 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ) (-199.28%), the turning point of 
competitive intensity (HHI) for the quadratic graph is 92.97%= 370.53% / (199.28% * 2). 
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point. Thus, the negative effect of competition on innovation is overpowering in China’s 
industrial markets. 
[Insert Table 2.12 here] 
In columns (2) and (3) for the EI and the LI (PCM), both of the marginal effects of the 
squared competition variables are insignificant, which is not consistent with the inverted-U. In 
column (4), the estimation result based on the FI shows a U-shaped relationship between 
competition and innovation, suggested by the marginal effect of the competition variable 
( 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ) is significantly negative, and the marginal effect of the squared 
competition variable ( 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ) is significantly positive. 
Similarly, we calculate that the turning point of the U-shaped relationship between competition 
and innovation (i.e., the quadratic graph goes from having a downward slope to an upward 
slope) is 10.67,62 which is much higher than the average industry competitive intensity (6.87), 
measured by the FI. We find that all industry competition in our sample lies on the left-hand 
side of the quadratic graph, passing left through the turning point. The findings suggest that the 
negative effect of competition on innovation plays a dominating role in China’s industrial 
market. To sum up, we confirm the vast majority of sectors in China are ‘laggard-and-laggard’ 
which is indicated by the data.   
2.8.3. Exploring the mechanism through intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection 
We attribute the negative effect of competition on innovation to intense competition in 
the Chinese manufacturing industry with difficulties obtaining sufficient finance. However, it 
could be possible that without the protection of intellectual property rights, innovation is likely 
to be imitated and expropriated by competitors. A common strategy in China is that once there 
                                                             
62 The turning point of competitive intensity (FI) for the quadratic graph is 10.67= 0.704% / (0.033% * 2).  
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is a potentially successful innovation, their competitors will imitate these products or business 
models to escape competition and gain more market shares (Allen et al., 2019). With a higher 
likelihood of imitation, more competition is associated with a higher risk of R&D failure, which 
will discourage more corporate innovation. For example, Fang et al. (2017) document that IPRs 
protection plays an important role in corporate innovation in China. 
To test whether IPRs protection could influence the impact of competition on 
innovation, we include an interaction term between the competition variable and IPRs 
protection scores and re-estimate Eq (2.6).63 A higher score of IPRs protection represents a 
better quality of local IPRs protection. The estimation results in Table 2.13 show the 
significantly positive marginal effects of the interaction terms between competition and IPRs 
protection scores. The finding suggests that weak IPRs protection enhances the negative impact 
of industry competition on innovation. These results suggest that IPRs protection acts as an 
alternative mechanism through which industry competition affects firms’ innovation activities.  
[Insert Table 2.13 here] 
2.8.4. Exploring the mechanism between competition and cash flow 
In this subsection, we provide an additional test by adding an interaction term between 
the competition variable and the cash flow variable to check whether increased competition 
leads to more financial constraints on firms’ innovation activities. According to the 
‘Schumpeterian theory’ (Schumpeter, 1943), increased competition should reduce firms’ 
profits, which adversely affects the internal and external finance premiums for innovation 
investment. In this subsection, we provide an additional test by adding an interaction term 
                                                             
63 Our IPRs data is a province-level index of IPRs protection from 1998 to 2007, which is developed by the 
National Economic Research Institute (NERI) of China (Fan et al., 2016).  
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between the competition variable and the cash flow variable to check whether increased 
competition leads to more financial constraints on firms’ innovation activities. Given that the 
sensitivity of R&D investment to cash flow can reflect the level of financial constraints, we 
expect increased industry competition to lead to an increase in the R&D-cash flow relationship.         
Table 2.14 reports the estimation results. Specifically, we find the marginal effects of 
the interaction term (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1) are significantly positive (49.317%, 1.299%, 
15.962% and 1.436%). This finding suggests that as competition increases, firms’ innovation 
activities face more financial constraints. Therefore, firms have to rely more on internal finance 
for innovation investment. When we introduce the interaction term ( 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗
𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1), the marginal effects of cash flow (𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1) are not particularly interesting since they 
only apply at the specific point when  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 equals zero. Besides, the marginal 
effects of the interaction term (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗) are significantly negative, 
which leaves all of our main conclusions unchanged. The results show that increased industry 
competition leads to a tightening of the R&D-cash flow relationship. This finding suggests that 
as competition increases, firms’ innovation activities face more financial constraints. Therefore, 
firms have to rely more on internal finance for innovation investments. 
[Insert Table 2.14 here] 
2.9. Conclusions 
Focusing on a relatively large firm-level database over the period 1998 to 2007, we 
have shown that there is a negative relationship between firms’ innovation activities and 
industry competition in China, suggesting that China’s manufacturing sector is dominated by 
laggard firms with high competition. We have found that the negative relation is stronger in 
industries that are more dependent on external finance. Further evidence shows that financing 
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constraints tighten the negative effect of competition on innovation and R&D-cash flow 
sensitivity.  
This research contributes to the understanding of China’s unconventional growth path 
and innovation hurdle (negative impact of industry competition). We believe this is an 
important contribution considering the important role of innovation in shaping growth 
strategies in emerging market economies. Today, with the challenge of rising labour costs and 
the squeeze from newly emerging low-cost producers, the leading advantages of China’s 
manufacturing are under threat. Industrial upgrading (moving from ‘laggard-and-laggard’ to 
‘neck-and-neck’) and innovation will be critical if China tends to maintain its position as a 
global manufacturing powerhouse. To this end, the Chinese government needs to deepen 
structural reforms to rein in surplus production capacity and over-competition. Strategically, 
the Chinese government needs to upgrade low-end manufacturing to the high end of global 
value chains and high-tech industries to promote high-quality development. Related policies, 
e.g., strengthening intellectual property protection and R&D tax relief could help to encourage 
more innovation activities and upgrade industry structure. 
Regarding external finance dependence (EFD) and financing constraints on corporate 
innovation, China also needs to make more efforts to deepen its financial system reform. 
Despite several positive steps, e.g., the financial reforms outlined by the Communist Party 
Central Committee’s Third Plenum in 2013, the financial system in China is relatively weak. 
There still exists a ‘lending bias problem’ and ‘institutional discrimination’ in allocating 
financial capital to firms. More policies are needed to enhance the market’s role in allocating 
resources and breaking financing obstacles to support innovation investment, especially for 
firms facing financial constraints. Meanwhile, policies could be implemented to regulate 
industries’ leverage ratios and prevent a destabilizing build-up of debt. Avoiding 
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overwhelming dependence on external finance and lowering firms’ financial constraints would 














Figure 2.1. Innovation rates and industry competition in China from 1998 to 2007 
1998                                                                    2007 
Figure 2.2. Average innovation rates in prefecture-level administrative divisions in China 
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Figure 2.3. Average innovation rates vs. industry competition for GB/T four-digit sector 
codes in China from 1998 to 2007 
  
Figure 2.4. Trend line comparison from 1998 to 2007. Note: The figure illustrates the time 
trends of the innovation rates of the treatment group (i.e., automobile manufacturing firms with 
GB/T four-digit code 3721) and the control group (i.e., metal ship manufacturing firms with 
GB/T four-digit code 3751) 
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Table 2.1  
Summary statistics - Sample means and medians (in parentheses) 





SOEs Private firms Diff1 Diff2 
Main regression variables        

























































































































Variables related to financial constraints 
       

































Observations 693,748 633,493 60,255 66,978 260,919   
Notes: Total assets are expressed in millions of yuan. All other variables except Log (number of patent applications plus 1), Competition [EI], Competition [FI], and age are shown in percentage 
terms. Diff1 and Diff2 are the p-values associated with the mean-equality test between the group with a new product output value > 0 and the group with a new product output value= 0 (Diff1) 








Table 2.2  
Modified baseline Euler equations (2.6) and (2.7) for the full sample 
 Eq. (2.6)  Eq. (2.7) 
  
HHI                      
(1) 
EI                      
(2) 
LI (PCM)                         
(3) 
FI                     
(4) 
HHI                      
(5) 
EI                      
(6) 
LI (PCM)                         
(7) 
FI                
(8) 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 -9.157*** -0.322*** -4.952*** -0.266***  -9.158*** -0.051 -1.655* -0.036 
 [0.869] [0.019] [0.816] [0.019]  [0.919] [0.042] [0.937] [0.040] 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1
∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 
    
 
-2.487*** -0.474*** -2.241*** -0.437*** 
      [0.437] [0.066] [0.453] [0.060] 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗      0.465 0.711* 0.604 1.062*** 
      [0.433] [0.376] [0.433] [0.406] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 45.040*** 45.012*** 45.335*** 45.131***  45.159*** 45.274*** 45.436*** 45.260*** 
 [0.268] [0.268] [0.268] [0.268]  [0.270] [0.271] [0.271] [0.270] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
2  -31.092*** -31.070*** -31.217*** -31.107***  -31.221*** -31.290*** -31.353*** -31.236*** 
 [0.271] [0.271] [0.272] [0.271]  [0.274] [0.276] [0.275] [0.275] 
𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 -0.789*** -0.787*** -0.796*** -0.787***  -0.787*** -0.789*** -0.794*** -0.785*** 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]  [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 1.934*** 1.929*** 1.869*** 1.927***  1.814*** 1.766*** 1.791*** 1.818*** 
 [0.177] [0.177] [0.178] [0.177]  [0.179] [0.179] [0.180] [0.179] 
𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 -0.143 -0.164 -0.165 -0.122  -0.211 -0.192 -0.221 -0.174 
 [0.229] [0.229] [0.231] [0.230]  [0.231] [0.233] [0.233] [0.232] 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Rho 0.273 0.273 0.270 0.272  0.273 0.270 0.270 0.271 
Firms 289,738 289,472 288,525 289,486  284,671 283,548 283,627 284,242 
Observations 693,748 693,152 688,599 693,044  679,512 673,098 675,328 677,991 
Left − censored 633,493 633,053 628,027 632,955  620,100 614,319 615,781 618,997 
Uncensored 60,255 60,099 60,572 60,089  59,412 58,779 59,547 58,994 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects on uncensored observations using the random-effects Tobit. The marginal effects are shown as percentages. The dependent variable 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 (new 
product output value / total assets) is a censored variable. Standard errors (in square brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Year, industry, ownership, and 
location dummies were included in all models, but their marginal effects are not reported for brevity. Rho denotes the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved 
heterogeneity. Prob > chi2 is the joint significance test of parameters, and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. See Appendix D for 
definitions of all variables and all classifications. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Modified baseline Euler equation (2.7): between SOEs and private firms 




Private            
(2) 
 SOEs                
(3) 
Private             
(4) 
 SOEs                 
(5) 
Private               
(6) 
 SOEs                 
(7) 
Private               
(8) 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 -6.115*** -8.498***  -0.033 0.009  -3.237** -2.750  -0.006 0.001 
 [1.420] [1.833]  [0.075] [0.082]  [1.390] [1.938]  [0.069] [0.078] 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1
∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 
-2.157*** -3.327***  -0.495*** -0.514***  -1.643** -3.017***  -0.404*** -0.441*** 
 [0.709] [0.904]  [0.113] [0.128]  [0.746] [0.934]  [0.102] [0.120] 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 -0.091 0.372  0.107 0.201  -0.012 0.414  0.253 0.333 
 [0.698] [0.897]  [0.601] [0.751]  [0.717] [0.890]  [0.650] [0.822] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 35.563*** 52.639***  35.645*** 52.653***  36.453*** 52.576***  35.482*** 52.562*** 
 [0.470] [0.490]  [1.380] [0.485]  [0.481] [0.489]  [0.471] [0.488] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
2  -22.415*** -35.832***  -22.594*** -35.778***  -23.065*** -35.731***  -22.520*** 
-
35.726*** 
 [0.526] [0.495]  [0.979] [0.494]  [0.537] [0.495]  [0.529] [0.494] 
𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 -0.806*** -0.909***  -0.780*** -0.909***  -0.842*** -0.906***  -0.796*** -0.897*** 
 [0.054] [0.026]  [0.061] [0.026]  [0.056] [0.026]  [0.054] [0.026] 
𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 1.381*** 2.225***  1.362*** 2.152***  1.246*** 2.132***  1.473*** 2.149*** 
 [0.459] [0.322]  [0.466] [0.323]  [0.477] [0.323]  [0.461] [0.322] 
𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 -0.256 -0.056  -0.240 0.020  -0.259 0.009  -0.291 0.040 
 [0.355] [0.445]  [0.359] [0.446]  [0.368] [0.446]  [0.359] [0.445] 
Diff1 (p − value)  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Diff2 (p − value) (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Rho 0.333 0.155  0.332 0.153  0.337 0.157  0.340 0.155 
Firms 27,378 139,682  26,895 139,423  26,706 139,466  27,190 139,621 
Observations 64,027 256,733  62,595 255,500  61,227 256,164  63,675 256,525 
Left − censored 54,254 235,728  53,044 234,566  51,578 235,039  54,132 235,555 
Uncensored 9,773 21,005   9,551 20,934   9,649 21,125   9,543 20,970 
Notes: This table reports marginal effects on uncensored observations using the random-effects Tobit. The marginal effects are shown as percentages. The dependent variable 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 (new 
product output value / total assets) is a censored variable. Diff1 (p-value) is the p-value for the difference in the marginal effects of the interaction term between the group of SOEs and the 
group of private firms. Diff2 (p-value) is the p-value for the difference in the marginal effects of lagged cash flow between the group of SOEs and the group of private firms. Standard errors 
(in square brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Year, industry, ownership, and location dummies were included in all models, but their marginal effects are 
not reported for brevity. Rho denotes the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. Prob > chi2 is the joint significance test of parameters, and the null 
hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. See Appendix D for definitions of all variables and all classifications. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 








Modified baseline Euler equation (2.7): differentiating firms based on size, age, state shares and region 
 Size  Age  State shares  Region 
  
Small            
(1) 
Large          
(2) 
 Young         
(3) 
Mature       
(4) 
 No            
(5) 
With              
(6) 
 
Coastal              
(11) 
Central and 
Western         (12) 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 -12.339*** -9.375***  -11.749*** -6.882***  -9.604*** -5.697***  -8.182*** -10.566*** 
 [1.590] [1.191]  [1.339] [1.240]  [1.099] [1.397]  [1.157] [1.506] 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1
∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 
-3.615*** -2.492***  -2.602*** -2.416***  -2.634*** -1.601**  -2.229*** -2.648*** 
 [0.813] [0.558]  [0.661] [0.595]  [0.530] [0.664]  [0.537] [0.736] 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 1.091 0.633  0.307 0.671  0.495 -0.292  0.996* -0.277 
 [0.805] [0.554]  [0.655] [0.591]  [0.526] [0.654]  [0.533] [0.729] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 52.184*** 44.866***  49.224*** 46.319***  49.006*** 37.432***  43.766*** 44.878*** 
 [0.529] [0.329]  [0.405] [0.349]  [0.315] [0.451]  [0.358] [0.446] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
2  -37.722*** -29.587***  -34.336*** -31.610***  -33.934*** -23.706***  -29.427*** -33.470*** 
 [0.539] [0.335]  [0.414] [0.362]  [0.320] [0.490]  [0.345] [0.490] 
𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 -0.600*** -0.644***  -0.817*** -0.784***  -0.829*** -0.810***  -1.021*** -0.493*** 
 [0.023] [0.025]  [0.023] [0.023]  [0.018] [0.049]  [0.023] [0.022] 
𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 1.404*** 1.030***  2.255*** 1.623***  1.846*** 0.896**  1.348*** 1.952*** 
 [0.279] [0.257]  [0.255] [0.252]  [0.201] [0.425]  [0.246] [0.256] 
𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 -1.328*** 0.055  0.096 -0.392  -0.337 0.13  0.059 -0.251 
 [0.446] [0.287]  [0.351] [0.312]  [0.280] [0.350]  [0.317] [0.322] 
Diff1 (p − value) (0.000)***   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Diff2 (p − value) (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Rho 0.172 0.287  0.199 0.269  0.215 0.344  0.307 0.228 
Firms 178,965 142,940  197,952 137,859  262,643 35,041  206,406 78,537 
Observations 343,480 336,032  370,119 309,385  597,325 82,180  499,665 179,847 
Left − censored 327,381 292,719  343,281 276,811  551,228 68,867  459,963 160,137 
Uncensored 16,099 43,319  26,838 32,574  46,097 13,313  39,702 19,710 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects on uncensored observations using the random-effects Tobit. The marginal effects are shown as percentages. The dependent 
variable 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  (new product output value / total assets) is a censored variable. Diff1 (p-value) is the p-value for the difference in the marginal effects of the interaction term 
between two groups. Diff2 (p-value) is the p-value for the difference in the marginal effects of lagged cash flow between the two groups. Standard errors (in square brackets) 
are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Year, industry, ownership, and location dummies were included in all models, but their marginal effects are 
not reported for brevity. Rho denotes the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. Prob > chi2 is the joint significance test of 
parameters, and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. See Appendix D for definitions of all variables and all 
classifications. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Chapter 2 




Modified baseline Euler Equation (2.8) using the difference-in-differences (DID) approach  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 3.865*** 0.707*** 0.499*** 
 [0.888] [0.070] [0.070] 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 2.525*** 0.997*** 1.024*** 
 [0.881] [0.039] [0.039] 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 -3.042*** -0.402*** 0.558** 
 [1.066] [0.087] [0.272] 




𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗   -3.680*** 
  
 [0.152] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 67.113*** 47.741*** 47.579*** 
 [2.863] [0.276] [0.277] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
2  -37.955*** -33.149*** -33.065*** 
 [2.885] [0.278] [0.280] 
𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 -1.942*** -0.853*** -0.857*** 
 [0.348] [0.016] [0.016] 
𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 2.335 1.237*** 1.151*** 
 [3.924] [0.177] [0.178] 
𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 1.517 -0.137 -0.218 
 [3.699] [0.226] [0.229] 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Rho 0.128 0.278 0.275 
Firms 1,286 291,241 286,547 
Observations 2,785 700,491 687,609 
Left − censored 1,890 639,291 627,216 
Uncensored 895 61,200 60,393 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects on uncensored observations using the random-effects 
Tobit. The marginal effects are shown as percentages. The dependent variable 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 (new product 
output value / total assets) is a censored variable. Standard errors (in square brackets) are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Ownership and location dummies were included 
in all models, but their marginal effects are not reported for brevity. Rho denotes the proportion of 
the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. Prob > chi2 is the joint 
significance test of parameters, and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are 
simultaneously equal to zero. See Appendix D for definitions of all variables and all classifications. 
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Table 2.6  
Modified baseline Euler equations (2.6) and (2.7) using the IV Tobit for the full sample (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 is instrumented with 𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑃𝑗,𝑡−1) 
  Eq. (2.6)  Eq. (2.7) 
 HHI                      
(1) 
EI                      
(2) 
LI (PCM)                         
(3) 
FI                     
(4) 
 HHI                      
(5) 
EI                      
(6) 
LI (PCM)                         
(7) 
FI                     
(8) 
 Panel A: only 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 is instrumented 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 -487.168*** -5.572*** -89.325*** -5.108***  -173.059*** -2.534*** -1.931 -0.655 
 [69.790] [0.755] [11.192] [0.622]  [29.082] [0.667] [10.431] [0.446] 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 
     -35.001*** -4.861*** -67.724*** -6.668*** 
      [4.459] [1.057] [7.599] [0.980] 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald test of exogeneity (p − value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Anderson − Rubin (p − value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firms 271,262 271,094 271,901 271,066  268,152 267,001 268,528 267,738 
Observations 647,893 647,446 650,171 647,205  638,614 631,836 640,124 636,842 
Left − censored 588,593 588,295 590,441 588,067  580,098 573,919 581,364 578,709 
Uncensored 59,300 59,151 59,730 59,138  58,516 57,917 58,760 58,133 
 Panel B: all other independent variables are instrumented 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 -128.784 -4.550*** -75.565*** -3.830***  -196.789*** -1.506** 26.219 -0.463 
 [82.091] [0.589] [14.235] [0.683]  [21.906] [0.698] [16.827] [0.528] 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗      -26.879*** -4.126*** -82.798*** -4.543*** 
 
     [8.594] [0.966] [19.927] [0.832] 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald test of exogeneity (p − value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Anderson − Rubin (p − value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firms 200,917 200,795 201,614 200,888  198,638 198,280 199,149 198,439 
Observations 411,751 411,324 413,730 411,545  406,076 403,051 407,412 405,115 
Left − censored 371,019 370,723 372,642 370,889  365,871 363,246 366,988 365,142 
Uncensored 40,732 40,601 41,088 40,656  40,205 39,805 40,424 39,973 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects as percentages using the IV Tobit method. The marginal effects are shown as percentages. When we use the IV Tobit, the dependent variable 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  
(new product output value / total assets) is a censored variable. Standard errors (in square brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. In panel A, we instrument the 
competition variable with the number of application procedures a firm has to go through to enter a GB/T four-digit industry. In panel B, we further instrument all the other control variables with 
their lagged values. Wald test of exogeneity is distributed as chi-square under the null hypothesis of exogeneity. Anderson-Rubin is under the null hypothesis that the minimum canonical correlation 
is zero. Year, industry, ownership, and location dummies were included in all models, but their marginal effects are not reported for brevity. Rho denotes the proportion of the total error variance 
accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. Prob > chi2 is the joint significance test of parameters, and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. 








Modified baseline Euler Equations (2.6) and (2.7) for the full sample with alternative measures of firms’ innovation activities 
                                                         Panel A: an alternative measurement of innovation activities (i.e. patent number, labelled as Log (Patent + 1) 
 Eq. (2.6)   Eq. (2.7) 
 HHI                      
(1) 
EI                      
(2) 
LI (PCM)                         
(3) 
FI                   
(4) 
 HHI                      
(5) 
EI                      
(6) 
LI (PCM)                         
(7) 
FI                    
(8) 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 -70.340*** -2.627*** -30.546*** -2.193*** 
 -70.102*** -2.221*** -38.177*** -2.027*** 
 [3.571] [0.084] [3.459] [0.084]  [3.746] [0.159] [3.867] [0.142] 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗      -2.136 -0.753*** 0.988 -0.362* 
      [1.510] [0.254] [1.588] [0.215] 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Rho 0.323 0.322 0.332 0.324  0.320 0.317 0.328 0.321 
Firms 300,187 300,080 299,306 300,139  295,108 294,161 294,168 295,008 
Observations 909,535 913,754 908,595 913,887  891,284 888,346 890,354 893,379 
Left − censored 870,051 874,331 868,625 874,285  852,446 849,526 851,113 854,355 
Uncensored 39,484 39,423 39,970 39,602   38,838 38,820 39,241 39,024 
          
                                                              Panel B: an alternative measurement of innovation activities (i.e. R&D expenditures/total assets, labelled as RD) 
 Eq. (2.6)  Eq. (2.7) 
 HHI                      
(1) 
EI                      
(2) 
LI (PCM)                         
(3) 
FI                   
(4) 
 HHI                      
(5) 
EI                      
(6) 
LI (PCM)                         
(7) 
FI                    
(8) 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 -0.474*** -0.015*** -0.286*** -0.011***  -0.518*** -0.012*** -0.246*** -0.008*** 
 [0.030] [0.001] [0.030] [0.001]  [0.031] [0.001] [0.033] [0.001] 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 
     -0.032** -0.007*** -0.019 -0.006*** 
      [0.013] [0.002] [0.014] [0.002] 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Rho 0.285 0.285 0.284 0.285  0.286 0.288 0.285 0.287 
Firms 253,768 253,503 252,432 253,695  248,514 247,490 248,089 248,984 
Observations 518,529 518,028 515,475 518,650  506,500 502,507 504,222 508,149 
Left − censored 453,987 453,675 450,543 454,134  443,955 440,359 441,340 445,350 
Uncensored 64,542 64,353 64,932 64,516   62,545 62,148 62,882 62,799 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects on uncensored observations using the random-effects Tobit. The marginal effects are shown as percentages. In Panel A, the dependent variable 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 1)𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the number of patent applications plus one. In Panel B, the dependent variable 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets. Standard 
errors (in square brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Year, industry, ownership, and location dummies were included in all models, but their marginal 
effects are not reported for brevity. Rho denotes the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. Prob > chi2 is the joint significance test of parameters, 
and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. See Appendix D for definitions of all variables and all classifications. *, **, and *** indicate 
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Table 2.8          
Modified augmented Euler equations (2.6) and (2.7): accounting for the contemporaneous terms 


















𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡 -4.036*** -0.113** -2.709** -0.079  -2.668 -0.197* -1.702 -0.001 
 [1.515] [0.046] [1.254] [0.048]  [4.462] [0.104] [3.563] [0.102] 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 -6.868*** -0.221*** -2.762** -0.195***  -6.400*** 0.033 0.169 0.001 
 [1.472] [0.046] [1.197] [0.048]  [1.518] [0.060] [1.310] [0.059] 
𝑺𝒖𝒎 (𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) -10.903*** -0.334*** -5.471*** -0.274***  -9.068** -0.164* -1.532 0.000 
 [0.985] [0.020] [0.941] [0.020]  [4.304] [0.088] [3.479] [0.086] 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗       -3.841 0.171 -1.499 -0.150 
      [7.140] [0.163] [5.429] [0.159] 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗       -2.125*** -0.468*** -2.035*** -0.379*** 
      [0.454] [0.077] [0.467] [0.070] 
𝑺𝒖𝒎 (𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 ∗ 𝑫𝒆𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒋)      -5.966 -0.297** -3.534 -0.530*** 
      [7.116] [0.144] [5.430] [0.142] 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗       3.894 -0.192 1.978 1.682* 
      [6.987] [0.822] [5.122] [0.955] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 45.270*** 45.073*** 45.517*** 45.173***  45.388*** 45.324*** 45.608*** 45.268*** 
 [0.274] [0.273] [0.274] [0.273]  [0.276] [0.276] [0.277] [0.276] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
2  -31.250*** -31.097*** -31.340*** -31.095***  -31.370*** -31.322*** -31.473*** -31.190*** 
 [0.277] [0.277] [0.277] [0.276]  [0.280] [0.281] [0.280] [0.280] 
𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 -0.313*** -0.312*** -0.325*** -0.315***  -0.309*** -0.308*** -0.321*** -0.309*** 
 [0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.021]  [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] 
𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 -0.587*** -0.581*** -0.591*** -0.579***  -0.589*** -0.584*** -0.591*** -0.577*** 
 [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023]  [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] 
𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 1.653*** 1.790*** 1.666*** 1.754***  1.602*** 1.710*** 1.627*** 1.752*** 
 [0.210] [0.210] [0.212] [0.210]  [0.212] [0.212] [0.213] [0.212] 
𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 1.185*** 1.100*** 1.132*** 1.109***  1.092*** 0.976*** 1.088*** 1.092*** 
 [0.222] [0.222] [0.223] [0.222]  [0.224] [0.225] [0.225] [0.225] 
𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.404 0.359 0.377 0.343  0.361 0.352 0.330 0.323 
 [0.252] [0.252] [0.254] [0.252]  [0.254] [0.255] [0.256] [0.255] 
𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 -0.074 -0.108 -0.127 -0.086  -0.132 -0.131 -0.170 -0.072 
 [0.243] [0.243] [0.245] [0.243]  [0.245] [0.246] [0.247] [0.247] 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Rho 0.271 0.273 0.268 0.272  0.271 0.271 0.268 0.272 
Firms 279,517 278,836 277,588 279,086  274,569 273,105 272,949 273,238 
Observations 663,751 660,177 661,608 660,718  650,083 640,915 649,045 640,492 
Left − censored 605,395 602,152 602,729 602,591  592,517 584,238 591,164 583,844 
Uncensored 58,356 58,025 58,879 58,127  57,566 56,677 57,881 56,648 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects on uncensored observations using the random-effects Tobit. The marginal effects are shown as percentages. The dependent variable 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 (new product output value / 
total assets) is a censored variable. Sum (Competition) is s the sum of the marginal effects of the contemporaneous term and the lagged term of competition variables. Sum (Competition* Dependence) is the sum 
of the marginal effects of the contemporaneous interaction term and the lagged interaction term between competition and industry external finance dependence. Standard errors (in square brackets) are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Year, industry, ownership, and location dummies were included in all models, but their marginal effects are not reported for brevity. Rho denotes the proportion of 
the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. Prob > chi2 is the joint significance test of parameters, and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. 
See Appendix D for definitions of all variables and all classifications. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Modified baseline Euler equations (2.6) and (2.7): accounting for domestic market fragmentation 
 Eq. (2.6)  Eq. (2.7) 
  
HHI                      
(1) 
EI                      
(2) 
LI (PCM)                         
(3) 
FI                 
(4) 
 HHI                      
(5) 
EI                      
(6) 
LI (PCM)                         
(7) 
FI              
(8) 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑟,𝑡−1 -3.612*** -0.335*** -1.308** -0.285*** 
 -2.924*** -0.152*** -0.395 -0.144*** 
 [0.219] [0.017] [0.543] [0.017]  [0.288] [0.034] [0.611] [0.031] 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑟,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑟       -1.402*** -0.345*** -1.112*** -0.260*** 
      [0.297] [0.054] [0.295] [0.047] 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑟       0.967*** 0.901*** 0.873*** 0.940*** 
      [0.275] [0.219] [0.282] [0.231] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑟,𝑡−1  42.996*** 42.945*** 43.243*** 42.892*** 
 42.651*** 42.682*** 42.958*** 42.615*** 
 [0.265] [0.264] [0.265] [0.266]  [0.269] [0.268] [0.269] [0.267] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑟,𝑡−1
2  -29.467*** -29.449*** -29.654*** -29.391***  -29.141*** -29.199*** -29.398*** -29.135*** 
 [0.267] [0.267] [0.267] [0.268]  [0.271] [0.270] [0.271] [0.270] 
𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑟,𝑡−1 -0.778*** -0.775*** -0.785*** -0.772***  -0.788*** -0.786*** -0.794*** -0.782*** 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]  [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑟,𝑡−1 1.527*** 1.546*** 1.494*** 1.531***  1.519*** 1.504*** 1.464*** 1.499*** 
 [0.180] [0.179] [0.182] [0.179]  [0.184] [0.183] [0.185] [0.184] 
𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑟,𝑡−1 -0.133 -0.129 -0.197 -0.114  -0.112 -0.091 -0.183 -0.086 
 [0.229] [0.229] [0.229] [0.229]  [0.231] [0.232] [0.232] [0.233] 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Rho 0.274 0.273 0.274 0.276  0.277 0.276 0.276 0.278 
Firms 287,390 289,587 288,814 288,568  280,739 281,702 282,915 281,296 
Observations 687,156 693,427 689,757 687,605  670,894 674,021 674,663 669,752 
Left − censored 627,377 633,588 629,726 628,288  612,842 615,894 616,424 611,979 
Uncensored 59,779 59,839 60,031 59,317  58,052 58,127 58,239 57,773 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects on uncensored observations using the random-effects Tobit. The marginal effects are shown as percentages. The dependent 
variable 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑟,𝑡 (new product output value / total assets) is a censored variable. We recalculate industry competition based on the eight regional markets. Standard errors 
(in square brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Year, industry, ownership, and location dummies were included in all models, but 
their marginal effects are not reported for brevity. Rho denotes the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. Prob > chi2 is the 
joint significance test of parameters, and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. See Appendix D for definitions of all 
variables and all classifications. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Modified baseline Euler equations (2.6) and (2.7) of Random-effects Probit estimation for the full sample        
 Eq. (2.6)  Eq. (2.7) 
  
HHI                      
(1) 
EI                      
(2) 
LI (PCM)                         
(3) 
FI                     
(4) 
 HHI                      
(5) 
EI                      
(6) 
LI (PCM)                         
(7) 
FI               
(8) 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 -11.608*** -0.393*** -5.215*** -0.311*** 
 
-11.574*** -0.063 -1.572 -0.026 
 [1.061] [0.023] [0.998] [0.023] 
 
[1.129] [0.052] [1.150] [0.048] 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗      -2.962*** -0.579*** -2.699*** -0.538*** 
      [0.534] [0.080] [0.556] [0.073] 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗       0.745 1.152** 0.858 1.607*** 
      [0.530] [0.459] [0.532] [0.493] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 58.255*** 58.148*** 59.067*** 58.081*** 
 
58.821*** 58.967*** 59.396*** 58.495*** 
 [0.548] [0.547] [0.553] [0.546] 
 
[0.555] [0.557] [0.560] [0.554] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
2  -45.758*** -45.674*** -46.314*** -45.558*** 
 
-46.265*** -46.363*** -46.651*** -45.935*** 
 [0.499] [0.499] [0.504] [0.498] 
 
[0.508] [0.510] [0.511] [0.506] 
𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 -1.117*** -1.113*** -1.136*** -1.110*** 
 
-1.124*** -1.128*** -1.138*** -1.114*** 
 [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] 
 
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] 
𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 1.733*** 1.724*** 1.694*** 1.729*** 
 
1.596*** 1.568*** 1.594*** 1.600*** 
 [0.215] [0.215] [0.219] [0.214] 
 
[0.219] [0.220] [0.222] [0.218] 
𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 -0.337 -0.372 -0.368 -0.308 
 
-0.423 -0.387 -0.438 -0.369 
 [0.272] [0.272] [0.277] [0.272] 
 
[0.277] [0.279] [0.280] [0.277] 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Rho 0.412 0.411 0.409 0.411 
 
0.411 0.410 0.409 0.410 
Firms 289,733 289,470 288,525 289,484  284,671 283,546 283,627 284,242 
Observations 693,736 693,146 688,599 693,038 
 
679,512 673,092 675,328 677,991 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects on the dependent variable 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 of using the random-effects Probit. The marginal effects are shown as percentages. The dependent 
variable 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  (new product output value / total assets) is a dummy variable taking one if firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 in year 𝑡 has a positive new product output value (uncensored 
observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). Standard errors (in square brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Year, industry, 
ownership, and location dummies were included in all models, but their marginal effects are not reported for brevity. Rho denotes the proportion of the total error variance accounted 
for by unobserved heterogeneity. Prob > chi2 is the joint significance test of parameters, and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to 








Modified baseline Euler equation (2.6): based on the aggregate industry-level data from 2001 to 2016 
 1 − 𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑎ℎ𝑙  1 − 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟 
       (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 -110.970** -118.062**  -63.273*** -70.016*** 
 
[50.101] [52.603]  [50.101] [19.118] 
𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1  -44.123*** 
  -48.453*** 
 
 [15.117] 
  [15.023] 
𝑐𝑓𝑗,𝑡−1  -34.578 
  46.498 
 
 [60.874] 
  [59.816] 
𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑗,𝑡−1  39.372 
  58.069 
 
 [45.199] 
  [45.292] 
R-squared within 0.261 0.277  0.271 0.286 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Rho 0.453 0.544  0.521 0.476 
Industries 50 49  50 49 
Observations 749 729  749 729 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of coefficients using the fixed-effects model. The 
dependent variable (𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡) is an industry innovation index for industry 𝑗 in year 𝑡. Standard 
errors (in square brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the industry level. Year 
dummies and industry dummies were included in all models, but their marginal effects are not 
reported for brevity. Rho denotes the proportion of the total error variance accounted for by 
unobserved heterogeneity. Prob > chi2 is the joint significance test of parameters, and the null 
hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. See Appendix D 
for definitions of all variables and all classifications. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 



















Modified baseline Euler equation (2.6): accounting for the squared competition term  
  
HHI            
(1) 
EI             
(2) 
LI (PCM)             
(3) 
FI                
(4) 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 370.532*** -0.228* -23.368 -0.704*** 
 
[41.841] [0.135] [29.198] [0.152] 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 -199.280*** -0.009 9.659 0.033*** 
 
[21.947] [0.012] [15.308] [0.011] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 45.014*** 45.013*** 45.335*** 45.123*** 
 
[0.267] [0.268] [0.268] [0.268] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
2  -31.079*** -31.072*** -31.217*** -31.099*** 
 
[0.271] [0.271] [0.272] [0.271] 
𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 -0.786*** -0.787*** -0.795*** -0.786*** 
 
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 1.938*** 1.928*** 1.868*** 1.924*** 
 
[0.177] [0.177] [0.178] [0.177] 
𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 -0.145 -0.165 -0.166 -0.118 
 
[0.229] [0.229] [0.231] [0.230] 
Prob > chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Rho 0.273 0.273 0.270 0.272 
Firms 289,738 289,472 288,525 289,486 
Observations 693,748 693,152 688,599 693,044 
Left-censored 633,493 633,053 628,027 632,955 
Uncensored 60,255 60,099 60,572 60,089 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects on uncensored observations using the random-effects 
Tobit. The marginal effects are shown as percentages. The dependent variable 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 (new product 
output value / total assets) is a censored variable. Standard errors (in square brackets) are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Year, industry, ownership, and location dummies 
were included in all models, but their marginal effects are not reported for brevity. Rho denotes the 
proportion of the total error variance accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity. Prob > chi2 is the 
joint significance test of parameters, and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients 
are simultaneously equal to zero. See Appendix D for definitions of all variables and all 
























𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 -16.044*** -0.520*** -8.176*** -0.428*** 
 [1.158] [0.025] [1.030] [0.025] 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 
∗ 𝐼𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝,𝑡−1  
0.824*** 0.021*** 0.341*** 0.017*** 
 [0.103] [0.002] [0.099] [0.002] 
𝐼𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝,𝑡−1 -0.685*** 0.005 -0.195** 0.008 
 [0.101] [0.011] [0.093] [0.013] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 44.862*** 44.801*** 45.180*** 44.938*** 
 [0.267] [0.279] [0.267] [0.279] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
2  -31.031*** -30.984*** -31.173*** -31.035*** 
 [0.270] [0.276] [0.271] [0.276] 
𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 -0.757*** -0.754*** -0.766*** -0.755*** 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 1.980*** 1.983*** 1.884*** 1.977*** 
 [0.176] [0.176] [0.178] [0.176] 
𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 -0.165 -0.184 -0.187 -0.144 
 [0.228] [0.229] [0.230] [0.229] 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Rho 0.272 0.272 0.269 0.271 
Firms 289.738 289,472 288,525 289,486 
Observations 693,748 693,152 688,599 693,044 
Left − censored 633,493 633,053 628,027 632,955 
Uncensored 60,255 60,099 60,572 60,089 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects on uncensored observations using the random- effects 
Tobit. The marginal effects are shown as percentages. The dependent variable 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 (new product 
output value / total assets) is a censored variable, which takes its real value if firm 𝑖 in industry 𝑗 in 
year 𝑡 has a positive new product output value (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-
censored observations). 𝐼𝑃𝑅𝑠𝑝,𝑡−1 is a province-level index of IPRs protection, which is developed 
by the National Economic Research Institute (NERI) of China (Fan et al., 2016). Standard errors (in 
square brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Ownership dummies, 
time dummies, industry dummies, location dummies, and constant terms are included in all 
specifications but not reported. Prob > chi2 is the joint significance test of parameters, and the null 
hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. Rho is the 
percentage contribution to the total variance of the panel-level variance component in the random-
effects Tobit regressions. See Appendix D for definitions of all variables and all classifications. *, ** 










Modified baseline Euler equation (2.7): accounting for the interaction term (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1) 
  
HHI                      
(1) 
EI                      
(2) 
LI (PCM)                         
(3) 
FI                
(4) 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 -12.922*** -0.165*** -0.350*** -0.162*** 
 [1.073] [0.044] [0.020] [0.041] 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1
∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 
-2.471*** -0.463*** -2.518*** -0.432*** 
 [0.437] [0.066] [0.420] [0.060] 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 0.450 0.636* 0.474 0.982** 
 [0.433] [0.376] [0.420] [0.406] 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1  49.317*** 1.299*** 15.962*** 1.436*** 
 [7.414] [0.139] [4.550] [0.133] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 45.114*** 45.214*** 45.152*** 45.196*** 
 [0.270] [0.271] [0.271] [0.270] 
𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
2  -31.167*** -31.214*** -31.184*** -31.156*** 
 [0.274] [0.276] [0.275] [0.275] 
𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 -0.793*** -0.799*** -0.782*** -0.795*** 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 -46.666*** -5.487*** -16.851*** -7.827*** 
 [7.292] [0.804] [4.302] [0.918] 
𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 -0.209 -0.161 -0.220 -0.139 
 [0.231] [0.233] [0.232] [0.232] 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Rho 0.273 0.271 0.272 0.271 
Firms 284,621 283,077 283,400 283,812 
Observations 679,341 671,425 676,065 676,513 
Left − censored 619,939 612,715 616,968 617,593 
Uncensored 59,402 58,710 59,097 58,920 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects on uncensored observations using the random- effects Tobit. The 
marginal effects are shown as percentages. The dependent variable 𝑛𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 (new product output value / total 
assets) is a censored variable. Standard errors (in square brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered 
at the firm level. Year, industry, ownership, and location dummies were included in all models, but their 
marginal effects are not reported for brevity. Rho denotes the proportion of the total error variance accounted 
for by unobserved heterogeneity. Prob > chi2 is the joint significance test of parameters, and the null hypothesis 
is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. See Appendix D for definitions of all 













Appendix A. Structure of the unbalanced panel 
Table 2.A1 
Distribution of the number of firm-level observations by years 
Year Number of observations Per cent (%) Cumulative (%) 
1998 122,636 6.26 6.26 
1999 120,404 6.15 12.41 
2000 125,215 6.40 18.81 
2001 135,702 6.93 25.74 
2002 150,273 7.68 33.42 
2003 171,532 8.76 42.18 
2004 261,025 13.33 55.51 
2005 256,901 13.12 68.63 
2006 284,309 14.52 83.16 
2007 329,775 16.84 100.00 
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Appendix B. Average innovation rates and competition intensity across the GB/T two-
digit industries in China (1998 – 2007) 
Table 2.A2 displays the mean annual innovation rates and competition intensity across 
39 GB/T two-digit code industries. We observe that there are 14 industries with an innovation 
rate higher than the mean value for all industries (7.83%) and these industries are heavy 
industries or high-tech industries, such as Medical & Pharmaceutical Products (23.0%), 
Electronic Communication Equipment Manufacturing (20.7%) and Instrument & Apparatus 
Manufacturing (20.0%). There are 25 remaining industries with an innovation rate lower than 
the average value for all industries (7.83%), and these industries are light, low-tech or public 
infrastructure industries, such as Water Production & Supply (0.91%), Electricity, Heat 
Production & Supply (1.22%) and Gas Production & Supply (1.34%). The patterns for SOEs 
and private firms are similar. Further statistics on industry competition show that the majority 
of the industries with a higher innovation rate (over 7.83%) have relatively low competition 
intensity (lower than the average competition intensity for all industries). We also find that the 
majority of industries with a low innovation rate (below 7.83%) have relatively high 
competition intensity (higher than the average competition intensity for all industries). The 
statistics are in line with Hypothesis 1, according to which there is a negative relationship 











Average innovation rates and competition intensity across GB/T Two-digit industries in China from 1998 to 2007 
 Innovation Rate Competition Intensity 









[06] Coal Mining & Treatment 2.107 1.720 2.371 98.800 5.814 95.605 7.968 
[07] Petroleum & Natural Gas Extraction 4.204 2.574 17.677 90.231 / 97.936 4.290 
[08] Ferrous Metals Mining & Treatment 1.598 2.001 1.739 98.604 5.582 93.372 6.523 
[09] Non-Ferrous Metals Mining & Treatment 2.174 3.022 2.442 96.472 4.674 92.079 5.618 
[10] Non-metal Minerals Mining & Treatment 2.907 6.016 2.674 97.629 4.833 94.270 5.482 
[11] Mining of other Minerals  14.729 33.333 29.444 87.939 / 94.458 / 
[13] Farm & Side-line Products Processing  4.062 3.448 4.256 98.871 6.007 96.605 6.974 
[14] Food Production  7.314 8.116 6.622 97.277 4.638 95.659 5.606 
[15] Beverage Manufacturing  9.499 14.379 7.431 96.720 4.665 93.921 5.827 
[16] Tobacco Processing 15.906 19.026 50.000 95.616 3.779 91.000 4.632 
[17] Textile Industry  6.548 18.283 4.605 99.020 6.336 97.563 7.274 
[18] Clothing, Shoes, Hats Manufacturing  3.693 5.071 3.287 99.702 7.596 96.025 8.418 
[19] Leather, Fur, Feathers Manufacturing  4.593 14.169 4.830 98.642 5.586 96.309 6.432 
[20] Timber Manufacturing  4.440 6.343 4.332 98.246 5.221 96.550 6.013 
[21] Furniture Manufacturing  5.529 10.833 6.230 99.061 5.901 95.428 6.652 
[22] Papermaking & Paper Products  4.130 9.375 3.373 99.294 6.367 95.921 7.353 
[23] Printing Industry 3.951 3.350 3.931 99.110 5.997 93.848 6.818 
[24] Cultural Educational & Sports Goods  6.413 25.860 5.972 97.810 5.097 96.348 5.898 
[25] Petroleum Processing & Coking  4.379 7.725 2.974 97.503 4.597 99.506 6.804 
[26] Chemical Raw Materials & Products 9.207 17.086 8.101 97.913 5.396 95.729 6.560 
[27] Medical & Pharmaceutical Products  23.016 29.848 19.898 98.489 5.291 92.015 6.409 
[28] Chemical Fibre  11.030 27.792 7.159 95.401 4.209 96.589 5.500 
[29] Rubber Products  9.761 31.614 6.564 97.280 4.849 95.951 5.693 
[30] Plastic Products  6.089 13.140 5.849 99.252 5.999 95.868 6.801 
[31] Non-metal Mineral Products  5.842 7.572 5.180 98.978 6.172 96.362 6.923 
[32] Ferrous Metal Smelting & Rolling    5.592 19.008 3.217 98.022 5.344 96.760 7.208 
[33] Non-Ferrous Metal Smelting & Rolling  7.318 15.952 5.622 97.157 4.988 97.049 6.172 
[34] Metal Products  5.980 15.773 5.327 98.747 5.562 96.214 6.408 
[35] Ordinary Machinery  13.546 35.412 9.769 98.148 5.434 95.723 6.363 
[36] Special Equipment  17.676 32.785 13.677 96.987 4.598 95.786 5.573 
[37] Transportation Equipment Manufacturing  15.661 31.629 9.745 98.099 5.682 96.018 6.940 
[39] Electric Equipment & Machinery  13.658 32.830 11.653 98.227 5.408 95.574 6.499 
[40] Electronic Communication Equipment  20.653 45.903 18.913 96.515 4.513 95.736 5.952 
[41] Instrument & Apparatus Manufacturing  19.990 47.667 17.966 96.186 4.348 95.798 5.277 
[42] Handicrafts & other Manufacturing  5.836 13.135 5.669 98.504 5.259 95.699 5.979 
[43] Waste Material Recycling Processing 2.997 12.500 3.236 96.442 4.455 95.317 5.282 
[44] Electricity, Heat Production & Supply 1.219 1.356 1.332 97.740 5.176 94.455 6.930 
[45] Gas Production & Supply  1.341 2.157 13.080 97.803 4.613 99.627 5.772 
[46] Water Production & Supply  0.914 0.757 4.486 98.954 5.771 99.020 6.828 
        Average 7.833 16.117 8.734 97.472 5.291 95.736 6.307 
Note: The numbers in square brackets are the GB/T two-digit industry codes assigned by the NBS of China. The 
innovation rate is defined as the percentage of firms, which have a positive new product output value. The 
ownership classification is based on the majority (at least 50%) of a firm’s total capital paid. Industry competition 
is measured as the mean of the competition measures based on the 4-digit industry code. HHI, EI, LI (PCM), and 
FI are four different measures of industry competition based on the Herfindahl Index, the Entropy Index, the Lerner 
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Appendix C. Distribution of the number of prefecture-level administrative divisions by 
innovation rates (1998 and 2007)  
 
Table 2.A3 
Distribution of the number of prefecture-level administrative divisions by innovation 
rates from 1998 and 2007 
1998 
                                                                     
                                                             Region 
Innovation rate 
Coastal Central Western Total 
(0 - 5%] 34 35 56 125 
(5% - 10%] 41 32 35 108 
(10% - 15%] 19 14 17 50 
(15% - 20%] 6 17 9 32 
(20% - 40.68%] 1 6 9 16 
Total 101 104 126 331 
     
2007 
                                                                            
                                                             Region 
Innovation rate 
Coastal Central Western Total 
(0 - 5%] 62 59 85 206 
(5% - 10%] 22 30 19 71 
(10% - 15%] 7 12 9 28 
(15% - 20%] 3 3 5 11 
(20% - 45.46%] 7 2 12 21 
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Appendix D. Definitions of all variables 
New product output value: output value from a firm’s new products. 
Log (Patent + 1): natural logarithm of the number of a firm’s patent applications plus one 
R&D expenditure: a firm’s expenditure on research and development (R&D) investment. 
Competition [HHI]: industry competition level measured with the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index. 
Competition [EI]: industry competition level measured with the Entropy Index. 
Competition [LI (PCM)]: industry competition level measured with the Lerner Index (Profit-
Cost Margin). 
Competition [FI]: industry competition level measured with the natural logarithm of the 
number of firms. 
External finance dependence (EFD): industry’s dependence on external finance.  
Sales: firms’ total sales including domestic and overseas sales. 
Cash flow: firms’ net income plus current depreciation. 
New long-term debt issue: the difference between long-term debt in year t and t-1. 
Total assets: the sum of a firm’s assets including fixed assets and current assets. 
Real total assets: a firm’s total assets are deflated using provincial ex-factory producer price 
indices (PPI) conducted by the NBS of China.  
Chapter 2 
China’s innovation hurdle: competition and finance 
100 
 
Firm age: the period from the year when the firm was established until the year when the data 
was recorded.  
state shares: a firms’ paid-in capitals controlled by the State. 
Intellectual property rights (IPRs): a province’s score of intellectual property rights protection. 
Table 2.A4 
Classifications for the degree of financing constraints  
Ownership  SOEs 
Private 
firms 
At least 50% of paid-in capital is state-owned. 





The firm’s real total assets lie in the bottom half of the distribution 
of all firms’ real total assets belonging to the same ownership 
group and operating in the same industry in that year. 
The firm’s real total assets lie in the top half of the distribution of 
all firms’ real total assets belonging to the same ownership group 







The firm’s age lies in the bottom half of the distribution of all 
firms’ age belonging to the same ownership group and operating 
in the same industry in that year. 
The firm’s age lies in the top half of the distribution of all firms’ 
age belonging to the same ownership group and operating in the 





The firm has some state shares. 
The firm has no state shares. 
Region Coastal 





Coastal regions: Liaoning, Tianjin, Beijing, Hebei, Shandong, 
Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan; 
Central regions: Heilongjiang, Jilin, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, 
Jiangxi, Hunan; 
Western regions: Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, 
Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, 
Xinjiang.  
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Do subsidies boost innovation? Evidence from patent filings of industrial 
firms in China 
 
Using a large panel of industrial firm-level data and patent filings data in China over the period 
1998-2008, we find that government subsidies have a positive direct effect on corporate 
innovation. We confirm the causal effect of subsidies on innovation by using an instrumental 
variable (IV) estimation and a difference-in-differences (DID) specification. The positive direct 
effect is enhanced for private firms and financially constrained firms. We also find that the 
positive direct effect is more pronounced for firms in industries with low external finance 
dependence (EFD) or high-tech intensiveness, and firms located in cities with low financial 
development or low foreign direct investment. We further find that subsidies have a greater 
positive indirect effect on innovation activities of firms without subsidies than firms with 













Since Schumpeter (1911) identified innovation as the critical dimension of economic 
development, there is long literature that explores the determinants of innovation, including 
competition (Aghion et al., 2005), institutional ownership (Aghion et al., 2013; Rong et al., 
2017), financing constraints (Brown et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2012). Whether government 
subsidies improve corporate innovation is an academic question that has attracted widespread 
attention. Yet, empirical findings on the impact of government subsidies on innovation are 
inconclusive. According to the spillover effect of public goods, government subsidies may 
facilitate corporate innovation since they can solve the problems of knowledge leakage and 
market failure in the innovation process (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1972; Stiglitz, 1989). However, 
government subsidies may crowd out firms’ inputs into research and development (R&D) and 
thus impede innovation (Busom, 2000; Wallsten, 2000). Government subsidies for corporate 
innovation have been a major practice and policy in most countries while the majority of them 
focus on western economies. This study contributes to the literature by exploring the extent to 
which subsidies affect innovation in China. Furthermore, we test whether the impact of 
subsidies on innovation varies across different types of firms, industries, and cities. 
After the 1978 reform and open-up, China has experienced its phenomenal economic 
growth with an average rate of around 10% per year, and thus China becomes from one isolated 
lagging economy to a highly globalized and the world’s second-largest market economy. 
Alongside China’s rapid economic development, China’s innovation has made a tremendous 
improvement in both quantity and quality during the past decades. For the quantity-level of 
innovation, according to the statistic of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
China has become the country receiving the largest number of patent applications worldwide 
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since 2011.64 For the quality-level of innovation, China’s latest ranking is 17th in the report of 
‘Global Innovation Index 2018’ published by the WIPO, which is the first time that China rides 
to the top 20 countries of the global innovation index.65 The ranking of China is the highest 
among all developing economies, and even higher than that of some developed economies such 
as Canada (18th), Australia (20th), and Spain (28th). In addition to the innovation outputs, 
China’s innovation input has also increased significantly. According to the OECD statistics, 
China’s gross domestic spending on R&D is 462,578 million US dollars in 2018, which is 
higher than that of other OECD members only except the US (551,518 million US dollars).66 
China is one of the few low or low-middle income countries whose R&D intensity (measured 
by the ratio of R&D expenditure to GDP) has risen by over 1%. Although China’s innovation 
has greatly improved in the decades, it still faces some considerable challenges such as weak 
intellectual property protection (IRP), overwhelming dependence on foreign technology, low 
input-output efficiency. In recent years as China is facing several bottlenecks in its economic 
growth,67 the Chinese government has realized innovation especially indigenous innovation 
would become the main driver for reversing China’s current economic slowdown. The 
government-led emphasis is being gradually placed on the in-depth development of China's 
innovation through different aid programmes. For example, in 2006 the State Council of China 
employs a strategy called ‘National Program for Medium- and Long-term Scientific and 
Technological Development’ (hereafter NPMLT), which aims at promoting China’s 
                                                             
64 The Economist, ‘How innovation is China? Valuing patents’, Jan. 5th, 2013. 
65  The report of ‘Global Innovation Index 2018’ could be browsed through the website address: 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2018.pdf. 
66 The data source for the gross domestic spending on R&D is from the OECD website, available at: 
https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm. 
67 China’s economy is now facing some difficulties, such as soaring labour costs, high staff turnover, and saturated 
infrastructure investments. From 1978 to 2014, China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) maintained a high growth 
rate of around 10% per annum, while after 2014 its growth has slowed below 7% per annum. 
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innovation.68 In 2015, the Chinese central government puts forward a strategic plan of ‘Made 
in China 2025’ to drive innovation.69 
As one important economic intervention tool implemented by governments to achieve 
economic targets, subsidies have been explored in academic areas such as production efficiency 
(Bagwell & Staige, 1989; Bagwell & Staige, 2006), firm value or firm performance (Lee et al., 
2014; Lim et al., 2018). Due to the unique government-influenced economic model in China, 
governments (including central and local) still maintain enormous influence over enterprises 
through policy instruments such as subsidies. Specifically, governments can support their 
favoured enterprises or industries by allocating subsidies. Government subsidies are considered 
as one of the most important financial sources for Chineses firms (Allen et al., 2005).70 Thus, 
to explore the role of subsidies in China’s rapid economic rise during recent decades is 
increasingly important since there is a global debate about whether subsidies could give an 
unfair advantage to Chinese firms to compete with their foreign counterparts (Godement et al., 
2011; Hormats, 2011; Fang & Walsh, 2018). Given the importance of innovation for China’s 
economic growth and government subsidies in innovation has become a top national innovation 
strategy, the impact of subsidies on innovation deserves more in-depth studies in China.71 
Besides, there has been little systematic research on how subsidies affect innovation in 
                                                             
68 The NPMLT strategy has three objectives that could be summarized as follows: first, china committed to 
increasing its ratio of R&D expenditure to GDP to 2.50% in 2020; second, China committed to stimulate its 
indigenous innovation and reduce foreign technology dependence; third, corporations would become the main 
driving forces of innovation. The state council also issued a list of follow-up policies implemented by government 
ministries and agencies at all levels for supporting the strategy. 
69 In May 2015, the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and his cabinet issued the plan ‘Made in China 2025’, which 
aims to help China move from being the world’s ‘factory’ (producing cheap and low-quality goods) and move to 
produce higher-value products and services. 
70 Allen et al. (2005) suggest that the four important financial sources for Chinese firms are bank loans, firms’ 
self-fundraising, foreign direct investment, and government subsidies. 
71 According to Fang et al. (2018), government subsidies account for 22% of Chinese firms’ R&D expenditures. 
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emerging economies. Our paper can enrich the understanding of the role of subsidies in 
innovation by examining the link between government subsidies and firms’ innovation 
activities in China, the largest emerging market. observations covering  
In this study, we examine the effect of subsidies on innovation by using a huge 
unbalanced panel of 2,373,488 observations covering 663,699 large and medium-sized 
enterprises distributed in 31 provincial regions and 40 GB/T two-digit industries over the 
period 1998-2008. We find a significant and positive direct effect of subsidies on firms’ 
innovation activities. To mitigate the potential problem of endogeneity, we first employ the 
instrumental variable (IV) method by using city-level fiscal revenue and the median value of 
government subsidies in each year-city-industry-ownership cluster as the instrumental 
variables for subsidies received by firms from governments. We further employ lagged values 
of government subsidies as the instrumental variable for a robustness test. Second, to provide 
clear identification of the causal effect of subsidies on innovation, we implement a difference-
in-differences (DID) method based on a subsample of firms in Suzhou (the most economically 
developed prefecture-level city in China). Specifically, one county-level city of Suzhou, 
Zhangjiagang, revised its patent subsidy policies in 2006 while other county-level cities of 
Suzhou did not make any revisions in the meantime. In this quasi-natural experiment, we find 
that in response to this exogenous patent subsidy policy, affected firms improve innovation 
more than firms not directly affected by the policy revision. Third, to mitigate potential omitted 
variables that affect firms’ innovation activities, we add the contemporaneous terms of 
independent variables into our regression models. Fourth, to overcome concerns about 
measurement error of firms’ innovation activities, we also use firms’ new product output value 
as a measure of firms’ innovation output and R&D expenditure as a proxy of firms’ innovation 
input. These results remain qualitatively the same. 
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To further enhance robustness, first, considering that patents have different levels of 
quality, we only use the number of firms’ invention patent applications to proxy firms’ 
innovation output since invention patents represent good-quality patents. Second, we employ 
the Zero-inflated Poisson method to estimate because the number of patent applications per 
firm is a counting variable that has lots of zero outcomes. Third, we standardize the independent 
variables in regressions by using the natural logarithm of firm-level financial variables. Fourth, 
we choose an alternative sample excluding the data in the year 2008 to estimate due to the data 
limitation in the year 2008. All robust estimation results keep qualitatively unchanged. 
Furthermore, we find that government subsidies have a stronger positive direct effect 
on innovation for private firms compared to SOEs. We also find that the positive direct effect 
of subsidies on innovation is more pronounced for firms with more financial constraints 
compared to their financially healthier counterparts. We further explore whether the impact of 
government subsidies on innovation varies across industries and cities. At the industry-level, 
we find that the positive direct effect of subsidies on innovation is weaker for firms in industries 
with higher external finance dependence (EFD) but stronger for firms in industries with high-
tech intensiveness. At the city level, the positive direct effect of subsidies on innovation is 
weaker for firms in cities with higher financial development and higher foreign direct 
investment (FDI). We further find that subsidies have a spillover effect on innovation activities 
of firms without subsidies. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it contributes to the 
literature on the effects of subsidies on innovation. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is 
the first to investigate the direct effects and indirect effects of government subsidies on firms’ 
innovation activities in China based on a large number of industrial firms which are mainly 
unlisted. Prior studies have investigated the effects of subsidies on innovation while the 
Chapter 3 
Do subsidies boost innovation? Evidence from patent filings of industrial firms in China 
107 
 
majority of them focus on developed economies (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1972; Stiglitz, 1989; 
Busom, 2000; Wallsten, 2000; Almus & Czarnitzki, 2003; Kleer, 2010; Bronzini & Piselli, 
2016). However, as the largest emerging economy with a strong government role, China’s 
experiences are instructive. Besides, previous papers exploring the effect of subsidies on 
innovation in China focus on the data of listed firms (Boeing, 2016), while listed firms cannot 
fully reflect China’s economy.72 Our paper is distinct from but also complementary to the 
literature by exploring a large panel of industrial firms (consists largely of SMEs and 95% of 
which are unlisted). Second, our paper contributes to the literature on the effects of subsidies 
on firms’ performance. Several papers have studied the factors that could be impacted by 
subsidies in China, such as firm value (Lee et al., 2014), corporate social responsibility (Lee et 
al., 2017), firm performance and the cost of debt (Lim et al., 2018). Using a large panel of 
industrial firms which are mainly unlisted, our paper explores the role of subsidies on 
innovation in China. Third, our paper contributes to the literature on innovation. Some studies 
have examined various factors affecting innovation in China, including financial constraints 
(Guariglia & Liu, 2014), institutional ownership (Rong et al., 2017), input tariff liberalization 
(Liu & Qiu, 2016) and total factor productivity (Boeing et al., 2016). Since subsidies are one 
of the main financing sources for China’s firms (Allen et al., 2005), it is important to explore 
innovation from the perspective of subsidies. Fourth, due to the ‘lending discrimination’ and 
the imbalance of regional economic development in China, for the first time, we extend the 
existing research by linking with the heterogeneity on firms, industries, and cities. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we introduce the 
background of China’s patent applications and government subsidies. In Section 3.3, we 
illustrate our theoretical motivation. In Section 3.4, we describe our datasets. In section 3.5, we 
                                                             
72 Generally, firms that can go public are firms with relatively good qualifications, standard management, and 
strong profitability. Thus, listed firms are less representative of all china’s enterprises. 
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explain our estimation specifications variable measures. In Section 3.6, we show summary 
statistics and discuss empirical results. In Section 3.7, we make some tests for alleviating 
endogeneity issues. In Section 3.8, we make further tests of heterogeneity on firms, industries 
and cities. We also test the indirect effect of subsidies on innovation in the section. In Section 
3.9, we draw some conclusions. 
 
3.2. Background of China’s patent applications and government subsidies 
3.2.1. China’s patent applications 
With the China economy on a firmer footing in recent decades, China’s patent filings 
also have experienced a dramatic growth rate. For example, the report of ‘World Intellectual 
Property Indicators 2018’ shows that the number of China’s patent filings increased from 
18,700 in 1995 to 1,381,594 in 2017 with an average annual rate of 23%.73 The report also 
admits ‘China remained the main driver of global growth in filings’, which could be reflected 
by that China’s patent filings account for 43.6% of patent applications worldwide in 2017 and 
experience a growth rate of more than 10% each year since 2010. Although patent applications 
in China started late and from a small base, China has become the world leader receiving patent 
applications, outpacing Europe and South Korea in 2005, Japan in 2010, and the U.S. in 2011. 
The jump in China’s patent applications has therefore drawn a lot of attention from both 
economists and innovation scholars. For example, Hu and Jefferson (2009) explore factors that 
account for China’s recent patent explosion, including foreign direct investment (FDI), 
                                                             
73  The report of ‘World Intellectual Property Indicators 2018’ could be browsed via: 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_941_2018.pdf. Since China revised its statistics method of 
patent applications in 2017 (China counts all patent applications received before 2017 while starting from 2017 it 
only counts applications for which the office received with necessary application fees) 
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amendments to the patent law, and ownership reforms. Li (2012) suggests that patent subsidy 
programs implemented by each provincial region have played an essential role in the explosive 
growth of Chinese patenting based on publicly available data. Some papers also find negative 
factors of China’s innovation, such as Liu and Qiu (2016) that find a negative relationship 
between a drastic input tariff liberalization and corporate innovation. 
Fig. 3.1 shows clearly the growing trend of the number of total patent applications to 
the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) of China since 1985 when the patent system was 
first implemented in China. According to the statistics, the number of total patent applications 
increased from only 18,509 in 1986 to 3,697,845 in 2017 with an average annual growth rate 
of 19.1%.74 Specifically, we find that patent applications grew rather modestly until the end of 
the 1990s, while after 2000 especially 2002 have surged dramatically (except 2014), which 
may be explained by the benefits of technology embedded in imported inputs caused by 
China’s entry into the WTO in December 2001. Amendments to patent law in 2000 also make 
a huge contribution to the upsurge in the new century. Also, we find that the SIPO receives the 
bulk of its patent applications from domestic innovators rather than foreign innovators. 
Although domestic and foreign applications both show growth trends, their growth rates are 
different. Specifically, domestic applications experienced excessive growth from 13,680 in 
1986 to 3,536,333 in 2017, while foreign applications had a relatively sluggish growth from 
4,829 in 1986 to 161,512 in 2017. Thus, the difference in the number of applications between 
domestic and foreign increased from 8,851 in 1986 to 3,374,821 in 2017. The explosive surge 
of domestic applications may be interpreted by consistent policies issued by China’s 
                                                             
74 The data in 1985 is recorded from 1st April 1985. Thus, we observe the development trend of China’s patent 
applications from the year 1986 rather than the year 1985. This also applies to the next description of Fig. 3.2. 
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government for stimulating indigenous innovation, such as the patent law amendments in 2008, 
which can encourage indigenous innovation. 
[Insert Figure 3.1 here] 
There are three types of patents granted by the SIPO: invention, utility model, and 
design. The three types of patents are different in applicable targets, protection period, and 
approval procedures.75 Among these three kinds of patents, invention patents are regarded as 
major innovation patents with high quality as they have the most difficult examination 
requirements. Fig. 3.2 shows the proportion of the three types of patent applications in China 
during the period from 1985 to 2017. We can find that the proportion of invention patent 
applications first had a downward trend from 43.27% in 1986, while after the patent law 
amendment in 1992 it presented a growth trend to 37.36% in 2017 although the growth trend 
fluctuated slightly. During the period, the proportion of utility model patent applications first 
decreased before 2007 and then increased, while the proportion of design patent applications 
did the opposite (increased before 2007 and then decreased). We also can find that during the 
period the proportion of invention patent applications rarely outpace 40% (except the year 1985 
and the year 1986), which is against the sum of the proportion of utility model patent 
applications and the proportion of design patent applications always being higher than 60%. 
The findings suggest although invention patent applications play an increasingly important role 
in the application system of China’s patents, the overall quality of China’s patent applications 
is still not high. 
[Insert Figure 3.2 here] 
                                                             
75 The detailed differences of the three types of patents are described in Appendix A. 
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3.2.2. China’s government subsidies 
Subsidies are a form of financial aid or support granted by the government or a public 
body and extended to a microeconomic sector (or institution, business, or individual) to 
promote economic and social policy (Myers, 2001). Government subsidies can be divided into 
various types based on targets, such as production subsidies, import/export subsidies, 
employment subsidies, R&D subsidies, etc. As a form of economic intervention, subsidies are 
inherently contrary to the free market’s demands. However, according to Schwartz and 
Clements (1999), there are at least three reasons why governments still apply subsidies as a 
policy instrument in the process of economy-control. First, governments could use subsidies to 
offset various market imperfections because the free market’s ‘invisible hand’ cannot always 
allocate resources most efficiently. Second, governments could use subsidies to gain economies 
of scale in production when important sectors are too small in scale to compete with their larger 
and more mature counterparts in the market. Third, governments could employ subsidies to 
achieve social policy objectives, such as a fairer distribution of consumption or income. 
As one of the four main financing sources (Allen et al., 2005), subsidies play an 
important role in the surge of China’s economy during the past decades. Since 1953 when 
China’s central government issued its first ‘Five-year’ plans to manage its industrial 
development, government subsidies in China are prevalent and persistent. The ‘Five-year’ 
plans of different periods issued by China’s central government show targeted products, 
enterprises, and industries that governments need to support in different periods. Subsidies are 
one of the most important financial tools to reflect administrative support. For example, more 
subsidies are allocated by governments to the enterprises in some strategic emerging industries 
in the 13th Five-year plan covering 2016 to 2020, such as information and communication 
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technology, aerospace hardware, new energy fuelled vehicles, and marine engineering 
equipment.  
Besides the central government, local governments also have the incentives to subsidize 
firms caused by two reasons. First, since the reform and open-up policy in 1978, China’s central 
government has been delegating the power on subsidy allocation to local governments. The 
decentralization makes that local governments have considerable discretion in determining the 
number of subsidies allocated to corporations. Second, the most important indicator for 
evaluating local government officials’ performance is the economic performance (GDP) of 
their respective areas. The evaluation performance mode, as well as the decentralization, lead 
to severe competition among local officials to promote economic development. Thus, local 
officials are keen to assist firms in their respective areas by granting subsidies. 
For China’s innovation (i.e. patent) subsidy policies, since 1999 Shanghai (the city with 
the largest economy in China, administratively equal to a province) implemented China’s first 
patent subsidy policy to promote local enterprises’ patenting activities, until 2007 most of the 
provinces have launched similar programs and many prefecture-level cities have their subsidies 
for patent applications (Li, 2012).76 Government subsidies come in various distribution forms, 
and all seven categories of them given by Schwartz and Clements (1999) have been 
                                                             
76 According to China’s constitution, cities are divided into three administration levels: 4 municipalities (Beijing, 
Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing) are first-level (province-level) administrative divisions and directly governed 
by the central government. The four cities are administratively to other 30 province-level administrative divisions 
(including Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan); prefecture-level cities including 15 sub-provincial cities are 
secondary-level (prefecture-level) administrative divisions and directly governed by the provincial government. 
These prefecture-level cities are ranked below province-level while above county-level in the administrative 
structure of China; county-level cities are third-level (county-level) administrative divisions and governed by the 
prefecture-level city government. Provincial governments directly govern a few county-level cities. The county-
level cities are the lowest-ranking cities in China. According to the China Statistical Yearbook 2018 
(http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2018/indexch.htm), by the end of 2017, there are totally 4 municipalities, 294 
prefecture-level cities and 363 county-level cities in China. 
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implemented to facilitate innovation in China. 77  Some policies offer a fixed amount of 
reimbursement to firms for patent applications, regardless of the actual costs or whether the 
application is granted. Some policies provide subsides with a cap based on applicants’ actual 
out-of-pocket expenses. Some policies pay a portion of application fees to applicants and award 
a prize (usually a much larger amount) for applications granted. For example, the State Council 
of China in 1999 approved the ‘innofund program,’ which is a special government R&D 
program to support innovation activities of small and medium technology-based enterprises 
(SMTEs) by appropriation, interest-free bank loans, and equity investment.  
Due to the various distribution forms of subsidies, the total amount of government 
subsidies is potentially unobservable because a fraction of subsidies granted is in the form of 
non-monetary supports (in other words, indirect grants). A bias is likely to appear since 
subsidies are underreported in firms’ financial statements. In China’s context of the study, we 
focus on the observable forms of government subsidies that are recorded in firms’ income 
statements.  
 
3.3. Theoretical motivation 
It is challenging to empirically test the impact of government subsidies on corporate 
innovation. There seems no consensus among prior research. A considerable number of 
scholars (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1972; Stiglitz, 1989; Görg and Strobl, 2007; Aerts & Schmidt, 
                                                             
77 Schwartz and Clements (1999) define the seven categories of government subsidies as: ‘direct government 
payments to producers or consumers (cash subsidies or cash grants); government guarantees, interest subsidies to 
enterprises, or soft loans (credit subsidies); reductions of specific tax liabilities (tax subsidies), government equity 
participations (equity subsidies); government provision of goods and services at below-market prices (in-kind 
subsidies); government purchases of goods and services at above-market prices (procurement subsidies); implicit 
payments through government regulatory actions that alter market prices or access (regulatory subsidies)’.  
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2008) suggest that government subsidies have a positive effect on corporate innovation. On the 
contrary, some scholars (Busom, 2000; David et al., 2000; Wallsten, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 
2018) argue that government subsidies affect corporate innovation negatively.  
On the one hand, there exists considerable evidence to show that government subsidies 
have a positive impact on corporate innovation. One research strand suggests that government 
subsidies could mitigate the uncertainty risk associated with innovation and have more 
incentives to innovate. Due to the spillover effect or knowledge leakage caused by R&D 
projects, innovators could not reap the full benefits of innovation and then weaken firms’ R&D 
incentives (Clarysse et al., 2009). This might subsequently lead to a market failure problem 
that R&D input cannot reach the optimal level (Arrow, 1972; Stiglitz, 1989). Besides, 
compared to other investments, R&D projects require a demand for high inputs and a long-
term investment cycle, which could result in higher costs of external financing. Government 
subsidies could stimulate firms’ innovation motivation due to the following reasons. First, 
subsidies can reduce the marginal cost and diversify the uncertainty risk of R&D projects 
(Almus & Czarnitzki, 2003; González & Pazó, 2008) by serving as a supplement to the 
innovation funds needed by firms (Tether, 2002). Second, government subsidies can reduce 
the problem of information asymmetry between firms and external investors by providing a 
positive signal of the firm’s quality. Specifically, external investors cannot fully know the real 
information on R&D projects. Obtaining government subsidies for a firm may signal to market 
investors that the firm has a greater probability of owing projects with high quality and low 
risk (Lerner, 1999; Feldman & Kelley, 2006; Kleer, 2010). Consequently, firms receiving 
government subsidies are more likely to raise more external funds for innovation. Hence, many 
scholars suggest that government subsidies are a supplement to innovation funds and have a 
positive effect on firms’ innovation activities. 
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On the other hand, another research strand holds that subsidies hurt firms’ input into 
R&D projects and thus play a discouraging role in firm innovation. Some scholars suggest that 
after obtaining subsidies from governments, due to managerial myopia (Stein, 1988), firms’ 
managers may invest these funds into projects with a short-term investment cycle to pursue 
more short-term profits rather than long-term projects such as R&D (Lundstrum, 2002). 
Subsidies may fail to play their expected role as a supplement to innovation funding at this 
condition since subsidies would be moved to more short-term projects whose funds are not 
fully covered. Thus, firms receiving subsidies from governments create a crowding-out effect 
on their innovation inputs (Yu et al., 2016). Also, because firms’ capital risk would be lower 
as R&D inputs decrease, firms with more subsidies tend to decrease more inputs into R&D and 
invest in more projects with short-term profits. The crowding-out effect of subsidies on 
innovation will become more obvious (Boeing, 2016). Therefore, some scholars argue that 
government subsidies fail to add more innovation funds and hurt firms’ innovation activities.  
 
3.4. Data 
This paper relies on a combined database that covers the patent data of the State 
Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) and the firm-level data of the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) of China. 
3.4.1. SIPO patent data 
The first data source for firms’ patent applications is the SIPO patent data 
(http://www.sipo.gove.cn), which is available since 1985 when the patent system was 
established in China. The SIPO dataset provides detailed information on all published patent 
applications, including patent application number, patent application date, applicant’s names 
and addresses, patent’s international patent classification (IPC), i.e., whether the patent is 
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applied as an invention patent, a utility model patent, or a design patent. The data is the most 
comprehensive coverage of patent information, and thus could be used in exploring China’s 
innovation. However, due to the difficulties in integrating such data with other firm-level data 
since the SIPO patent data nearly has no same common identifier with other datasets, academic 
papers using Chinese patent data are still sparse. Some papers (Dang & Motohashi, 2015; Liu 
& Qiu, 2016) choose the official Chinese names of patent applications recorded in the SIPO 
patent data to merge such data with the NBS firm-level data used in the study. However, this 
matching method still has some drawbacks since the names of firms listed in the datasets may 
not be fully consistent. Specifically, first, in the NBS firm-level data, the recorded variable of 
firms’ official names has many obvious errors.78 Second, one firm’s name could change in the 
NBS firm-level data but the corresponding applicant firm probably does not timely update in 
the SIPO patent data or vice versa. Thus, if we directly link the SIPO patent data with the NBS 
firm-level data by using firms’ names, there are potential estimation bias arising from the 
matching step. Fortunately, He et al. (2018) have created a matching algorithm that fits with 
the SIPO patent data and the NBS firm-level data from 1998 to 2009.79 They processed the 
SIPO patent data and found the corresponding legal person codes of each patent applicant. 
Thus, we can merge the SIPO patent data processed by He et al. (2018) with the NBS firm-
level data by using firms’ legal person codes. The merging process is described in Section 3.4.3. 
3.4.2. NBS firm-level data 
The second data source for firm-level financial information is the Annual Survey of 
Industrial Enterprises over the period 1998-2008, which is drawn from the annual accounting 
                                                             
78 For example, we see many problematic names such as ‘鄂鄂州市隆昌合金钢有限责任公司’ (the second 鄂
is redundant and must be a data entry error) and ‘S试笫星旆嵋_铣’ (the firm name is a total error messed up).  
79 The processed database could be found in He, Z.-L., Tong, T., Zhang, Y. & He, W. Harvard Dataverse 
http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/QUH8KT (2017). 
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reports conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China.80 Thus, the census data 
is called NBS firm-level data and the most comprehensive firm-level dataset that spans the 
population of large and medium-sized firms in China. These firms are either state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) or non-SOE with annual main business income (i.e., sales) above 5 million 
Chinese yuan (approximately 680,000 US dollars, according to the official 2008 exchange 
rate).81 The data covers roughly 165,000 businesses in 1998 to around 450,000 in 2008 as more 
enterprises are added during the period. All firms in the dataset are distributed in 39 mining, 
manufacturing, and public utilities and across all 31 provinces or provincial administrative 
units (except Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan), representing the broad Chinese economy. The 
dataset features detailed firm characteristics such as official names, locations, industry codes 
as well as most items of each firms’ financial performance every year, including total assets, 
total liabilities, main business sales, net income, accumulated depreciation, etc. The original 
sample for the period 1998-2008 contains 2,640,143 observations.82 Additionally, the data has 
an advantage in constructing a panel with its unique legal identifier known as the legal person 
code (fa ren dai ma) to each firm (Chang & Wu, 2014).83 The data has been explored in studies 
                                                             
80 Actually, now the dataset has been updated to 2013. However, we have to stop the data until 2008 due to some 
reasons as follows. First, some key variables are lost after 2007 such as the current-year depreciation that is lost 
during the period 2008 to 2010, while current-year depreciation is used for calculating cash flow which is one 
control variable in our regression models. Since in our baseline model all independent variables are lagged by one 
year, we can choose the latest data until 2008. Second, the patent data for matching with NBS firm-level data is 
processed by He et al. (2018) until 2010. Third, in 2011 the China NBS adjusts the threshold of ‘above-scale’ 
enterprises for this dataset by increasing annual sales from 5 million Chinese yuan to 20 million Chinese yuan. 
Fourth, the financial crisis in 2008 potentially could make an estimation bias. Based on the above reasons, we 
have to choose the latest data until 2008.  
81 The firms with annual sales of more than 5 million Chinese yuan are referred to ‘above-scale’ firms, and thus 
the dataset is also called ‘above-scale’ industrial enterprise database. 
82 In order to enhance the data reliability, we compare the NBS firm-level data with the records of the China 
Statistical Yearbook. The detailed description could be viewed in Appendix A. 
83 We do not choose firms’ names to construct the panel data since firms could change their names frequently. 
According to China’s Company Registration Rules, the legal person code of one firm is unique nationwide and 
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of economy and finance on serval topics: competition (Cai & Liu, 2009; Aghion et al., 2015), 
financial constraints (Ding et al., 2013; Guariglia & Liu, 2014), foreign direct investment 
(Wang & Wang, 2015; Lin & Ye, 2017) and innovation (Hu & Jefferson, 2009; Liu & Qiu, 
2016)  
Before the construction of the combined data with the SIPO patent data, we process the 
NBS firm-level data to secure data quality. First, we supplement 408 observations’ legal person 
codes which are less than nine digits to nine digits by and capitalize all English letters in the 
legal person code of 5,834 observations in the dataset to eliminate the influence of data 
collection error.84 Second, we remove 5,838 observations without legal person codes and 641 
observations with duplicated legal person codes, as these observations could not be used to 
construct the panel data.85 Third, since China’s government revised the ‘National Industries 
                                                             
would not change after the registration of its legal entity even if it has adjusted its name and business nature. 
Occasionally, firms change their legal person code as firms’ ownership has changed, which may be caused by 
restructuring, joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, etc. For this situation, these firms generally change their 
legal entity. Thus, we treat only firms with different legal person codes are different firms and use firms’ legal 
person codes to construct the panel data. 
84 First, in the dataset, 408 observations in 2008 have a legal person code of fewer than nine digits. We manually 
check them and find that this is a data collection error. If we use figure 0 to complement these observations’ legal 
person codes to nine digits, we can observe that some of these 408 observations in 2008 are the same firms as 
observations with the corresponding complemented legal person codes in previous years. For example, the 
observation with the legal person code of ‘9316247’ in 2008 actually is the same firm as the observation with the 
legal person code of ‘009316247’ in 2007. Second, we also find that this is a data collection error for 5,834 
observations with lowercase English letters in legal person codes. After capitalizing all English letters in the legal 
person code of these observations, we find that observations with the adjusted legal person codes in other years 
are the same firms as those 5,834 observations. For example, the observations with the legal person codes of 
‘x20723214’ in 2005, 2006 and 2007 are the same firm as the observations with the legal person codes of 
‘X20723214’ in 2004 and 2008. 
85 Some different firms share the same legal person code (probably due to statistical errors) and we cannot 
distinguish exactly which one of the various observations with the same duplicated legal person code is reliable. 
The fraction of these observations is quite low, roughly 0.024%, and thus we delete all observations with 
duplicated legal person codes in order to construct the panel and ensure data reliability. 
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Classification’ in 2002 to keep consistent with the WTO regulation in 2001, we adjust the 
sector codes for firms before 2002 to keep the sector codes consistent during the sample 
period.86 We delete 7,646 observations in the industries transferred from manufacturing sectors 
and in the industries that disappeared in the scope of manufacturing sectors after the 
classification revision in 2002, as firms in these industries could not keep consistent during the 
sample period. After the industry-matching procedure, we use the updated industry codes to 
construct industry dummy variables in regression models. Fourth, we drop 253,108 
observations with annual sales of less than 5 million Chinese yuan to avoid the interference of 
no ‘above-scale’ enterprises.87 Fifth, we drop 218 observations from the dataset by following 
the basic rules of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Specifically, 
observations whose total fixed assets are greater than total assets; liquid assets are greater than 
total assets; current depreciation is greater than accumulated depreciation are taken out of our 
sample. 
3.4.3. Merging SIPO patent data with NBS firm-level data 
We construct our unique dataset by linking the SIPO patent data processed by He et al. 
(2018) with the NBS firm-level data. Specifically, for the SIPO patent data, we calculate the 
number of each firm’s all patent applications (including invention, utility model and design) 
every year as the measure of firms’ innovation output, and then we merge the calculated 
innovation proxy with the NBS firm-level data through firms’ legal person codes. After 
merging, we find that only approximately 3.42% of observations in the NBS firm-level data 
                                                             
86 The Chinese description of the ‘National Industries Classification’ revision in 2002 could be viewed via: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgz/tjdt/200207/t20020711_16330.html. The detailed information on China’s industry 
codes and the adjustment in 2002 are shown in Appendix B.  
87 We have discussed that the dataset also records SOEs with annual sales of less than 5 million Chinese yuan. 
Additionally, in 2004 and 2008, all industrial firms are required to participate in the China NBS survey.  
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have patent applications, suggesting that the participation rate of applying patents for Chinese 
firms is low. 
To obtain a clear panel, we trim observations in the one per cent tails of each of the 
firm-level continuous regression variables to control for the potential influence outliers.88 All 
financial variables are deflated by using the provincial-level Producer Price Index (PPI) of each 
year during the sample period (1998 - 2008) conducted by the NBS.89 After all adjustments, 
we finally get a large unbalanced panel data of 2,373,488 observations covering 663,699, 
mainly unlisted firms for the period 1998-2008.90 
Based on our adjusted huge unbalanced panel data, we observe patent applications of 
China’s firms from different perspectives (years, regions, and industries). Fig. 3.3 and Fig. 3.4 
respectively show the development trends of the participation rate of patent applications for 
firms and the number of patent applications per 1,000 firms in China during the period 1998 – 
2008. On the one hand, we can find that from 1998 to 2008, China’s firms show an increase in 
the enthusiasm of applying for patents. Specifically, for the full sample, the participation rate 
of patent applications increases from 2.10% in 1998 to 4.34% in 2008. There is also an 
increasing trend for the number of patent applications per 1,000 firms from 73.67 in 1998 to 
373.33 in 2008. On the other hand, although firms’ patent applications in China have shown 
obvious growth trends in the decade, we find that the level of China’s patent applications is 
                                                             
88 The number of patent applications is a firm-level discrete variable and only less than 4% of the observations 
have patent applications. Additionally, because we employ the natural logarithm of the number of patent 
applications, the influence of discrete characteristics could be avoided to some extent. Thus, we do not winsorize 
the variable of innovation output of 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) in our regressions.  
89 The information on the provincial-level PPI could be searched on the NBS website (http://data.stats.gov.cn/). 
90 Appendix A shows details of the structure of the unbalanced panel. Additionally, because the data in 1998 and 
1999 are used to construct lagged values in regression models. To enhance compatibility with the data in our 
regression estimations, in Table 3.2 of summary statistics we only summarize the data in our regression models 
during the period from 2000 to 2008. 
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still not high, which can be reflected by the low participation rates of patent applications (never 
exceed 5%). The increase in firms’ enthusiasm for applying patents is possibly interpreted by 
the policies of promoting innovation issued by Chinese governments, and the low participation 
rates of Chinese firms’ patent applications may be caused by that Chinese firms’ face R&D 
capital constraints. 
[Insert Fig. 3.3 here] 
[Insert Fig. 3.4 here] 
Fig. 3.3 and Fig. 3.4 also compare SOEs and private firms in China.91 It is clear that 
compared to private firms, SOEs have a higher level of patent applications over the whole 
sample period, no matter in the participation rate of patent applications or the number of patent 
applications per 1,000 firms. Specifically, the participation rate of patent applications for SOEs 
and private firms respectively is 2.96% and 1.69% in 1998. Although the rate for SOEs and the 
rate for private firms grow separately to 7.32% and 3.46% in 2008, we can find that the 
difference in participation rates between SOEs and private firms rises from around 1.27% in 
1998 to 3.86% in 2008. It also can apply to the number of patent applications per 1,000 firms 
and the gap of the numbers between SOEs and private firms increases from almost 22.97 to 
561.51. A reasonable explanation for the enlarged gap is that SOEs can expand their advantages 
in applying for patents by enjoying the privilege of cheap loans from banks dominated by state 
capital or easily get support from governments such as subsidies. Besides, the relatively weak 
China’s IRP possibly limits private firms’ patent applications since they have to protect 
                                                             
91 We use the percentage of paid-in capitals to identify firms’ ownership types. If a firm’s at least 50% of paid-in 
capitals are owned by the state, it is an SOE; if a firm’s at least 50% of paid-in capitals are owned by individuals, 
it is a private firm. 
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business interests, while SOEs can take advantage of their good connections with governments 
to fully ensure their benefits. 
Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6 respectively show the snapshots of the average participation rate 
of patent applications for firms and the average number of patent applications per 1,000 firms 
across prefecture-level administrative divisions in China during the period 1998 - 2008.92 We 
can find that cities in coastal regions have a higher level of patent applications than cities in 
central and western regions, no matter in the participation rate of firms’ patent applications or 
the number of patent applications per 1,000 firms. It keeps consistent with the conventional 
view that patenting activities are positively related to economic development.93 Specifically, 
we find that more than two-thirds of the cities in coastal regions ((38+31)/101=68.32% and 
(39+29)/101=67.33%) have higher values than the median values of the average participation 
rates (1.87%) and the average number (62.71) across cities. However, the proportions of cities 
in central regions and western regions owning values greater than the median values of the 
average participation rates (1.87%) and the average number (62.71) across cities are all below 
                                                             
92  There are totally three main administration levels in China. We have introduced in Note 14 that four 
municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing) are administratively equivalent to other 30 province-
level administrative divisions (including Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan). The second level is prefecture-level 
administrative divisions (prefecture-level cities, areas, autonomous prefectures or leagues). The third level is 
county-level administrative divisions (districts, county-level cities, counties, autonomous counties, banner or 
autonomous banner). According to the China Statistical Yearbook 2018, by the end of 2017, there are totally 34 
province-level administrative divisions (excluding Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan), 334 prefecture-level 
administrative divisions and 2,851 county-level administrative divisions in China. Our maps of Figure 5 and 
Figure 6 are based on 4 municipalities and 334 prefecture-level administrative divisions. Hong Kong, Macao and 
21 cities in Taiwan are included in the maps, but they miss the data records. 
93 The economic development among regions in China is not balanced. Coastal regions are the most important 
areas in China’s economy. For example, according to the 2018 China Statistical Yearbook, China’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) is 82,712.77 billion yuan and the sum of GDP for 11 provinces in coastal regions (excluding Hong 
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) is 47,124.47 billion yuan that is 56.97% of the country’s GDP. In contrast, the sum of 
GDP for 8 provinces in central regions and sum of GDP for 12 provinces in western regions are only 20,733.38 
billion yuan and 16,856.16 billion yuan that are respectively 25.07% and 20.38% of the country’s GDP. 
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half. The findings can suggest that the development level of patenting activities in coastal 
regions is better than that in central and western regions. The detailed data of the distribution 
of the number of prefecture-level administrative divisions for Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6 are shown 
in Appendix E. 
[Insert Fig. 3.5 here] 
[Insert Fig. 3.6 here] 
 
3.5. Estimation specifications and variable measures 
We choose a modified Euler equation that is first employed to test the presence of 
financial constraints on investment (Whited, 1992; Bond et al., 2003). As a dynamic structural 
model, the Euler equation model has the advantage of controlling expected future profitability. 
Thus, financial variables in the regression do not pick investment opportunities (Bond et al., 
2003). The baseline model is shown as following Eq. (3.1): 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) = 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 +
                                   𝛽5𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑉𝑖 + 𝑉𝑡 + 𝑉𝑜 + 𝑉𝑗 + 𝑉𝑝 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑜,𝑝,𝑡             (3.1) 
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the measure of firms’ innovation output calculated by the number of patent 
applications for a firm i in a given year t. However, we encounter a problem that in our dataset 
the majority of observations have zero patent filings (that is 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡  equals 0) because the 
majority of firms do not submit patent applications to the SIPO during the sample period. Thus, 
we construct a measure of 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 by using the natural logarithm of it - 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1)  to 
avoid the problem of too many zeros. We then employ the transformation 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1)  as 
the dependent variable in our regression models. We choose the application year of one patent 
Chapter 3 
Do subsidies boost innovation? Evidence from patent filings of industrial firms in China 
124 
 
rather than the grant year because the patent’s application year can better capture the actual 
time of innovation (Griliches et al., 1986).  
Using patents to measure innovation output has pros compared to other proxies 
(Bronzini & Piselli, 2016). Specifically, first, patents are less exposed to personal or subjective 
considerations. Second, patents are better to reflect innovation quality, because experts who 
can judge novelty and utility must examine one innovation product and then decide whether it 
can be patented. Third, Griliches (1990) suggests that patent activity can be interpreted as an 
indicator of the growth of economically valuable knowledge, and therefore a good measure of 
invention activity. Thus, given these advantages of patents, we believe that the number of 
patent applications is a suitable measure of innovation output in our empirical research. 
In addition to patent filing data, there are other measures of innovation activities such 
as new product output value and R&D expenditure. Since in the NBS firm-level dataset the 
record of new product output value is incomplete,94 we employ the variable of new product 
output value as an alternative measure of firms’ innovation output to alleviate the potential 
measurement error of innovation output to enhance robustness. We also choose the variable of 
R&D expenditure as a measure of firms’ innovation input for a robustness test to check whether 
the effect of subsidies on innovation keeps consistent.95 
Our main explanatory variable is 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡  which represents total subsidies a firm i 
receives from governments in year t. We standardize the variable by using the variable itself 
divided by total assets. For other control variables, we denote a firm i’s ratio of sales to total 
                                                             
94 The data of new product output value is available from the years 1998-2008 but missing in 2004 and 2008. 
Thus, during the sample period 1998-2008 in the study, the new product output value is less satisfactory than 
patent filing.  
95 The data of R&D expenditure is only available for the years 2001-2003 and 2005-2007. 
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assets in year t as 𝑆𝑖,𝑡, its ratio of cash flows to total assets in year t as 𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡 and its ratio of new 
long-term debts to total assets in year t as 𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 .
96 All independent firm-level continuous 
variables are lagged by one year (𝑡 − 1) to meet the modified Euler equation to eliminate 
simultaneity issues. We also add some dummy variables into the regression model. 𝑉𝑖 is firm 
fixed effects. 𝑉𝑡 is year fixed effects to control the impact of economic cycle changes. 𝑉𝑜 is 
ownership dummy variables to control the effects of different ownerships which are grouped 
based on the fraction of firms’ registered paid-in capitals.97 𝑉𝑗 is industry dummy variables 
because government subsidies are generally distributed to firms in emerging strategic industries 
or industries that governments need to support.98 𝑉𝑝 is geographical dummy variables because 
the regional gap of economic development makes that firms in China’s various places differ in 
their ability and probability to obtain subsidies from governments.99 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑜,𝑝,𝑡 is an idiosyncratic 
error term. Table 3.1 shows the definitions of all regression variables in Eq. (3.1). 
[Insert Table 3.1 here] 
Table 3.2 shows the pairwise correlation analysis of the main regression variables. We 
find that except for the lagged innovation variable of 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)  and the lagged 
squared innovation variable of 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 , there is no collinearity between other 
variables. The correlation index between our dependent variable (innovation output variable of 
                                                             
96 New long-term debts are the difference between the contemporaneous long-term debts and the lagged long-
term debts. Thus, in the dataset observations with new long-term debts are recorded from 1999. 
97 Following Guariglia and Liu (2014), we choose the fraction of firms’ registered paid-in capitals to construct 
firms’ ownership categories. Based on the majority (at least 50%) of registered paid-in capital (see Ayyagari et 
al., 2010, for a similar approach), all firms are divided into six categories: state-owned enterprises (SOEs); foreign 
firms; private firms; collective firms; Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan (HMT) firms; and mixed ownership firms. 
The detailed description of ownership classification is in Appendix D. 
98 Due to the limitation of statistical software packages, GB/T two-digit sector codes rather than three-digit codes 
and four-digit sector codes are used as industry dummies in Eq. (3.1) to control industry fixed effects. 
99 Here we use province codes as geographical dummy variables. 
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𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1)) and main explanatory variable (subsidy variable of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1) is  0.0188 and 
the significance level is 1%, which can indirectly suggest a positive relationship between firms’ 
patenting activities and government subsidies. The finding possibly shows that government 
subsidies have a promoting effect on firms’ innovation output.  
[Insert Table 3.2 here] 
 
3.6. Summary statistics and empirical results  
3.6.1. Summary statistics 
Table 3.3 summarizes the means (and medians in parentheses) of the main variables for 
the full sample, firms with/without patent applications, SOEs and private firms. 100  The 
observations with patent applications (52,147) are approximately one out of twenty 
observations without patent applications (1,058,235), reflecting a low participation rate of 
patenting activities in China. Additionally, there are 90,124 SOE firm-year observations 
compared to 446,572 private firm-year observations (around 40% of the full sample), 
suggesting that private firms are still the main components of Chinese corporations. 
[Insert Table 3.3 here] 
It is no strange that firms with patent applications have a higher average value of 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) (1.454) than firms without patent applications, whose corresponding value is 
zero. We also find that innovative firms have a higher ratio of lagged government subsidies to 
                                                             
100 We summarize the number of observations estimated into regressions. This is the reason that the number of 
total observations is 1,110,382. If we summarize the number of all observations in the panel (2,373,488), the 
findings remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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total assets (mean value of 0.260%) compared to that of non-innovate firms (mean value of 
0.182%). The finding may indirectly reflect a positive relationship between firms’ innovation 
activities and government subsidies. More subsidies received from the government possibly 
can increase firms’ innovation activities. Moreover, innovative firms have a lower ratio of sales 
to total assets (mean value of 125.652%) compared to non-innovate firms (mean value of 
192.177%). We also find that firms with patent applications have a lower ratio of cash flow to 
total assets (mean value of 8.645%) and a higher ratio of new long-term debt issue to total 
assets (mean value of 0.319%) compared to firms without patent applications (corresponding 
values are 9.752% and 0.064%). The finding may be caused by greater demand for external 
funds of R&D characteristics, which is that firms’ limited internal finance generally cannot 
solo support their innovation activities. Therefore, innovative firms have to rely more on 
external finance. For other firm-level variables, patenting firms are larger and more mature in 
terms of real total assets (mean value of 776.732 million yuan) and age (mean value of 14.647 
years old) compared to their non-patenting counterparts (corresponding values are 82.779 
million yuan and 11.501 years old). Firms with patent applications are more politically 
affiliated (mean value of 66.575) and have more percentage of state shares (mean value of 
10.231%) than firms without patent applications (corresponding values are 74.352 and 
8.105%).101 We also find innovative firms are more likely to locate in coastal regions (mean 
value of 1.320) rather than non-innovate firms (mean value of 1.357).102 
Table 3.3 also compares SOEs and private firms. We find that SOEs own more 
innovation activities versus private firms, which can be shown by that the average values of all 
                                                             
101 We define all variables in Appendix D to show that political affiliation is a categorical variable. In the Chinese 
dataset, its Chinese appellation is ‘zhengzhilishu’ (lishu). If the value of variable ‘zhengzhilishu’ one firm is higher, 
the firm tends to own less political affiliation. On the contrary, firms displaying lower values of variable 
‘zhengzhilishu’ are more likely to be highly political affiliated or controlled by the government. 
102 We define coastal regions as 1, central regions as 2 and western regions as 3. 
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the three innovation indexes are higher for SOEs (average values of 0.083, 2.527% and 0.113% 
respectively) than private firms (average values of 0.054, 2.105% and 0.095% respectively). It 
is no doubt that the ratio of government subsidies to total assets for SOEs (mean value of 
0.277%) is higher than private firms (mean value of 0.168%) since SOEs can easily obtain 
more subsidies from governments by using their close connection with governments.  
3.6.2. Estimation method 
One significant feature of our data is that the majority of firms do not own patent 
applications in some of the year, so our dependent variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is left-censored 
at zero. Additionally, our data is a huge unbalanced panel. Considering firms’ heterogeneity, 
we, therefore, employ the Random-effects Tobit estimator in this study (Tobin, 1958). To 
ensure robustness, we also estimate the Pooled Tobit based on the full sample. Since the Tobit 
is a non-linear estimation method, we estimate average marginal effects. According to Cong 
(2001), in the study, we report all three types of marginal effects of the Tobit estimation, which 
are the marginal effects on the probability, the quantity of truncated data, and the quantity of 
censored data.103  
3.6.3. Empirical results 
Table 3.4 shows the estimation results based on the full sample. We observe that more 
firms’ subsidies received from governments increase both the likelihood and the intensity of 
firms’ innovation activities. We report the estimation results of baseline Eq. (3.1) using 
                                                             
103 According to Cong (2001), for the marginal effects in the probability, it measures how the probability of being 
uncensored changes with respect to the regressors; for the quantity of truncated data, it describes the changes in 
dependent variable with respect to changes in the regressors among the subpopulation for which dependent 
variable is not at a boundary. For the quantity of censored data, it measures how the observed dependent variable 
changes with respect to the regressors. 
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Random-effects estimation in Table 3.4. In columns (1) to (3), we find that the marginal effects 
of the subsidy variable (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1) are all significant and negative. To be specific, the magnitude 
of the marginal effect in the probability of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1  in column (1) is 0.193 (19.3%) and 
significant at the 1% level, which means that a 10% increase in the ratio of firms’ subsidies 
received to total assets is associated with an average increase of 0.0193 (1.93%) in the 
probability that firms own patent applications. The magnitude of the marginal effect in the 
quantity of truncated data of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 in column (2) is 0.721 (72.1 %) and significant at the 1% 
level, suggesting as the ratio of firms’ subsidies received to total assets increases by 10%, the 
number of patent applications rises by 0.0721 (7.21 %) for firms with patent applications. The 
marginal effect in the quantity of censored data of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 in column (3) is 0.238  (23.8%) and 
significant at the 1% level, showing that a 10% increase in the ratio of firms’ subsidies received 
to total assets leads to an average increase of 0.0238 (2.38%) in the number of patent 
applications for firms with/without patent applications. The estimation results clearly show that 
there is a positive and significant relationship between firms’ subsidies obtained from 
governments and firms’ innovation activities. The results suggest that more government 
subsidies could promote more firms’ innovation activities, verifying the supplement effect of 
subsidies to innovation funds since government subsidies could increase firms’ motivation for 
innovation and reduce information asymmetry between firms and market investors. 
[Insert Table 3.4 here] 
For other control variables, we find that that the marginal effects of 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) 
on 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) are all positive and significant at the 1% level and the marginal effects 
associated with 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 are all negative and significant at the 1% level, keeping 
consistent with the theoretical assumption. The signs of the marginal effects of 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 are all 
significantly negative at the 1% level. The finding could be explained by the short-sighted 
Chapter 3 
Do subsidies boost innovation? Evidence from patent filings of industrial firms in China 
130 
 
behaviours of Chinese firms, suggested by that Chinese firms would not innovate as their 
market shares expand. Although the marginal effects of 𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1  and 𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1  are all 
significantly positive at the 1% level, we find that the magnitudes of the marginal effects of 
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 are all larger than those of 𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1, showing that firms prefer internal finance (cash 
flow) to external finance (bank loans) to support patent activities. We also estimate the Pooled 
Tobit in columns (4) to (6) and find the empirical results keep qualitatively unchanged. 
 
3.7. Endogeneity issues and robustness tests 
A major challenge in our main regressions is that government subsidies are likely 
endogenous. Firms with more innovation activities are more likely to obtain subsidies from 
governments (more innovation, more subsidies), that is, a reverse causality between 
corporation innovation and government subsidies. In Section 3.7.1 and Section 3.7.2, we 
implement the instrumental variable (IV) approach and the quasi-natural experiment to confirm 
the causal effect of subsidies on innovation. To further circumvent endogeneity issues 
associated with potential omitted variables and measurement errors, in Section 3.7.3, we add 
the contemporaneous terms of the firm-level financial variables at the right-hand side to control 
for potential omitted variables. In Section 3.7.4, we use alternative measures of firms’ 
innovation activities to alleviate potential measurement errors in our regression model.  
3.7.1. Instrumental variable (IV) approach 
In this section, we employ the instrumental variable (IV) method. The first IV used for 
government subsidies received by firms (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡) is the amount of annual public finance revenue 
in prefecture-level cities divided by the number of firms in prefecture-level cities each year 
Chapter 3 




104 Since government subsidies come from public finance revenue, the more 
public finance revenue in a city, the more subsidies from governments for firms in the city. We 
also  employ the median value of government subsidies in each year-city level (𝑀𝑒𝑑_𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑐,𝑡) 
as the second IV since it is likely to be closely linked to firms’ government subsidies. Both two 
instrument satisfies the relevance condition of the instrument but is unlikely to be affected by 
firms’ decisions on innovation.   
Table 3.5 reports the estimation results of the IV method. Columns (1) to (4) show the 
results when 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 is only instrumented by 𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1. Column (1) shows the first-stage 
regression results based on Newey’s two-step estimator (Newey, 1987).105 The coefficient 
value of 𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1 (0.003%) shows that the ratio of public finance revenue divided by the 
number of firms at the prefecture-city level (𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1 ) is significantly and positively 
correlated with the subsidies received by firms from governments. The findings suggest that 
firms tend to obtain more government subsidies when they are located in cities where local 
governments have more public finance revenues. The statistical first-stage F-value (418.100) 
is far greater than the rule of thumb of 10, showing that the IV (𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1) is valid and does 
not suffer from a possible weak instrument bias (Staiger & Stock, 1997; Stock & Yogo, 2005). 
Columns (2) to (4) demonstrates the second-stage estimation results when 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1  is only 
instrumented by 𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1. Although the magnitudes of the marginal effects of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 
(41.993%, 153.064%, and 58.750% respectively) are larger compared to those of our main 
                                                             
104 Information on public finance revenue at the city level is collected from the China City Statistical Yearbook. 
105 For the IV Tobit estimation in STATA process, we have to add the option ‘twostep’ after the code ‘ivtobit’ to 
estimate the first-stage regression results, which is based on Newey’s two-step estimator. For the marginal effects 
of the second-step regression results, we could employ the default estimator of maximum likelihood instead of 
the option ‘twostep’.   
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empirical results, we find that all marginal effects of the instrumented 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1  remain 
statistically significant and positive. 
[Insert Table 3.5 here] 
Columns (5) to (8) show the estimation results when 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1  is instrumented by 
𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1  and 𝑀𝑒𝑑_𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑐,𝑡−1. Column (5) shows the first-stage regression results, and it is 
no doubt that the median value of government subsidies in each year-city level (𝑀𝑒𝑑_𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑐,𝑡−1) 
is significantly and positively (198.118%) correlated with government subsidies received by 
firms. The coefficient of 𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1 remains statistically significant and positive (0.003%). 
The first-stage estimation results confirm the relevance of these two IVs to subsidy variable 
(𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1). The statistical first-stage F-values (418.190) is larger than the rule of thumb of 10, 
suggesting that the instrumental variables (𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1 and 𝑀𝑒𝑑_𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑐,𝑡−1) are valid and do 
not face a potential weak instrument bias. Columns (6) to (8) report the second-stage estimation 
results when 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 is instrumented by 𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1  and 𝑀𝑒𝑑_𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑐,𝑡−1. We find that the 
marginal effects of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 are all positive (7.591%, 27.674%, and 10.619% respectively) at 
the 1% significant level, which keeps consistent with our main empirical results. The estimation 
results of the two IV methods verify that government subsidies have a positive effect on firms’ 
innovation activities in China, even after considering the endogenous nature of subsidies.  
To evaluate the validity of the instruments, we conduct a Wald test of exogeneity and 
an Anderson-Rubin (AR) test. Specifically, the Wald test measures whether the error terms in 
the structural equation and the reduced-form equation for the endogenous variables are 
correlated. In Table 3.5, the significant p-value statistics (0.000) suggest that our regressors are 
not exogenous and confirm the necessity of introducing instrumental variables. The AR test is 
a joint test of the structural parameter and the exogeneity of the instruments. The null 
hypothesis of the AR test is that all regressors are exogenous and the minimum canonical 
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correlation is zero. In Table 3.5, the significant p-value statistics (0.000) lower than 0.05 
suggest that our model is identified and/or our instruments are valid. Additionally, we also 
conduct a Hausman test and a Smith-Blundell test to confirm the existence of endogenous 
variables (Smith & Blundell, 1986). 
3.7.2. Quasi-natural experiment   
In this section, we provide clear identification of the causal effect of subsidies on 
innovation by using a difference-in-differences (DID) specification. In 2006, the State Council 
of China initiated the ‘National Program for Medium- and Long-term Scientific and 
Technological Development’ to promote innovation. As a response to the central strategy, 
some local authorities changed their subsidy policies for patent applications. For example, in 
2006, Zhangjiagang, one county-level city of Suzhou (a prefecture-level city in Jiangsu 
province) revised its subsidy policies for patent applications by increasing the number of 
subsidies per the patent application, while subsidy policies in other neighbouring county-level 
cities of Suzhou remained unchanged (Lei et al., 2012). Specifically, before 2006, the county-
level cities of Suzhou have the same subsidy policies for the patent application, which is 
implemented in 2003.106 On June 12th, 2006, Zhangjiagang increases the number of subsidies 
from 1,500 yuan, 1,000 yuan and 500 yuan to 3,000 yuan, 1,500 yuan and 1,000 yuan for 
applications of invention patents, utility model patents, and design patents, respectively. It also 
awards more than 10,000 yuan for the grant of each invention patent application. However, at 
the same time, the subsidy policies in other county-level cities of Suzhou remain unchanged.107 
                                                             
106 In 2006, Suzhou prefecture-level city is made up of 7 county-level districts (Municipal districts, Canglang, 
Pingjiang, Jinchang, Huqiu, Wuzhong, and Xiangcheng) and 5 county-level cities (Changshu, Zhangjiagang, 
Kunshan, Wujiang, and Taicang). The county-level districts are the centre areas of one prefecture-level city. Thus, 
we make a combination of all seven county-level districts and call it as Suzhou urban districts. 
107 The detailed information of the amount of subsidies of patent applications for all county-level cities of Suzhou 
are shown in Appendix F.  
Chapter 3 
Do subsidies boost innovation? Evidence from patent filings of industrial firms in China 
134 
 
Thus, the exogenous shock to subsidies for firms’ patent applications in Zhangjiagang provides 
us with an ideal opportunity of using a quasi-natural experiment to identify the causal effect of 
subsidies on patent filings.  
For the specification, first, we choose a dummy variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 that equals 1 for the 
treatment group (firms distributed in Zhangjiagang) and 0 for the control group (firms 
distributed in other neighbouring county-level cities of Suzhou), which can capture the 
difference in 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1)  between the treatment and control groups before the policy 
revision. Second, to separate the full sample period into the pre-revision and post-revision 
periods, we employ a time dummy variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡  that equals 1 starting from 2006 and 0 
otherwise, which can check the difference in 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) between the pre-revision and 
post-revision periods for the firms in the control group. The aggregate factors that could change 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) can be captured by the dummy variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, even in the absence of the 
policy revision in 2006. Third, we construct an interaction term (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) to yield the 
average treatment effect, which compares the difference between the treatment and control 
groups in their average differences between the pre-revision and post-revision periods. Last, 
we replace the subsidy variable (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1) with the interaction term (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) in baseline 
Eq. (3.1) to re-estimate.108 
Table 3.6 shows the estimation results of marginal effects in the quantity of censored 
data based on our DID specification due to space limitation, while the other two types of 
marginal effects keep qualitatively unchanged. In column (1) when we do not include other 
control variables, the marginal effect of the interaction term (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) is statistically 
significant and positive (0.047), suggesting that after the revision of subsidy policies in 2006, 
                                                             
108 We employ county-level cities as the geographical dummy variables since we estimate the subsample of firms 
in Suzhou. 
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firms in Zhangjiagang with better patent subsides undertake more patenting activities than 
firms in other county-level cities. The marginal effect of the single term (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡) is significant 
and positive, suggesting that the firms in Zhangjiagang have more a greater number in 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1)  than firms in other county-level cities in the pre-treatment period. The 
significant positive marginal effect of the single term ( 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ) shows a positive trend in 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) for the firms in other county-level cities from the pre-revision to post-revision 
periods. However, we only need to observe the marginal effect of the interaction term (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡). The main effect of the single term (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡) only applies when 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 equals 0, which can 
capture the difference in 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) in the pre-treatment period. The main effect of the 
single term (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) also applies when 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 equals 0. In column (2) when we include other 
control variables, we find the marginal effect of the interaction term keeps statistically 
significant and positive (0.080). 109  We do not include county dummy variables and year 
dummy variables because doing it would introduce collinearity with the single terms of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 
and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡. In column (3) we check when we add the geographical effect (𝑉𝑝) and the year effect 
(𝑉𝑡) in estimation but do not cover the single terms of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 and 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, and the estimated 
marginal effect of the interaction term ( 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ) keeps qualitatively unchanged 
(0.079).110 The findings confirm our main empirical results and then successfully test the causal 
effect of subsidies on innovation.  
[Insert Table 3.6 here] 
Next, we conduct a series of validity checks for the experiment setting and report the 
estimation results in Table 3.6. In column (4), we make a test for the ‘parallel trend’ assumption, 
                                                             
109 Due to space limitation, we do not show the estimation results of other control variables while they keep 
qualitatively consistent with our main empirical results. 
110 Here we use the codes of county-level cities to reflect the geographical effect. 
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which is necessary for a DID approach. Specifically, we use a flexible estimation by 
constructing a time series of interaction terms between 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 and the year dummies for the full 
sample period, that is, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡  * 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  with 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  indicating 2000 through 2008. 111  The 
estimation also could remedy the drawback that the interaction term (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) does not 
consider year-to-year changes. The estimated marginal effects of these interaction terms are all 
statistically insignificant for years before 2006, showing that before the policy revision in 2006 
there is no significant change for the difference in firms’ patenting activities between the 
treatment and control groups. Thus, the ‘parallel trend’ assumption of patenting activities for 
the two groups before the revision could be achieved. Meanwhile, the marginal effects of the 
interaction terms become statistically significant and positive for every year from 2006 
outwards. Specifically, the magnitude of the marginal effect of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2007 (0.111) is 
higher than that of 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2006 (0.055) and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2008 (0.059), showing that 
the revision has the largest promoting effect on innovation in the year 2007. The results again 
verify the dynamics of the impact of the revision on innovation.  
We also plot the differences in average response outcomes between the treatment and 
control groups from the pre- to post-revision periods in Fig. 3.7 and Fig. 3.8. First, we find that 
both groups show a similar trend in outcomes before the revision in 2006 so the differences of 
patent applications are small. Specifically, for Fig. 3.7 the difference in the patent participation 
rate is approximately between -1% and 1% before 2006 and for Fig. 3.8 the difference in the 
number of patent applications is negative before 2006. Second, both groups show different 
trends in outcomes after the revision in 2006 so the differences in patent applications become 
large. Specifically, for Fig. 3.7 the difference in the patent participation rate reaches more than 
                                                             
111 We introduce in the Note 27 that the data in years 1998 and 1999 are used to construct control variables. Thus, 
the estimation for the full sample covers years from 2000 to 2008. The benchmark is the interaction term 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 
* 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2000 for the next interaction terms 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 * 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 from 2001 to 2008. 
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2% after 2006 and for Fig. 3.8 the difference in the number of patent applications substantially 
increases to approximately 100 after the year 2006. The figures show that our DID method 
satisfies the parallel trend assumption. 
[Insert Fig. 3.7 here] 
[Insert Fig. 3.8 here] 
We take more placebo tests for the validity check and report them in Table 3.6. First, 
we assume that the policy revision happened in 2005 and construct the dummy variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 
equals 1 starting from 2005 and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 keeps unchanged, 1 
for firms in Zhangjiagang and 0 for firms in other county-level cities. We then run the data 
until the year 2006 before the policy revision and the marginal effect of the interaction term 
(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) reported in column (5) is statistically insignificant, suggesting that if the policy 
revision happened in 2005, firms’ patenting activities of firms in Zhangjiagang could not be 
affected. Second, we assume that one of the other county-level cities without the policy revision 
such as Changshu (one of the county-level cities of Suzhou) is affected by the policy revision, 
and thus construct the dummy variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 equals 1 for firms in Changshu and 0 otherwise. 
The dummy variable 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 keeps unchanged, 1 starting from 2006 and 0 otherwise. In column 
(6) we report the marginal effect of the interaction term (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) that is statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that firms’ patenting activities in Changshu are not affected by the 
policy revision. The estimation results of the placebo tests suggest an only revision of subsidy 
policy in Zhangjiagang in 2006 has a causal impact on innovation. 
3.7.3. Potential omitted variables- adding the contemporaneous terms 
As mentioned above, the baseline Eq. (3.1) only considers the impact of lagged terms 
of independent variables while contemporaneous terms may also affect firms’ innovation 
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activities. Thus, an estimation bias of omitted variables would appear. To address the concern, 
we include the contemporaneous terms of all firm-level financial variables to augment the 
baseline Eq. (3.1). Specifically, we not only add the contemporaneous subsidy variable (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡) 
but also include the contemporaneous cash flow variable (𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡) as firms’ R&D projects are 
largely affected by their contemporaneous internal cash flow. Also, since there is a potential 
correlation between internal cash flow and sales (Dechow et al., 1998), we add the 
contemporaneous sales variable (𝑆𝑖,𝑡) in the regression to avoid an estimation bias. We also add 
the contemporaneous term of the new long-term debt issue (𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡) into the specification.  
Table 3.7 shows the estimation results of the augmented Eq. (3.1) covering 
contemporaneous terms of all firm-level financial variables. We find that the estimation results 
keep qualitatively consistent with those of our main results: the sum of the marginal effects of 
subsidy variables (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡) is still statistically significant and positive. Specifically, 
in columns (1) to (3), the magnitudes of the sum of the marginal effects of subsidy variables 
(𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡) are 0.275, 1.015 and 0.331 respectively and significant at the 1% level, 
verifying that more subsidies increase innovation activities. Besides, we notice that the 
magnitudes of the contemporaneous subsidy variable are larger (0.191, 0.704, and 0.229, 
respectively) compared to those of the lagged subsidy variable (0.084, 0.311 and 0.101 
respectively), showing that contemporaneous subsidies have a larger positive effect on 
innovation activities. The findings confirm the necessity of including the contemporaneous 
terms in the estimation. 
[Insert Table 3.7 here] 
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3.7.4. Potential measurement errors - alternative measures of innovation 
In our main results, we use the number of patent applications per firm to measure 
innovation output. However, using the number of patent applications to measure innovation 
output still has disadvantages in a brief discussion as not all innovation outputs would be 
patented (Griliches, 1990). Specifically, first, the requirements of patent applications are strict. 
The number of patent applications cannot fully reflect the further improvement for products 
that have been patented, thus firms’ innovation performance may be undervalued. Second, to 
secure business economic returns, firms might not patent their innovation outputs to avoid the 
premature leakage of innovation information. Only innovation outputs whose patents have 
economic value above a certain minimal threshold are patented (Griliches, 1990). Third, 
China’s relatively weak IRP also can hamper firms’ enthusiasm for patent applications. Thus, 
using the number of patent applications may yield measurement bias for innovation output. For 
mitigating this issue, we further measure firms’ innovation output by using the ratio of firms’ 
new product output value to total assets (𝑁𝑝𝑖,𝑡) in baseline Eq.(3.1) to re-estimate.
112 Compared 
to the number of patent applications, new product output value can reflect the industrialization 
performance of innovation achievements. In other words, new product output value can 
measure commercialized innovation output while patents can only measure technological 
innovation outputs (Guo et al., 2016). Besides that, we also choose the ratio of firms’ R&D 
                                                             
112 In the China Statistical Yearbook (2006), new products are defined as “those new to the Chinese market that 
either adopt completely new significant principles, technologies or designs, or are substantially improved in 
comparison with existing products in terms of performance and functionality, through significant changes in 
structure, materials, design or manufacturing process.” As a good indicator of innovation output, new product 
output value has been widely used in recent papers related to innovation (Henard & Szymanski, 2001; Guariglia 
& Liu, 2014). Because in the NBS firm-level dataset the variable of new product output values is only recorded 
from 1998 to 2007 and missing in 2004, we have to make it as a robustness test. 
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expenditure to total assets (𝑅𝑑𝑖,𝑡) to proxy firms’ innovation activities based on R&D input 
level to estimate baseline Eq. (3.1). 
Table 3.8 shows the corresponding estimation results. In columns (1) to (3) when firms’ 
innovation output is measured by the ratio of firms’ new product output value to total assets, 
we find that the signs of the marginal effects of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 still keep significantly positive (0.083, 
0.047, and 0.024). Next, in columns (4) to (6), the marginal effects of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1  are also 
statistically significant and positive (0.406, 0.006, and 0.004) when innovation activities are 
measured by the ratio of firms’ R&D expenditure to total assets. The findings of the robustness 
tests suggest that no matter which proxy of innovation activities we employ, the positive effect 
of subsidies on innovation can hold. 
[Insert Table 3.8 here] 
3.7.5. Additional robustness tests 
Besides the aforementioned estimation methods, our results keep consistent when we 
employ various robustness tests. First, following some studies (Lei et al., 2012; Li, 2012), since 
invention patents represent good-quality patents, we only select the number of invention patent 
applications to proxy firms’ innovation output. Compared to two other types of patents, 
invention patents are the most technologically innovative and require more R&D efforts. 
Second, since the number of patent applications per firm is a count variable, the majority of 
whose values are 0, we employ the Zero-inflated Poisson method to estimate again.113 Third, 
                                                             
113 In our main estimations, we do not winsorize the innovation output variable of 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) since we 
employ the natural logarithm to eliminate the effect of discrete values. In the part, we winsorize the number of 
patent applications per firm that is not presented by the natural logarithm (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡) at its 99
 percentage to avoid the 
influence of extreme values. Additionally, according to Vuong (1989), since the statistics value of Vuong in our 
estimation is relatively large (67.37>1.96), we should choose Zero-inflated Poisson regression rather than standard 
Poisson regression. 
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since we choose the natural logarithm of the number of patent applications as the dependent 
variable, we also use the natural logarithm to standardize firm-level financial variables to 
estimate. Fourth, due to the data limitation in the year 2008, we choose an alternative sample 
excluding the data in the year 2008 to estimate. Table 3.9 shows the results of all robustness 
estimations that remain qualitatively unchanged with our main empirical results.114 
[Insert Table 3.9 here] 
 
3.8. Further tests 
3.8.1. Firms’ ownership 
There are significant differences between firms of various ownerships in resource 
acquisition and signal transmission through the mechanism of using subsidies for innovation 
(Liang et al., 2012). In Table 3.10, we test whether there is a difference in the effect of subsidies 
on innovation between the two groups of firms.  
[Insert Table 3.10 here] 
Using a Random-effects Tobit estimator, our results show that the marginal effects of 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1on 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) for SOEs are all significantly greater than those of private firms. 
Specifically, for private firms in columns (2), (4) and (6) the marginal effect in the probability 
of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 is 0.294, the marginal effect in the quantity of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 of truncated data is 1.237, 
and the marginal effect in the quantity of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 of censored data is 0.375. The marginal 
effects are all significant at the 1% level. By contrast, in columns (1), (3) and (5) the marginal 
                                                             
114 For brevity, we only report the marginal effects in quantity of censored data.  
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effects of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 for SOEs are statistically insignificant. The p-values associated with the t-
tests for the equality of the marginal effects between SOEs and private firms show that these 
differences are significant. The results suggest that government subsidies have a more 
promoting effect on patenting activities of private firms rather than those of SOEs. 
The difference in the effect of subsidies on innovation between SOEs and private firms 
could be explained as follows. First, from the perspective of resource acquisition, compared to 
private firms, SOEs could easily get financial support from governments such as subsidies 
because SOEs are controlled or operated by governments (Li et al., 2008; Guariglia & Mateut, 
2016). The financial advantage could cause a problem of soft budget constraints to SOEs (Lin 
& Tan, 1999; Chow et al., 2010; Liang et al., 2012), which makes that using subsidies to 
promote innovation performance is not important for SOEs. Additionally, the financial 
advantage of SOEs could result in a problem of resource slack that deepens the agency problem 
(Greve, 2003). Thus, the incentives of using subsidies to innovate are not strong for managers 
of SOEs. They are likely to invest in less risky activities rather than R&D. Second, 
administratively appointed managers of SOEs often lack professional management ability, 
which also weakens the efficiency of SOEs in transforming innovative resources such as 
subsidies into innovative output (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000; Carman & Dominguez, 2001). 
By contrast, although private firms have a high enthusiasm for innovation, they are normally 
constrained by available funds due to the ‘lending bias’ in China (Chen et al., 2012).115 Thus, 
using subsidies to promote innovation performance is important for private firms. Third, 
private firms have more autonomy and flexibility in the implementation of innovation strategy 
                                                             
115 Due to the unique state-dominated financial system in China, compared to SOEs, private firms face institutional 
discrimination from state-controlled ‘Big-five’ commercial banks that have always been dominant players in 
China’s financial markets. The ‘Big-Five’ commercial banks in China are Bank of China Limited, Agricultural 
Bank of China Limited, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited, China Construction Bank Corporation, 
and Bank of Communications. 
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compared to SOEs, since private firms do not face the problems that SOEs have such as 
managers’ administration promotion pressure, redundant employees, policy burdens (Lin & 
Tan, 1999). These organizational advantages enable private firms to transform innovative 
resources into innovative output more effectively (Liang et al., 2012). 
3.8.2. Heterogeneity on firms’ financing constraints 
Since the ‘lending bias’ existed in China’s financial market, firms in China generally 
have a disparity in financial constraints. Thus, we further take the heterogeneity of firms’ 
financial constraints into account. Specifically, we first use firms’ size and age to measure 
firms’ financial constraints due to two reasons. First, small and young firms generally face 
high-cost external financing since they are typically characterized by high idiosyncratic risk 
and high bankruptcy costs (Carpenter et al., 1994; Chirinko & Schaller, 1995; Czarnitzki & 
Hottenrott, 2011; Guariglia & Yang, 2016). Second, small and young firms cannot enjoy the 
benefits of economies of scale that large and mature firms own, thus they do not have enough 
physical assets as collateral or long records of accomplishment to obtain external finance such 
as bank loans. Thus, compared to large and mature firms, small and young firms have a large 
probability of facing more financial constraints. Second, we choose firms’ political affiliation 
and state shares as proxies of firms’ financial constraints. Since firms with political affiliation 
and firms with state shares are more likely to obtain loans from the bank system dominated by 
state capitals (Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Khwaja & Mian, 2005) and thus face less financial 
constraints compared to firms without political affiliation and firms without state shares. Last, 
Following Hadlock and Pierce (2010), we also construct the SA index to measure firms’ 
financial constraints. Firms with a higher SA index are more financially constrained firms, 
while firms with a lower SA index are less financially constrained firms. 
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Table 3.11 shows the estimation results based on firms’ heterogeneity on financial 
constraints. Due to space limitation, we only report marginal effects in the quantity of censored 
data while the estimation results of the other two types of marginal effects keep qualitatively 
consistent. In columns (1) and (2) showing the estimation results of small firms and large firms, 
we find that the marginal effect of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 on 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is significantly stronger for 
small firms (0.212) rather than large firms (0.152). In columns (3) and (4), we observe that the 
marginal effect of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1  for young firms (0.305) is significantly higher than that for mature 
firms (0.203). The results suggest that the positive effect of government subsidies on patenting 
output is more pronounced for small firms and young firms rather than their large counterparts 
and mature competitors.  
[Insert Table 3.11 here] 
Table 3.11 also compares firms without political affiliation and firms with political 
affiliation in columns (5) and (6), firms without state shares and firms with state shares in 
columns (7) and (8). We find that the marginal effect of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 on 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) for firms 
without political affiliation (0.460) is statistically significant at the 1% level, while insignificant 
0.044 for firms with political affiliation. Besides, the positive marginal effect of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 for 
firms without state shares is larger (0.256) and more significant (at the 1% level) than that for 
firms with state shares (its magnitude is 0.145 at the 10% significant level). The results show 
that patenting activities of firms without political affiliation and firms without state shares are 
more positively affected by government subsidies than those of firms with political affiliation 
and firms with state shares. 
Based on firms’ size and age, we also construct the index of firms’ financial constraints 
– the SA index and divide the full sample into two parts: firms with low SA index and firms 
with high SA index. The former are less financially constrained firms while the latter are more 
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financially constrained firms. Table 3.11 displays the estimation results of firms with a low 
level of SA index and firms with a high level of SA index. Specifically, in columns (9) and 
(10). we find that the marginal effect of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 is significantly 0.204 for firms with a high SA 
index while only significantly 0.173 for firms with a low SA index. The findings show that 
government subsidies have a stronger effect on innovation activities of firms with a high SA 
index than those of firms with a low SA index. 
In short, the positive effect of subsidies on innovation is more pronounced for more 
financially constrained firms, suggesting that the supplement effect of subsidies on innovation 
is stronger for firms with more financial constraints. Specifically, the supplement effect is 
stronger for small firms, young firms, firms without political affiliation, firms without state 
shares, and firms with a high SA index rather than their counterparts: large firms, mature firms, 
firms with political affiliation, firms with state shares and firms with low SA index. The p-
values associated with the t-tests for the equality of the marginal effects between high 
financially constrained firms and low constrained firms show that these differences are 
significant at the 1 % level. 
3.8.3. Industry heterogeneity  
Due to the different characteristics of industries and cities, we also test what changes to 
the positive effect of subsidies on innovation based on different industries and cities. For 
industries, we first compare firms in industries with different levels of external finance 
dependence (EFD) and second compare firms in industries with different levels of high-tech 
intensiveness. For EFD, we follow Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Acharya and Xu (2017) to 
compute the level of industry EFD. Specifically, we first calculate the fraction of firms’ capital 
expenditure that cannot be financed by their internal cash flow to proxy firms’ EFD. Then, we 
obtain the median value of all firms’ EFD in one industry each year to construct a time series 
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of the industry’s EFD level. Finally, we choose the median value of the time series of one 
industry’s EFD level as the industry’s dependence on external finance (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗) over 
the period 1998 to 2008. As regards the classification of high-tech intensiveness, we make it 
based on the ‘High-tech industries classification’ conducted by the NBS of China. 116 The 
industries whose codes are listed in the classification are regarded as the industries with high-
tech intensiveness and the rest as the industries without high-tech intensiveness. We construct 
a dummy variable (𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑗) that equals 1 for the industries with high-tech intensiveness 
and otherwise as 0. To test the changes to the positive effect of subsidies on innovation 
concerning industry variables, we construct the interaction terms (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 
and 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑗) and respectively add them into baseline Eq. (3.1) to re-estimate. 
Table 3.12 shows the estimation results with industry variables. In columns (1) to (3), 
we find that the marginal effects of the interaction term ( 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 ) show 
statistically significant and negative (-0.513, -1.888 and -0.615), indicating that the positive 
effect of subsidies on innovation would be reduced with higher industry EFD. The explanation 
is that a higher EFD in China may reflect a greater borrowing capacity for firms. Thus the 
supplement effect of subsidies on innovation funds would be alleviated for these firms with a 
strong financing ability. The magnitudes of the single term of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 become smaller (0.158, 
0.583 and 0.190) compared to those in Table 3.4, which is not particularly interesting given 
that the main effect of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 only applies when 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 equals zero. The same also 
applies to the single term (𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗).  
[Insert Table 3.12 here] 
                                                             
116  The website link of the classification of high-tech industries could be browsed via: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjbz/201812/t20181218_1640081.html. 
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Next, in columns (4) to (6), the marginal effects of the interaction term (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑗,𝑡−1) are statistically significant and positive (0.279, 1.034, and 0.384), which 
means that the positive effect of subsidies on innovation is stronger for firms in industries with 
high-tech intensiveness. The finding is possibly interpreted by that firms in industries with 
high-tech intensiveness generally have a greater demand for funds to support their large number 
of innovation activities caused by their industry characteristics, thus having a higher incentive 
of using subsidies to stimulate R&D. As a comparison, firms in industries without high-tech 
intensiveness do not have a high requirement of innovation funding.  
3.8.4. City heterogeneity  
For cities, we first compare firms in cities with different levels of financial development 
and second compare firms in cities with different levels of foreign direct investment. Following 
Hsu et al. (2014), we use the ratio of deposits to gross regional product (GRP), the ratio of 
loans to GRP, and the ratio of household savings to GRP to respectively measure city-level 
financial development in years (𝐹𝑖𝑛 − 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡). For city-level foreign direct investment in years 
(𝐹𝑜𝑟 − 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑐,𝑡), we employ the natural logarithm of the number of foreign new contracts signed, 
the ratio of agreed foreign investment to GRP, and the ratio of actual foreign investment to 
GRP to proxy it. Information on all city-level financial variables is collected from the China 
City Statistical Yearbook.117 As similar to the industry variables, for exploring the influence of 
city-level financial variables on the positive effect of subsidies on innovation, we construct the 
related interaction terms (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑛 − 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1  and 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 − 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1 ) and put 
them into baseline Eq. (3.1) to re-estimate, respectively. 
                                                             
117 In the China City Statistical Yearbook, the data related to financial development is recorded from 2003 and the 
data related to foreign direct investment is recorded from 2000. 
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Table 3.13 presents the corresponding estimation results. In panel A, we find that the 
marginal effects of the interaction term (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑛 − 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1) are statistically significant 
and negative, regardless of which measures of the city-level financial development, showing 
that higher financial development would reduce the stimulating effect of subsidies on 
innovation. The finding could be explained by that firms located in cities with a higher level of 
financial development are more likely to easily obtain funds from the banking system since 
banks in these cities have a strong lending capacity. If financial development could mitigate 
the financing constraints faced by innovative firms. The promoting effect of subsidies on 
innovation may be reduced. 
[Insert Table 3.13 here] 
In Panel B of Table 3.13, we find that the marginal effects of the interaction term 
(𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 − 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1) are statistically significant and negative, suggesting that higher 
city-level foreign direct investment would also decrease the positive effect of subsidies on 
innovation. The interpretation is similar to that of financial development. Since firms could 
enjoy the benefits of financing sources from foreign direct investment, the positive effect of 
subsidies on innovation would decrease. 
3.8.5. Indirect effect of subsidies on innovation 
In Section 3.6.2, we have tested the impact of subsidies on firms’ innovation and we 
could define the impact as the direct effect of subsidies on innovation. However, subsidies may 
have an indirect effect of subsidies on innovation, especially for firms without subsidies. In 
this section, we further explore the indirect effect of subsidies on firms’ innovation. 
First, we define industry (𝑗) groups and geographical (𝑐) areas as industry-city clusters 
(𝑗, 𝑐). The definition (rather than using clusters based solely on, say, industry classification, or 
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regions) provides us with a sufficiently large number of clusters. Second, we construct a new 
subsidy variable to represent the proportion of firms with subsidies in one cluster, which is 
𝑆𝑢𝑏 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑁1𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 𝑁2𝑗,𝑐,𝑡⁄ = ∑ 𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡
𝑁2
𝑖 𝑁2𝑗,𝑐,𝑡⁄ . We define 𝑁1𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 as the number of 
firms with subsidies in one cluster (𝑗, 𝑐) and year (𝑡) and 𝑁2𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 as the number of all firms in 
one cluster (𝑗, 𝑐) and year (𝑡). 𝑑𝑖,𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 is a binary variable which equals 1 if one firm (𝑖) receives 
subsidies in one cluster ( 𝑗, 𝑐 ) and year ( 𝑡 ) and equals 0 if not. Third, we add 
𝑆𝑢𝑏 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑗,𝑐,𝑡−1 into Eq. (3.1) to test its effect on firms’ innovation. 
Table 3.14 shows the corresponding estimation results. We find the marginal effect in 
the probability of the interaction term ( 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑏 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1 ) in column (1) is 
significant and negative, suggesting that the positive effect of subsidies on innovation is 
reduced as the proportion of firms with subsidies in one cluster increases. The marginal effect 
in the quantity of truncated data in column (4) and the marginal effect in the quantity of 
censored data in column (7) keep significant and negative. The finding could be explained that 
a high probability of obtaining subsidies reflected by an increasing number of firms with 
subsidies could decrease the initial positive effect of subsidies on firms’ innovation. Since an 
increasing number of firms obtaining subsidies could reduce the number of subsidies 
distributed to each firm in the cluster, firms’ innovation funds would be reduced and thus the 
promoting effect of subsidies on innovation decreases. Furthermore, we use 𝑆𝑢𝑏 −
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1  instead of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1  to explore the indirect effect of subsidies on innovation by 
dividing the full sample into two groups: firms with subsidies and firms without subsidies. The 
estimation results are reported in columns (2) and (3), and the marginal effect in the probability 
of 𝑆𝑢𝑏 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1  on innovation is significant and positive for firms without subsidies 
while insignificant for firms with subsidies. The finding shows that subsidies have a greater 
positive indirect effect on innovation for firms without subsidies than firms with subsidies. If 
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the proportion of firms with subsidies in one cluster becomes large, the patent activities of 
firms without subsidies increase faster than those of firms with subsidies. An increasing 
proportion of firms obtaining subsidies would encourage more firms without subsidies to 
participate in innovation activities. We also report the marginal effect in the quantity of 
truncated data in columns (5) and (6) and the marginal effect in the quantity of censored data 
in columns (8) and (9), which keep qualitatively unchanged. 
[Insert Table 3.14 here] 
 
3.9. Conclusions 
Using panel data covering mainly unlisted firms in China over the period 1998-2008, 
we find that firms with more government subsidies are more likely to innovate. The estimation 
results also have some policy implications for China from the perspective of the incentive 
mechanism. First, since subsidies could play an active role in improving firms’ innovation 
performance, governments should implement subsidy schemes that could motivate firms’ 
innovation activities. Second, our study shows that the impact of government subsidies on 
innovation varies across firms with different types of ownership. Thus governments should 
further adjust the objective mechanism of subsidies. Specifically, more subsidies should be 
allocated to private firms instead of  SOEs as the former has a strong demand for innovation 
and R&D funds. Third, considering our estimation results showing that subsidies have a 
stronger positive effect on innovation activities of more financially constrained firms compared 
to those of less financially healthier firms, governments should apply more subsidy policies to 
financially constrained firms, such as small firms, young firms, firms without political 
affiliation, firms without state shares, firms with a higher SA index. For example, in May 1999, 
the State Council of China approves a special government R&D program called ‘Innovation 
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fund for technology-based firms’ which aims to ‘facilitate and encourage the innovation 
activities of small and medium technology-based enterprises (SMTEs).’ More policies similar 
to the program should be issued for financially constrained firms. Fourth, since the positive 
direct effect of subsidies on firms’ innovation activities could be influenced by some other 
factors, such as industry external finance dependence, industry high-tech intensiveness, city 
financial development level, and city foreign direct investment level, governments need to be 
more considerate when they grant subsidies. Fifth, due to the positive indirect effect of 
subsidies on innovation for firms without subsidies, if governments hope to make more 
enterprises innovate, a certain amount of subsidies should be distributed to more firms to 













Figure 3.1. Number of China’s patent applications from 1985 to 2017. Data Source: China’s 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) – www.stats.gov.cn 
 
Figure 3.2. Proportion of three types of China’s patent applications from 1985 to 2017. Data 
Source: China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) – www.stats.gov.cn 
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Figure 3.3. Participation rate of patent applications for firms in China from 1998 to 2008 
  
Figure 3.4. Number of patent applications per 1,000 firms in China from 1998 to 2008 
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Figure 3.5. Average participation rate of patent applications for firms across prefecture-level 
administrative divisions in China from 1998 to 2008 
 
Figure 3.6. Average number of patent applications per 1,000 firms across prefecture-level 
administrative divisions in China from 1998 to 2008 
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Figure 3.7. Trend line of the difference in the participation rate of patent applications from 
1998 to 2008. Note: The figure illustrates the time trends of the difference in the participation 
rates of patent applications between the treatment group (i.e., firms in Zhangjiagang) and the 
control group (i.e., firms in the other county-level cities of Suzhou) 
 
Figure 3.8. Trend line of the difference in the average number of patent applications from 1998 
to 2008. Note: The figure illustrates the time trends of the difference in the average number of 
patent applications between the treatment group (i.e., firms in Zhangjiagang) and the control 
group (i.e., firms in the other county-level cities of Suzhou) 
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Complete definitions of regression variables 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) Natural logarithm of the number of patent applications plus one for 
firm 𝑖 in the year 𝑡 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) Natural logarithm of the number of patent applications plus one for 
firm 𝑖 in the first lagged year of year 𝑡 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2
 Squared natural logarithm of the number of patent applications plus 
one for firm 𝑖 in the first lagged year of year 𝑡 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1  The amount of sales to the amount of total assets for firm 𝑖 in the first 
lagged year of year 𝑡 
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 The amount of cash flows to the amount of total assets for firm 𝑖 in 
the first lagged year of year 𝑡 
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 The amount of new long-term debts to the amount of total assets for 
firm 𝑖 in the first lagged year of year 𝑡 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 The amount of total government subsidies to the amount of total 
assets for firm 𝑖 in the first lagged year of year 𝑡 
𝑉𝑖  Firm fixed effects 
𝑉𝑡  Year fixed effects (2000 - 2008) 
𝑉𝑜  Ownership dummies (six types, SOE dummy is the benchmark) 
𝑉𝑗  Industry dummies (39 GB/T two-digit industry codes) 
𝑉𝑝  Geographical dummies (31 provincial administrative units except for 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) 














Correlation analysis of regression variables 
 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) 1.0000*** 
      
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 0.0188*** 1.0000*** 
     
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) 0.6220*** 0.0173*** 1.0000***     
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 0.5991*** 0.0109*** 0.8816*** 1.0000***    
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0645*** -0.0708*** -0.0630*** -0.0385*** 1.0000*** 
  
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.0092*** -0.0167*** -0.0147*** -0.0069*** 0.4864*** 1.0000***  
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 0.0100*** -0.0011 0.0065*** 0.0051*** -0.0064*** -0.0066*** 1.0000*** 
Notes: This table reports the correlation indexes of the main regression variables in the baseline Euler equation (1). ***, ** and * indicates 












Summary statistics - Sample means and medians (in parentheses) 







SOEs Private firms Diff1 Diff2 
Main regression variables        

















0.277            
(0.000) 
0.168          
(0.000) 
0.000 0.000 









0.044            
(0.000) 
0.000 0.000 








0.137         
(0.000) 






















4.377         
(3.123) 












0.131              
(0.000) 
0.000 0.105 
Other firm-level variables        




























39.784              
(40.000) 
82.002                
(90.000) 
0.000 0.000 

















1.780            
(2.000) 
1.330             
(1.000) 
0.000 0.000 
Observations 1,110,382 52,147 1,058,235 90,124 446,572   
Notes: Real total assets are expressed in millions of yuan. All other variables except Log (number of patent applications), age, political affiliation and region are shown 
in percentage terms. All monetary variables are deflated using provincial ex-factory producer price indices. The last two columns present the p-values associated with 
the mean-equality test between the group of firms with patent applications and the group of firms without patent applications (Diff1) and between the group of SOEs 
and the group of private firms (Diff2). Complete definitions of all the variables and classification standards are in Table 3.1 and Appendix D. 
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Modified baseline Euler equation (3.1) for the full sample  
 Random-effects Tobit   Pooled Tobit 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Probability Truncated Censored  Probability Truncated Censored 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 0.193*** 0.721*** 0.238***  0.185*** 0.686*** 0.255*** 
 [0.021] [0.080] [0.026]  [0.019] [0.071] [0.026] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) 0.049*** 0.184*** 0.061***  0.100*** 0.369*** 0.137*** 
 [0.001] [0.003] [0.001]  [0.001] [0.005] [0.002] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 -0.003*** -0.012*** -0.004***  -0.010*** -0.038*** -0.014*** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]  [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.009*** -0.032*** -0.011***  -0.009*** -0.033*** -0.012*** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 0.032*** 0.121*** 0.040***  0.033*** 0.124*** 0.046*** 
 [0.002] [0.007] [0.002]  [0.002] [0.007] [0.002] 
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 0.015*** 0.054*** 0.018***  0.019*** 0.071*** 0.026*** 
 [0.003] [0.010] [0.003]  [0.003] [0.010] [0.004] 
Rho 0.370 0.370 0.370     
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000     
Pseudo R2      0.226 0.226 0.226 
Prob > F     0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firms 337,637 337,637 337,637  337,637 337,637 337,637 
Observations 1,110,382 1,110,382 1,110,382  1,110,382 1,110,382 1,110,382 
Left-censored 1,058,235 1,058,235 1,058,235  1,058,235 1,058,235 1,058,235 
Uncensored 52,147 52,147 52,147  52,147 52,147 52,147 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the modified baseline Euler equation (3.1) using the Random-
effects Tobit and the Pooled Tobit. The dependent variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a censored variable that takes 
its real value if the firm has patent applications (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored 
observations). Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. Time, industry, location and ownership dummies 
are included in all specifications but not reported. Rho is the per cent contribution to the total variance of the 
panel-level variance component in the Random-effects Tobit regressions. Pseudo R2 is McFadden’s pseudo-
R-squared in the Pooled Tobit regressions. Prob > chi2 and Prob > F are the test of joint significance for 
parameters and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. 
Complete definitions of all variables and classification standards are in Table 3.1 and Appendix D. 
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Modified baseline Euler equation (3.1) using the IV Tobit for the full sample 
 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 is only instrumented by 𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑡−1   𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 is instrumented by 𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑡−1 and 𝑀𝑒𝑑_𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑐,𝑡−1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 First-stage Probability Truncated Censored  First-stage Probability Truncated Censored 
𝐹𝑖𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑡−1  0.003*** 
    0.003***    
 [0.000]     [0.000]    
𝑀𝑒𝑑_𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑐,𝑡−1 
     198.118***    
 
     [0.098]    
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 
 41.993*** 153.064*** 58.750***   7.591*** 27.674*** 10.619*** 
  [5.854] [18.956] [8.676]   [1.217] [4.334] [1.723] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) 0.059*** 0.102*** 0.371*** 0.142*** 
 0.059*** 0.102*** 0.372*** 0.143*** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.010] [0.001]  [0.000] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.038*** -0.014***  -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.038*** -0.014*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.030*** -0.009*** -0.032*** -0.012*** 
 -0.030*** -0.009*** -0.033*** -0.013*** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.005] [0.002]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 0.220*** 0.034*** 0.123*** 0.047*** 
 0.219*** 0.033*** 0.122*** 0.047*** 
 [0.000] [0.011] [0.041] [0.014]  [0.000] [0.003] [0.012] [0.004] 
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 0.013 0.021*** 0.076*** 0.029*** 
 0.013 0.021*** 0.076*** 0.029*** 
 [0.000] [0.003] [0.011] [0.004]  [0.000] [0.003] [0.011] [0.004] 
F − statistics 418.100     418.190    
Adjusted R2 0.036     0.036    
Prob > chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald test of exogeneity (p − value)  0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 
Anderson − Rubin (p − value)  0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firms 306,659 306,659 306,659 306,659  306,659 306,659 306,659 306,659 
Observations 948,873 948,873 948,873 948,873  948,873 948,873 948,873 948,873 
Left-censored 902,183 902,183 902,183 902,183  902,183 902,183 902,183 902,183 
Uncensored 46,690 46,690 46,690 46,690  46,690 46,690 46,690 46,690 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of the modified baseline Euler equation (3.1) using the IV Tobit. Columns (1) and (5) report coefficients (in percentage) of 
the first-stage results. Columns (2) to (4) and columns (6) to (8) report the marginal effects of the second-stage results. The dependent variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a censored 
variable that takes its real value if the firm has patent applications (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). Heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. Time, industry, location and ownership 
dummies are included in all specifications but not reported. Prob > chi2 is the test of joint significance for parameters and the null hypothesis is that all the regression 
coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. Wald test of exogeneity is distributed as chi-square under the null hypothesis of exogeneity. Anderson-Rubin is under the null 
hypothesis that the minimum canonical correlation is zero. Complete definitions of all variables and classification standards are in Table 3.1 and Appendix D. 
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Table 3.6  
Modified baseline Euler equation (3.1) of the quasi-natural experiment for the subsample of firms in Suzhou 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 0.047*** 0.080*** 0.079***  0.018 0.004 
 [0.009] [0.015] [0.015]  [0.017] [0.010] 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 0.014** 0.029***  0.031*** 0.006 0.028*** 
 [0.006] [0.009]  [0.009] [0.007] [0.008] 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 0.049*** 0.041***   0.012** 0.040*** 
 [0.002] [0.004]   [0.005] [0.004] 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 2001    -0.001   
    [0.023]   
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 2002    0.007   
    [0.025]   
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 2003    -0.024   
    [0.018]   
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 2004    -0.006   
    [0.020]   
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 2005    0.007   
    [0.021]   
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 2006    0.055**   
    [0.022]   
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 2007    0.111***   
    [0.027]   
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 2008    0.059**   
    [0.026]   
Other control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rho 0.681 0.334 0.357 0.359 0.164 0.323 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firms 21,506 8,740 8,740 8,740 4,576 8,740 
Observations 68,065 30,180 30,180 30,180 12,992 30,180 
Left-censored 65,214 28,362 28,362 28,362 12,421 28,362 
Uncensored 2,851 1,818 1,818 1,818 571 1,818 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the modified baseline Euler equation (3.1) using the 
Random-effects Tobit. The dependent variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a censored variable that takes its real 
value if the firm has patent applications (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored 
observations). Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. Industry, location and ownership dummies 
are included in all specifications but not reported [except column (1)]. Rho is the per cent contribution to 
the total variance of the panel-level variance component in the Random-effects Tobit regressions. Prob > 
chi2 is the test of joint significance for parameters and the null hypothesis is that all the regression 
coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. Complete definitions of all variables and classification 
standards are in Table 3.1 and Appendix D. 
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Modified augmented Euler equation (3.1) the full sample with contemporaneous terms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Probability Truncated Censored 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡  0.191*** 0.704*** 0.229*** 
 [0.028] [0.104] [0.034] 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 0.084*** 0.311*** 0.101*** 
 [0.028] [0.104] [0.034] 
SUM (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1) 0.275*** 1.015*** 0.331*** 
 [0.028] [0.104] [0.034] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) 0.053*** 0.196*** 0.064*** 
 [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 -0.003*** -0.012*** -0.004*** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡  -0.005*** -0.019*** -0.006*** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.005*** -0.018*** -0.006*** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡  0.020*** 0.075*** 0.024*** 
 [0.003] [0.009] [0.003] 
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 0.020*** 0.073*** 0.024*** 
 [0.003] [0.010] [0.003] 
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡  0.016*** 0.058*** 0.019*** 
 [0.003] [0.011] [0.004] 
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 0.018*** 0.068*** 0.022*** 
 [0.003] [0.011] [0.004] 
Rho 0.335 0.335 0.335 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firms 287,452 287,452 287,452 
Observations 868,294 868,294 868,294 
Left-censored 828,868 828,868 828,868 
Uncensored 39,426 39,426 39,426 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the modified augmented Euler equation (3.1) using the 
Random-effects Tobit. The dependent variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a censored variable that takes its real value 
if the firm has patent applications (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). 
SUM (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 ) is the sum of the marginal effects of the contemporaneous subsidy variable 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡  and the lagged subsidy variable 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. Time, 
industry, location and ownership dummies are included in all specifications but not reported. Rho is the per 
cent contribution to the total variance of the panel-level variance component in the Random-effects Tobit 
regressions. Prob > chi2 is the test of joint significance for parameters and the null hypothesis is that all the 
regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. Complete definitions of all variables and classification 
standards are in Table 3.1 and Appendix D. 
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Modified baseline Euler equation (3.1) for the full sample: using alternative measurements of innovation 
activities (new product output value / total assets and R&D expenditure / total assets, labelled as 𝑁𝑝 and 𝑅𝑑)  
 New product output value   R&D expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 Probability Truncated Censored  Probability Truncated Censored 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 0.083*** 0.047*** 0.024*** 
 0.406*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 
 [0.025] [0.014] [0.007]  [0.047] [0.001] [0.000] 
𝑁𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1(𝑅𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1) 0.607*** 0.346*** 0.177*** 
 27.790*** 0.390*** 0.253*** 
 [0.004] [0.002] [0.001]  [0.197] [0.003] [0.002] 
𝑁𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
2(𝑅𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1)
2 -0.481*** -0.274*** -0.140***  -572.315*** -8.038*** -5.211*** 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.001]  [5.977] [0.086] [0.058] 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.003*** 
 -0.014*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 0.018*** 0.010*** 0.005*** 
 0.062*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]  [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] 
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 0.019*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 [0.003] [0.002] [0.001]  [0.006] [0.000] [0.000] 
Rho 0.270 0.270 0.270  0.286 0.286 0.286 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firms 327,550 327,550 327,550  252,311 252,311 252,311 
Observations 888,928 888,928 888,928  514,380 514,380 514,380 
Left-censored 829,733 829,733 829,733  449,395 449,395 449,395 
Uncensored 59,195 59,195 59,195  64,985 64,985 64,985 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the modified baseline Euler equation (3.1) using the Random-
effects Tobit. The dependent variable 𝑁𝑝𝑖,𝑡 or  𝑅𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is a censored variable that takes its real value if the firm 
has a new product output value or R&D expenditure (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-
censored observations). Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. Time, industry, location 
and ownership dummies are included in all specifications but not reported. Rho is the per cent contribution 
to the total variance of the panel-level variance component in the Random-effects Tobit regressions. Prob > 
chi2 is the test of joint significance for parameters and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients 
are simultaneously equal to zero. Complete definitions of all variables and classification standards are in 













Modified baseline Euler equation (3.1) of additional robustness tests for the full sample  






Log of financial 
variables 
Data excluding 
the year 2008 
 Censored / Censored Censored 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 0.134*** 0.162*** 0.003*** 0.193*** 
 [0.012] [0.024] [0.000] [0.027] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) 0.062*** 0.030*** 0.084*** 0.063*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.004*** 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.006*** -0.011*** 0.013*** -0.010*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.006*** 0.035*** 
 [0.001] [0.002] [0.000] [0.003] 
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.001*** 0.017*** 
 [0.002] [0.003] [0.000] [0.003] 
Rho 0.234 0.190 0.203 0.228 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firms 337,637 335,620 305,876 297,534 
Observations 1,110,382 1,089,180 782,094 905,590 
Left-censored 1,088,763 1,055,302 751,291 865,272 
Uncensored 21,619 33,878 30,803 40,318 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of the modified baseline Euler equation (3.1) of additional 
robustness tests. In columns (1), (3) and (4) we report marginal effects in the quantity of censored data and 
the dependent variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a censored variable that takes its real value if the firm has patent 
applications (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). In column (2) we 
report marginal effects on the expected value of the number of patent applications concerning the random 
effect and the dependent variable is the number of patent applications per firm (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡). Heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated 
by ***, ** and * respectively. Time, industry, location and ownership dummies are included in all 
specifications but not reported. Rho is the per cent contribution to the total variance of the panel-level variance 
component in the Random-effects Tobit and Random-effects Poisson regressions. Prob > chi2 is the test of 
joint significance for parameters and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are 
simultaneously equal to zero. Complete definitions of all variables and classification standards are in Table 












Modified baseline Euler equation (3.1) for the sample of SOEs and private firms 














𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 0.068 0.294*** 0.196 1.237*** 0.081 0.375*** 
 [0.074] [0.030] [0.213] [0.132] [0.088] [0.039] 
Diff1 (p − value) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) 0.082*** 0.062*** 0.234*** 0.260*** 0.098*** 0.079*** 
 [0.003] [0.001] [0.009] [0.009] [0.004] [0.002] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.018*** -0.025*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.036*** -0.030*** -0.015*** -0.009*** 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 0.109*** 0.024*** 0.312*** 0.100*** 0.130*** 0.030*** 
 [0.009] [0.003] [0.026] [0.012] [0.011] [0.004] 
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 0.022** 0.020*** 0.064** 0.083*** 0.026** 0.025*** 
 [0.009] [0.004] [0.025] [0.017] [0.010] [0.005] 
Rho 0.273 0.234 0.273 0.234 0.273 0.234 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firms 32,418 177,573 32,418 177,573 32,418 177,573 
Observations 95,650 435,205 95,650 435,205 95,650 435,205 
Left-censored 90,015 418,145 90,015 418,145 90,015 418,145 
Uncensored 5,635 17,060 5,635 17,060 5,635 17,060 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the modified baseline Euler equation (1) using the Random-
effects Tobit. We report marginal effects in the quantity of censored data and the dependent variable 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a censored variable that takes its real value if the firm has patent applications (uncensored 
observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. 
Time, industry, location and ownership dummies are included in all specifications but not reported. Diff1 (p-
value) is the p-value for the difference in the marginal effects of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 between SOEs and private firms. Rho 
is the per cent contribution to the total variance of the panel-level variance component in the Random-effects 
Tobit regressions. Prob > chi2 is the test of joint significance for parameters and the null hypothesis is that all 
the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. Complete definitions of all variables and 












Modified baseline Euler equation (3.1) for the heterogeneity on firms’ financial constraints 





















 Censored Censored  Censored Censored  Censored Censored  Censored Censored  Censored Censored 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 0.212*** 0.152*** 
 0.305*** 0.203***  0.446*** 0.047  0.244*** 0.154*  0.173*** 0.204*** 
 [0.044] [0.008]  [0.035] [0.037]  [0.03] [0.038]  [0.028] [0.087]  [0.009] [0.042] 
Diff1 (p − value) (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) 0.071*** 0.173*** 
 0.123*** 0.150***  0.085*** 0.073***  0.067*** 0.099***  0.179*** 0.072*** 
 [0.003] [0.002]  [0.002] [0.002]  [0.002] [0.002]  [0.001] [0.003]  [0.003] [0.003] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 -0.013*** -0.016***  -0.014*** -0.014***  -0.008*** -0.005***  -0.005*** -0.006***  -0.017*** -0.013*** 
 [0.000] [0.001]  [0.001] [0.001]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.001]  [0.001] [0.000] 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.006*** -0.019*** 
 -0.010*** -0.014***  -0.009*** -0.014***  -0.010*** -0.016***  -0.012*** -0.002*** 
 [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.001]  [0.000] [0.000] 
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 0.005*** 0.045*** 
 0.033*** 0.062***  0.033*** 0.065***  0.037*** 0.132***  0.078*** 0.003*** 
 [0.001] [0.004]  [0.003] [0.004]  [0.003] [0.004]  [0.002] [0.010]  [0.004] [0.001] 
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 0.005*** 0.033*** 
 0.028*** 0.025***  0.019*** 0.024***  0.018*** 0.031***  0.034*** 0.009*** 
 [0.000] [0.006]  [0.005] [0.005]  [0.005] [0.005]  [0.003] [0.010]  [0.006] [0.000] 
Rho 0.174 0.232  0.212 0.234  0.241 0.329  0.325 0.296  0.222 0.181 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Firms 195,972 209,831  231,066 185,465  232,662 159,139  313,605 41,707  198,370 202,027 
Observations 457,705 652,677  520,124 589,009  635,312 475,070  982,444 124,176  658,374 452,008 
Left-censored 448,993 609,242  499,797 557,344  608,397 449,838  938,790 115,800  614,440 443,795 
Uncensored 8,712 43,435  20,327 31,665  26,915 25,232  43,654 8,376  43,934 8,213 
Notes: This table only reports the marginal effects in the quantity of censored data of the modified baseline Euler equation (1) using the Random-effects Tobit. The dependent 
variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a censored variable that takes its real value if the firm has patent applications (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored 
observations). Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. 
Time, industry, location and ownership dummies are included in all specifications but not reported. Diff1 (p-value) is the p-value for the difference in the marginal effects 
of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 between two groups for one comparison. Rho is the per cent contribution to the total variance of the panel-level variance component in the Random-effects Tobit 
regressions. Prob > chi2 is the test of joint significance for parameters and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. Complete 
definitions of all variables and classification standards are in Table 3.1 and Appendix D. 
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Modified baseline Euler equation (3.1) for the full sample with industry-level EFD and High tech-intensiveness 
  EFD   High tech-intensiveness 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 Probability Truncated Censored  Probability Truncated Censored 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 0.158*** 0.583*** 0.190***  0.146*** 0.544*** 0.179*** 
 [0.024] [0.087] [0.028]  [0.023] [0.088] [0.029] 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑗 -0.513*** -1.888*** -0.615***     
 [0.138] [0.507] [0.165]  
   
𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑗 0.012*** 0.045*** 0.015***     
 [0.002] [0.007] [0.002]  
   
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑗,𝑡−1     0.292*** 1.088*** 0.359*** 
     [0.059] [0.218] [0.072] 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑗,𝑡−1     
0.01*** 0.060*** 0.020*** 
     
[0.001] [0.004] [0.001] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) 0.054*** 0.198*** 0.064***  0.049*** 0.183*** 0.060*** 
 [0.001] [0.003] [0.001]  [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 -0.003*** -0.013*** -0.004***  -0.003*** -0.012*** -0.004*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.008*** -0.031*** -0.010***  -0.009*** -0.032*** -0.011*** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 0.031*** 0.113*** 0.037***  0.032*** 0.119*** 0.039*** 
 [0.002] [0.008] [0.003]  [0.002] [0.007] [0.002] 
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 0.015*** 0.054*** 0.018***  0.015*** 0.054*** 0.018*** 
 [0.003] [0.010] [0.003]  [0.003] [0.010] [0.003] 
Rho 0.332 0.332 0.332  0.371 0.371 0.371 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firms 292,722 292,722 292,722  337,637 337,637 337,637 
Observations 878,713 878,713 878,713  1,110,382 1,110,382 1,110,382 
Left-censored 838,638 838,638 838,638  1,058,235 1,058,235 1,058,235 
Uncensored 40,075 40,075 40,075  52,147 52,147 52,147 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the modified baseline Euler equation (3.1) using the Random-effects 
Tobit. The dependent variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a censored variable that takes its real value if the firm has patent 
applications (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). Heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, 
** and * respectively. Time, industry, location and ownership dummies are included in all specifications but not 
reported. Rho is the per cent contribution to the total variance of the panel-level variance component in the Random-
effects Tobit regressions. Prob > chi2 is the test of joint significance for parameters and the null hypothesis is that all 
the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. Complete definitions of all variables and classification 
standards are in Table 3.1 and Appendix D. 
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Table 3.13     
Modified baseline Euler equation (3.1) for the full sample with city-level financial development and foreign direct investment 
 Panel A: financial development 
 Loans  Deposits  Savings 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
 Probability Truncated Censored  Probability Truncated Censored  Probability Truncated Censored 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 0.250*** 0.902*** 0.328*** 
 0.252*** 0.910*** 0.331***  0.242*** 0.871*** 0.317*** 
 [0.027] [0.098] [0.036]  [0.027] [0.097] [0.035]  [0.026] [0.094] [0.034] 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝑖𝑛 − 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1 -0.082* -0.294* -0.107** 
 -0.074** -0.265** -0.097**  -0.285** -1.028** -0.374** 
 [0.044] [0.160] [0.058]  [0.030] [0.108] [0.039]  [0.118] [0.426] [0.155] 
𝐹𝑖𝑛 − 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1 0.010*** 0.035*** 0.013***  0.008*** 0.027*** 0.010***  0.002 0.006 0.002 
 [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]  [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]  [0.001] [0.005] [0.002] 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Rho 0.240 0.240 0.240  0.239 0.239 0.239  0.238 0.238 0.238 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firms 277,534 277,534 277,534  277,534 277,534 277,534  277,534 277,534 277,534 
Observations 784,847 784,847 784,847  784,847 784,847 784,847  784,847 784,847 784,847 
Left-censored 745,600 745,600 745,600  745,600 745,600 745,600  745,600 745,600 745,600 
Uncensored 39,247 39,247 39,247  39,247 39,247 39,247  39,247 39,247 39,247 
 Panel B: foreign direct investment 
 New contracts signed  Agreed investment  Actual investment 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
 Probability Truncated Censored  Probability Truncated Censored  Probability Truncated Censored 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 0.225*** 0.823*** 0.280***  0.216*** 0.792*** 0.269***  0.214*** 0.782*** 0.265*** 
 [0.023] [0.084] [0.029]  [0.023] [0.084] [0.029]  [0.023] [0.084] [0.028] 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑟 − 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1 -0.030** -0.108** -0.037**  -0.508* -1.858* -0.631*  -1.011 -3.701 -1.256 
 [0.012] [0.044] [0.015]  [0.281] [1.028] [0.349]  [0.631] [2.308] [0.783] 
𝐹𝑜𝑟 − 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1 0.004*** 0.015*** 0.005***  0.027*** 0.099*** 0.034***  0.051*** 0.186*** 0.063*** 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]  [0.003] [0.011] [0.004]  [0.006] [0.024] [0.008] 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Rho 0.361 0.361 0.361  0.361 0.361 0.361  0.362 0.362 0.362 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firms 314,677 314,677 314,677  314,844 314,844 314,844  315,118 315,118 315,118 
Observations 1,011,225 1,011,225 1,011,225  1,012,299 1,012,299 1,012,299  1,013,293 1,013,293 1,013,293 
Left-censored 962,103 962,103 962,103  963,144 963,144 963,144  964,122 964,122 964,122 
Uncensored 49,122 49,122 49,122  49,155 49,155 49,155  49,171 49,171 49,171 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the modified baseline Euler equation (3.1) using the Random-effects Tobit. The dependent variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a censored 
variable that takes its real value if the firm has patent applications (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. Time, industry, location and ownership dummies are included 
in all specifications but not reported. Rho is the per cent contribution to the total variance of the panel-level variance component in the Random-effects Tobit regressions. Prob > chi2 
is the test of joint significance for parameters and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. Complete definitions of all variables and 
classification standards are in Table 3.1 and Appendix D. 
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Modified baseline Euler equation (3.1) with the variable of 𝑆𝑢𝑏 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1 




















  0.666***   0.203***   
 [0.025]   [0.097]   [0.034]   
𝑆𝑢𝑏 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1 0.027*** 0.006*** 0.003 0.101*** 0.024*** 0.009 0.037*** 0.007*** 0.005 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Diff1 (p − value)   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑆𝑢𝑏 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1 -0.654***   -2.691***   -0.886***   
 [0.001]   [0.003]   [0.001]   
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) 0.099*** 0.087*** 0.159*** 0.366*** 0.366*** 0.390*** 0.136*** 0.115*** 0.244*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.014*** -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.034*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.021*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.015*** -0.032*** -0.028*** -0.037*** -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.023*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 0.034*** 0.024*** 0.109*** 0.125*** 0.100*** 0.268*** 0.046*** 0.031*** 0.167*** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.018] [0.002] [0.002] [0.011] 
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 0.019*** 0.012*** 0.053*** 0.070*** 0.052*** 0.130*** 0.026*** 0.016*** 0.81*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.024] [0.004] [0.004] [0.015] 
Rho 0.228 0.211 0.239 0.228 0.211 0.239 0.228 0.211 0.239 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firms 337,637 318,696 73,952 337,637 318,696 73,952 337,637 318,696 73,952 
Observations 1,110,382 950,926 159,456 1,110,382 950,926 159,456 1,110,382 950,926 159,456 
Left-censored 1,058,235 915,194 143,041 1,058,235 915,194 143,041 1,058,235 915,194 143,041 
Uncensored 52,147 35,732 16,415 52,147 35,732 16,415 52,147 35,732 16,415 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of the modified baseline Euler equation (3.1) using the Random-effects Tobit. The dependent variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a censored variable that 
takes its real value if the firm has patent applications (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). The marginal effect associated with the 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗
𝑆𝑢𝑏 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1 interaction is computed based on the difference of the average marginal effects relative to 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 evaluated at two infinitesimally close values of 𝑆𝑢𝑏 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1 (the 
mean and the mean plus 0.001), divided by the difference between these two values (i.e. 0.001). Diff1 (p-value) is the p-value for the difference in the marginal effects of 𝑆𝑢𝑏 − 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑗,𝑡−1 
between two comparative groups. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and * respectively. 
Time, industry, location and ownership dummies are included in all specifications but not reported. Rho is the per cent contribution to the total variance of the panel-level variance component 
in the Random-effects Tobit regressions. Prob > chi2 is the test of joint significance for parameters and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to 
zero. Complete definitions of all variables and classification standards are in Table 3.1 and Appendix D. 
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Appendix A. Description of the three types of patents in China 
The three types of China’s patents are different in applicable targets, protection periods 
and approval procedures. First, according to China’s patent law, invention patents are defined 
as new technical proposals on products, methods or their improvements; utility model patents 
are defined as new technical proposals on product shape, product structure or their combination; 
design patents are defined as new aesthetic designs of product shape, product pattern, product 
colour or their combination. Second, the amendment to China’s patent law in 1992 extends the 
protection duration for invention patents from 15 to 20 years and for utility model patents and 
design patents from 5 to 10 years, which is also a major requirement from the ‘Agreement On 
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Right’ (TRIPS) to ensure benefits of patent 
applications. Third, it usually takes about 2 to 3 years for the SIPO to process an invention 
patent application, while the corresponding approval cycle for a utility model patent application 
and a design patent application is about 6 months. Besides that, the approval procedures for an 
innovation patent must meet the high requirement of ‘novelty, inventiveness, and practical 
applicability’. However, the approval procedures for a utility model patent and a design patent 
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Appendix B. NBS firm-level panel data 
In principle, the sample coverage of the NBS firm-level data should be identical to that 
of the China Statistical Yearbook, or the discrepancies are relatively small. Thus, we compare 
the NBS-firm level data with the China Statistical Yearbook 2009 to verify the data reliability, 
and Table 3.A1 reports the comparison results. The statistics for all years except 1998, 2004 
and 2008 are identical, confirming that the NBS-firm level data in our paper are also the basis 
for the numbers reported in the China Statistical Yearbook. For the year 1998, the number of 
firms in the NBS firm-level data is more than that recorded in the China Statistical Yearbook, 
while the discrepancy is quite small (only 38). Additionally, the data in 1998 is used to 
construct lagged values of the independent variables in our models, and thus the period of our 
estimation sample does not cover the year 1998. The data in the year 2004 contains the 
information of some SOEs that are not ‘above-scale’ enterprises, so the number of firms in 
2004 of the NBS firm-level data is more than that recorded in the China Statistical Yearbook. 
In the section of our data process, we have dropped the observations with sales of less than 5 
million Chinese Yuan to avoid the influence of no ‘above-scale’ enterprises. The number of 
firms in the year 2008 is less than 10,000 than that recorded in the China Statistical Yearbook, 
so we also delete the data in the year 2008 to estimate again for robustness test and the results 











Comparison of the NBS firm-level data with the China Statistical Yearbook 2009 
Year NBS firm-level data China Statistical Yearbook 
1998 165,118 165,080 
1999 162,033 162,033 
2000 162,885 162,885 
2001 171,256 171,256 
2002 181,557 181,557 
2003 196,222 196,222 
2004 279,092 276,474 
2005 271,835 271,835 
2006 301,961 301,961 
2007 336,768 336,768 
2008 412,212 426,113 

































Structure of the unbalanced panel  
Year Number of observations Per cent (%) Cumulative (%) 
1998 123,544 5.21 5.21 
1999 121,014 5.10 10.30 
2000 125,585 5.29 15.59 
2001 137,985 5.81 21.41 
2002 150,861 6.36 27.76 
2003 172,869 7.28 35.05 
2004 262,145 11.04 46.09 
2005 258,969 10.91 57.00 
2006 290,526 12.24 69.24 
2007 330,185 13.91 83.16 
2008 399,805 16.84 100.00 
Total 2,373,488 100.00  
    
Number of years per firm Number of observations Per cent (%) Cumulative (%) 
1 196,037 8.26 8.26 
2 216,454 9.12 17.38 
3 257,418 10.85 28.22 
4 242,812 10.23 38.45 
5 419,360 17.67 56.12 
6 228,102 9.61 65.73 
7 157,465 6.63 72.37 
8 168,976 7.12 79.49 
9 106,038 4.47 83.96 
10 111,920 4.72 88.67 
11 268,906 11.33 100.00 
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Appendix C. China’s industry classification standard and its revision in 2002 
China’s industry sector code is made up of four digits. The first two digits are GB/T 
two-digit sector codes, the first three digits are GB/T three-digit sector codes, and all four digits 
are GB/T four-digit sector codes. In 2002, China revised its industrial classification standard 
issued in 1994 to keep consistent with the regulations of the WTO. The revision of the industry 
classification in 2002 has little impact on two-digit codes but more on three-digit codes and 
four-digit codes. The adjustments to four-digit sector codes have four types: first, some sectors 
just change their codes; second, some sectors are broken down into new ones; third, some 
sectors are merged with others into a new sector; fourth, some sectors are broken down into 
new sectors some of which are merged with other sectors into a new one. We manually adjust 
all four-digit sector codes to the revision in 2002. After the adjustment, we extract the first 
three digits and first two digits respectively to get the adjusted three-digit sector codes and the 
adjusted two-digit sector codes. Finally, we get 525 GB/T four digit-sector codes, 191 GB/T 
three digit-sector codes and 39 GB/T two digit-sector codes. All industry dummy variables are 
constructed on the adjusted sector codes. We drop observations in the sectors that disappeared 
or transferred to other non-manufacturing sectors after the revision in 2002. The proportion of 
these observations in the transferred and disappeared is low, only approximately 0.290%. 
Since in our regression models we include the industry dummy variables based on GB/T 
two digit-code, we show the detailed description of all two-digit sectors in Table 3.A3. We can 
find all two-digit sectors keep the same codes after the revision in 2002 except the sector of 
timber and bamboo wood with the code of 12 (which is removed from the scope of 
manufacturing industries) and the sector of Waste Material Recycling Processing with the code 
of 43 (which is moved to the scope of manufacturing industries).  
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Description of GB/T two-digit industries 





Coal Mining & Dressing 06 06 
Petroleum & Natural Gas Extraction 07 07 
Ferrous Metals Mining & Dressing 08 08 
Non-Ferrous Metals Mining & Dressing 09 09 
Non-metal Minerals Mining & Dressing 10 10 
Mining of other Mineral  11 11 
Timber and bamboo wood   12 / 
Farm & Side-line Products Processing  13 13 
Food Production  14 14 
Beverage Manufacturing  15 15 
Tobacco Processing 16 16 
Textile Industry  17 17 
Clothing, Shoes, Hats Manufacturing  18 18 
Leather, Fur, Feathers Manufacturing  19 19 
Timber Manufacturing  20 20 
Furniture Manufacturing  21 21 
Papermaking & Paper Products  22 22 
Printing Industry 23 23 
Cultural Educational & Sports Goods  24 24 
Petroleum Processing & Coking  25 25 
Chemical Raw Materials & Chemical Products 26 26 
Medical & Pharmaceutical Products  27 27 
Chemical Fibre  28 28 
Rubber Products  29 29 
Plastic Products  30 30 
Non-metal Mineral Products  31 31 
Ferrous Metal Smelting & Rolling Processing   32 32 
Non-Ferrous Metal Smelting & Rolling Processing  33 33 
Metal Products  34 34 
Ordinary Machinery  35 35 
Special Equipment  36 36 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing  37 37 
Electric Equipment & Machinery  40 39 
Electronic Communication  Equipment Manufacturing  41 40 
Instrument & Apparatus Manufacturing  42 41 
Handicrafts & other Manufacturing  43 42 
Waste Material Recycling Processing / 43 
Electricity, Heat Production & Supply 44 44 
Gas Production & Supply  45 45 
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Appendix D. Variable definition and Classification standards 
Patent: the number of a firm’s patent applications. 
New product output value: output value from a firm’s new products. 
R&D expenditure: a firm’s expenditure on research and development (R&D) investment. 
Sales: a firm’s total sales including domestic and overseas sales. 
Cash flows: a firm’s net income plus current depreciation. 
New long-term debt issue: a firm’s difference between long-term debt in year t and t-1. 
Total assets: the sum of a firm’s long-term assets and current assets. Long-term assets 
comprise fixed assets(tangible assets), intangible assets, deferred assets, long-term investments, 
and other long-term assets. Current assets include accounts receivable, inventories, short-
term investments, and other current assets. 
Real total assets: a firm’s total assets are deflated using provincial ex-factory producer price 
indices (PPI) conducted by the NBS of China. 
Age: a firm’s age is calculated by the difference between its accounting year and the year when 
it was established. 
Political affiliation: an index of firms’ political affiliation (lishu) whose categories are – 10, 
firms are politically affiliated at central level; 20, firms are politically affiliated at the provincial 
level; 40, firms are politically affiliated at the prefecture-level; 50, firms are politically 
affiliated at the county-level; 61, 62 and 63, firms are politically affiliated at sub-district, town 
or township level; 71, 72 and 73, firms are politically affiliated at community or village level; 
90, firms have no political affiliation. 
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State shares: a firm’s paid-in capitals controlled by the State. 
SA Index: An index of a firm’s financial constraints is from Hadlock and Pierce (2010) based 
on the firm’s size and age. The calculation method of the index is S𝐴 = (−0.737 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) +
(0.043 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒2) − (0.040 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒). At this equation, size is the log of real total assets. Size is 
replaced with a log of $4.5 billion when a firm’s real total assets are converted into more than 
$4.5 billion. Age is replaced with 37 years when the actual value of a firm’s age exceeds 37 






Description of classification standards 
Ownership (based 






At least 50% of paid-in capitals are state-owned; 






If a firm’s real sales are in the lower half distribution of 
real sales of all firms with the same ownership type in 
the same GB/T Four-digit industry in a given year; 
If a firm’s real sales are in the higher half distribution of 
real sales of all firms with the same ownership type in 





If a firm’s age is in the lower half distribution of all 
firms’ age with the same ownership type in the same 
GB/T Four-digit industry in a given year; 
If a firm’s age is in the higher half distribution of all 
firms’ age with the same ownership type in the same 
GB/T Four-digit industry in a given year. 
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Political affiliation No 
With 
 
If a firm has no political affiliation (lishu = 90); 
If a firm is affiliated at a level of village, neighbourhood, 
township, town, sub-district, county, prefecture, 
province and central government (lishu <90). 
State Shares No 
Yes 
If a firm has no state shares; 
If a firm has some state shares. 






If a firm’s SA index is in the lower half distribution of 
all firms’ SA indexes with the same ownership type in 
the same GB/T Four-digit industry in a given year; 
If a firm’s SA index is in the lower half distribution of 
all firms’ SA indexes with the same ownership type in 
the same GB/T Four-digit industry in a given year. 
 
For firms’ ownership, all firms are grouped into six categories based on the majority 
(at least 50%) of registered paid-in capital: state-owned enterprises (SOEs); foreign firms; 
private firms; collective firms; Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan (HMT) firms; and mixed 
ownership firms. Specifically, we regard firms with the majority of state capitals as SOEs; 
firms with the majority of foreign capitals as foreign firms; firms with the majority of capitals 
from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan as HMT firms; firms with the majority of individual 
capitals as private firms; firms with the majority of capitals from collective investors as 
collective firms; firms with the majority of capitals from legal entities and firms without the 
majority of any type of capitals as mixed-ownership firms. Some papers group firms with the 
majority of capitals from legal entities into private firms (Ding et al., 2013; Guariglia et al., 
2011; Guariglia & Liu, 2014). As one form of registered paid-in capitals, capitals from legal 
entities are a mixture of capitals from state-owned legal entities and private legal entities. 
However, the firms that are invested mainly by state-owned legal entities should not be 
classified as SOEs. In this dataset, we cannot exactly distinguish which firms are invested 
mainly by state-owned legal entities and which firms are mainly invested by private legal 
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entities since this dataset does not record it. Thus, to alleviate estimation bias, we only group 
firms with the majority of individual capitals into private firms and firms with the majority of 
state capitals into SOEs. For firms with the majority of capitals from legal entities, we have to 
classify them as one form of mixed-ownership firms. We also estimate if firms mainly invested 
by legal entities as private firms and all results keep consistent. Firms without the majority of 
any type of capitals is another form of mixed-ownership firms. For example, the firm with the 
legal person code of ‘613991812’ in 2002 that has 43.7% of state capitals, 42.8% of individual 
capitals and 13.5% of foreign capitals is one mixed-ownership firm. This form of mixed-
ownership firms makes up a small fraction of our sample, just around 1.6%. Since we compare 
the estimation results between SOEs and private firms in our main analysis, thus we only report 
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Appendix E. Distribution of the number of prefecture-level administrative divisions for 
firms’ patent applications (detailed explanation of maps of Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6) 
Table 3.A5 
Distribution of the number of prefecture-level administrative divisions for firms’ patent applications 
First. Average participation rate of firms’ patent applications 
                                                                     
                                                             
Region 
Participation rate 
Eastern (Coastal) Central Western Total 
(0 – 1.09%] 8 30 48 86 
(1.09% - 1.87%] 24 34 27 85 
(1.87% - 3.26%] 38 25 21 84 
(3.26% - 8.77%] 31 21 34 86 
Total 101 110 130 341 
     
Average number of patent applications per 1,000 firms 
                                                                            
                                                             
Region 
Number 
Eastern (Coastal) Central Western Total 
(0 – 27.67] 9 23 54 86 
(27.67 - 62.71] 24 40 20 84 
(62.71 - 136.56] 39 24 23 86 
(136.56 - 1597.76] 29 23 33 85 
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Appendix F. Overview of subsidy policies for all county-level cities of Suzhou during the 
period from July 2004 to April 2008 
We obtain the data from the study of Lei et al. (2012) and show them in Table 3.A6. 
We can find that the number of subsidies for all types of patent applications in Zhangjiagang 
increased after June 2006. Specifically, subsidies for invention patent applications increased 
from 1,500 to 3,000 + 10,000 (the ‘+’ means the reward for granted invention patent); subsidies 
for utility model patent applications increased from 1,000 to 1,500; subsidies for design patent 
applications increased from 500 to 1,000. As a comparison, subsidies for all types of patent 
applications across the other five neighbouring county-level areas of Suzhou remained 
unchanged until April 2008 (the subsidy policy in Changshu changed after April 2008). The 
Suzhou county-level city is the combination of municipal districts of Suzhou prefecture-level 
city (in China, a municipal district of one prefecture-level administrative division is a county-















Amount of subsidies (Unit: Chinese Yuan) for patent applications across county-level cities of Suzhou  
County-level city 













Zhangjigang 1,500 1,000 500 
 
3,000+10,000 1,500 1,000 
Wujiang 2,000 1,000 800 
 
unchanged 





4,000 1,000 1,000 
 
unchanged 
Kunshan 4,000 1,000 500 
 
unchanged 
Changshu 2,000 1,000 1,000   unchanged 
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To what extent does political turnover affect the finance-innovation nexus: 
Evidence from China 
We examine how local policy turnover affects financial development and corporate innovation 
nexus in China. Using a large panel of 739,672 industrial firms across 305 cities over the period 
2003 – 2014, we find that local political uncertainty arising from local policy turnover reduces 
the positive effect of city-level financial development on corporate innovation while local 
political turnover alone encourages corporate innovation. Further evidence shows that the 
moderating effect played by local political turnover on the positive relationship between 
financial development and innovation varies across turnover types of local government heads, 
firms’ political connections and financial constraints. The results are robust to the use of 
various estimation methods. Our findings shed light on how both political and financial systems 
















The importance of innovation to economic growth has been widely discussed 
(Schumpeter, 1911; Solow, 1957; Kogan et al, 2017). Although China has become the second-
largest economy during the past few decades with phenomenal economic growth, it now faces 
pressure due to rising costs of production factors such as labour or capitals.118 Additionally, 
under the background of the emerging global trade protectionism and the COVID-19 pandemic 
recession, China’s economy is facing a lot of challenges, such as the steadily slowing growth 
speed.119 To maintain high economic growth in the future, China, perhaps, needs to pursue a 
strategic transformation from investment-driven growth to innovation-driven growth, and 
innovation is becoming a critical force for China’s sustained economic growth. However, 
because innovation typically demands significant fund,  faces high failure probability and has 
a long-term investment cycle (Holmstrom, 1989), research and development (R&D) 
investment are likely to be subject to financial constraints. It becomes critical for China to 
promote a financial system to better serve corporate innovation. Meanwhile, given a unique 
socialist system, Chinese firms are more likely to exposed to government intervention, political 
turnover/uncertainty has a substantial impact not just on enterprise investments e.g. innovation 
                                                             
118 The report issued by the State Information Center (SIC) of China (http://www.sic.gov.cn/News/455/7360.htm) 
describes the increase in the costs of production factors. For example, China is facing a decrease in its domestic 
demographic dividend. According to the data in China Statistical Yearbook published by the National Burear of 
Statistics (NBS) of China (http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/), the fraction of people aged 65 or above clearly 
increase from around 7.43% in 1998 to 12.57% in 2019. The fast increase of aging population comes with rising 
labour costs. The actual growth rate of average salary in China from 2008 to 2014 is 9%, while during the same 
period the rate is 1.9% in the US, 0.5% in the Europe and -0.8% in Japan. 
119 Since the initiation of economic reforms and open-up in 1978, China’s GDP rapidly grew at an average rate 
exceeding 9% annually until 2017, compared with a growth rate of 2.9% for the global economy (EY, 2018). The 
China-United States trade war staring from the year 2018 is one of the factors that lead to a decrease in China’ 
GDP growth rates from 6.7% in 2018 to 6.1% in 2019 (according to the World Bank). The COVID-19 pandemic 
recession makes that China’s GDP growth rate sharply dropped to 2.3 in 2020% (according to the NBS of China). 
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but also on their access to finance (An et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2020). Thus, in 
this study, we examine how city-level financial development affect corporation innovation, and 
further investigate the extent to which policy turnover affects the relationship between 
innovation and finance and the moderating effects vary across different turnover types, political 
connections and financial constraints. 
Along with the rapid growth of China’s economy over the past few decades to the 
world’s second-largest economy, China’s innovation capability has also substantially improved. 
According to the report of ‘Global Innovation Index 2020’ published by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), China edged into the top 25 of the innovation ranking in 2016 
and moved to the 14th in 2020.120 Among the 131 economies in 2020, China is the only-middle-
income economy in the top 30, even higher than some advanced economies such as Japan 
(16th), Canada (17th) and Australia (23th). The report also shows that as an emerging market, 
China is a world leader based on several key output indicators such as the number of patent 
applications which is one of the widely used metrics for measuring innovative activity. 
Specifically, the number of international patent applications filed by China via WIPO’s Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) is 59,193 in 2019, which is the first time that China surpasses the 
US (57,499).121 Despite an estimated drop in global GDP of 3.5% in 2020 due to the COVID-
19 pandemic recession, China remains the largest user of WIPO’s PCT with 68,720 patent 
filings, representing a 16.1% growth rate from 2019. Additionally, China’s R&D spending rose 
by 8.6% in 2018. China has not experienced aggregate R&D declines since the 2008-2009 
financial crisis. In recent years, Chinese governments also have realized the importance of 
                                                             
120  The report of ‘Global Innovation Index 2020’ could be browsed through the website address: 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2020.pdf. 
121 The data is from the report of ‘Innovation Perseveres: International Patent Filings via WIPO Continued to 








indigenous innovation and adopted some policies to tackle the problem of overwhelming 
dependence on foreign technology. For example, in May 2015, the Chinese premier Li Keqiang 
released the plan of ‘Made in China 2025’, which aims to promote indigenous innovation to 
help China to shift from being the ‘Made in China’ (producing cheap and low-quality goods) 
to the ‘Made with Wisdom in China’ (producing higher-value goods and services). 
As the largest emerging market and manufacturing economy in the world, China’s 
financial system has developed dramatically with its rapid economic growth during the last 
decades. Before 1984, China did not have an integrated financial system. Since 1984 when the 
four state-owned banks (the ‘Big-Four’) took over the commercial banking business from the 
central government of China, China has experienced a rapid expansion of financial 
intermediation over the past decades.122 Specifically, compared to the excessive growth speed 
of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) from 727.85 billion Chinese Yuan (CNY) in 1984 to 
99.09 trillion CNY in 2019, the amount of total loans in China’s financial institutions even 
shows a greater upward tendency from 441.96 billion CNY in 1984 to 153.11 trillion CNY in 
2019.123 Thus, the ratio of China’s total loans to GDP has increased from 60.72% in 1984 to 
154.52% in 2019. Although Schumpeter (1911) finds that financial development is critical for 
a nation’s innovation, prior research has not found consistent evidence that financial 
development contributes to China’s rapid economic growth (Allen et al., 2005).  Little is known 
about the link between financial development and corporate innovation in China. 
As the largest communist country in the world, China’s political and economic systems 
are significantly different from those of western countries. Despite China’s claim that it has 
gradually shifted from a planned economic system to a market-oriented system since the reform 
                                                             
122 The ‘Big-Four’ commercial banks in China are Bank of China Limited, Agricultural Bank of China Limited, 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited and China Construction Bank Corporation. 
123 The data is from the China Statistical Yearbook 2020 (http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/).  
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and opening up in 1978, the Communist Party of China (CPC) has absolute authority in every 
aspect of local political and economic systems. Thus, political factors still play an important 
role in China’s economy. For example, in China, the government dominates the economy. 
Local government officials could have a great influence on the allocation of capitals in the 
economy (Jiang et al., 2020). A change in the local political environment e.g. political turnovers 
of local government heads could thus have a significant impact on firms’ activities through 
policies such as access to debt financing,  land use, business permit and government subsidies. 
It is likely that firms’ innovation activities as a key strategical investment are also affected by 
political turnovers of local government officials. Most of the previous studies of the impact of 
political uncertainty on innovation focus on cross-country data or developed economies 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2017; Pertuze et al., 2019; Ovtchinnikov et al., 2020), and very few papers 
have examined the impact of local political uncertainty such as political turnovers on corporate 
innovation in China. Thus, in this study, we explore the extent to which local political turnover 
affect firms’ innovation activities. We particularly focus on whether political turnover has an 
impact on the relationship between finance and innovation in China.  
To empirically evaluate the impact of city-level financial development and local 
political turnover on firms’ innovation activities in China, we use a large unbalanced panel data 
set of 3,160,672 observations covering 739,672 industrial firms in 305 cities over the period 
from 2003 to 2014. We focus on financial development and political turnover at the prefecture-
level (cities) instead of the province-level or county-level for the following reasons. On the one 
hand, the prefecture-level government plays a major role in economic plans since it can directly 
control state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and indirectly affect private sectors through regulation, 
license and network (Piotroski & Zhang, 2014). On the other hand, the data at the prefecture-
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level is more advantageous than the ones at the provincial-level as the former provides more 
information and variations in local financial development and political turnovers.124  
We find that both city-level financial development and local political turnovers promote 
firms’ innovation activities. However, we find that local political uncertainty arising from local 
political turnovers attenuates the positive effect of financial development on innovation. The 
results remain consistent with those of various robustness tests. Specifically, to eliminate the 
endogeneity issues, first, we use the fraction of seniors as the instrumental variable for the 
financial development variable and an indicator of predicted political turnovers as the 
instrumental variable for the political turnover variable to confirm the causality; second, we 
employ alternative measures of financial development, political turnover and innovation to 
mitigate measurement errors; third, we cover the contemporaneous terms of independent 
variables taking potential omitted variables into account; finally, we make more additional 
robustness tests including change of ‘above-scale’ sample, deletion of municipalities and other 
estimation methods.  
In addition to robustness tests, we make a further extension to find that the moderating 
effect of political turnover on the positive relationship between financial development and 
corporate innovation varies across turnover types of local government heads, firms’ political 
connections and financial constraints. Specifically, the moderating effect of political turnover 
is more pronounced for firms facing abnormal political turnovers, firms with political 
connections, and firms with less financial constraints.   
The paper has contributions as follows. Firstly, it contributes to the literature on finance 
and innovation. Our paper is distinct from but also complementary to the previous studies of 
                                                             
124 There are 31 provincial administrative regions in mainland China while about 300 prefecture-level cities. Thus, 
compared to the data at the provincial-level, the data at the prefecture-level is more plentiful. 
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financial development and innovation. Previous studies on the effect of financial development 
on innovation mainly focus on cross-country data or developed economies (Xiao & Zhao, 2012; 
Hsu et al., 2014; Ang & Kumar, 2014; Zhu et al., 2020). Unlike earlier studies, we are the first 
to use a rich set of cross-city data together with a large census dataset of firms including 
unlisted and listed firms to examine specific economic mechanisms through which financial 
development affects corporate innovation in China. Unlike listed firms which can raise external 
funds from the equity market, unlisted firms obtain external funds only from the credit market. 
Thus, unlisted firms can better capture the effect of the local credit markets in more than 300 
cities on corporate innovation in China than listed firms which are mainly distributed in specific 
cities. 125  Additionally, compared to most of the previous papers on China’s financial 
development based on national or provincial data (Liang & Teng, 2006; Zhang et al., 2015; He 
et al., 2017), we choose the financial development data across cities, which can better explore 
local financial development in depth.  
Secondly, our paper contributes to the literature on the effect of political uncertainty/ 
turnover on innovation. Some studies have explored the impact of political uncertainty on 
innovation based on cross-country data or western countries (Bhattacharya et al., 2017; Pertuze 
et al., 2019; Ovtchinnikov et al., 2020), while the related studies in China are still sparse. As 
the largest communist country with a unique political system, China provides an opportunity 
for us to investigate the effect of local political uncertainty on corporate innovation. The 
investigation helps us to understand the unique political mechanism through which how 
corporate innovation is affected. As the same as the aforementioned contribution, we link the 
                                                             
125  The distribution of listed firms in China is extremely unbalanced. Most listed firms are located in 4 
municipalities, sub-provincial cities or capital cities of provinces. The majority of prefecture-level cities own a 
small number of listed firms, or even zero. Thus, compared to listed firms, unlisted firms which are naturally 
distributed in all cities can better reflect the effect of financial development across cities. 
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data of unlisted firms with the data of political turnovers at the city-level, which is 
complementary to the previous studies on political uncertainty and innovation.  
Thirdly, our paper contributes to the literature on corporate innovation in China. Prior 
studies have explored the factors related to innovation in China, such as financial constraints 
(Guariglia & Liu, 2014), intellectual property rights protections (Fang, et al., 2017) and input 
tariff liberalization (Liu & Qiu, 2016). However, studies that have tested the effects of financial 
development and political turnovers on corporate innovation in China are not systematically 
consolidated.  
Fourth, our paper contributes to the literature on innovation by providing new insights 
into the real effects of financial development related to political turnover. In the Chinese 
context, we are the first to enrich the emerging research by examining the financial channel, 
e.g., financial development, through which political uncertainty/turnover affects corporate 
innovation. Considering that the unique government-intervention system is inextricably linked 
to every aspect of social life in China, China’s financial system is significantly affected by 
changes in the political environment. Thus, the study about the role played by political turnover 
in the relationship between financial development and corporate innovation can improve our 
understanding of China’s marvellous economic performance over the past few decades. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we introduce the 
background of China’s innovation, financial system and political system. In Section 4.3 we 
develop our testable hypotheses. In Section 4.4 and Section 4.5, we describe the variable 
measures and the datasets used in the study. In Section 4.6, we present our model specifications 
and summarize the variables in models. In Section 4.7, we show our empirical results. In 
Section 4.8 we make robustness tests and in Section 4.9 we make further tests to other factors. 
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Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 4.10 and provide detailed information on some 
related aspects in the appendices. 
 
4.2. Background of China’s innovation, financial system and political system 
4.2.1. China’s innovation  
China’s economic boom has coincided with a transformation from a laggard to a leader 
in innovation. Besides the enormous strides in the global innovation ranking, China has also 
experienced substantial growth in patent applications,  which is a poster child of innovation. 
Specifically, since the year 1985 when the patent system was established in China, China 
surpassed the US in 2011 and has become the country receiving the most number of patent 
applications. 126  According to the report of ‘World Intellectual Property Indicators 2018’ 
released by the WIPO, the number of patent applications filed by China to the WIPO rose from 
18,700 in 1995 to 1,381,594 in 2017, with an average annual growth rate of 23%.127 According 
to the China Statistical Yearbook published by the NBS of China, the number of domestic 
patent applications to the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) increased from 13,680 in 
1986 to 4,195,104 in 2019.128 Additionally, China’s R&D spending has soared in the past thirty 
years. According to the statistics of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
                                                             
126  The Economist, ‘How innovation is China? Valuing patents’, Jan. 5th, 2013. 
https://www.economist.com/business/2013/01/05/valuing-patents. 
127  The report of ‘World Intellectual Property Indicators 2018’ can be viewed via: 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_941_2018.pdf.  
128 The China Statistical Yearbook could be viewed via: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/. Actually, the year 
when the patent system was established in China is 1985. However, the number of patent applications is recorded 








Development (OECD), China’s gross domestic spending on R&D rose from $13,119 million 
in 1991 to $462,578 million in 2018, which is only behind the US ($551,518 million).  
Although China’s innovation nationwide has made significant progress over the past 
decades, there are still some disadvantages. The biggest challenge is unbalanced regional 
development. Compared to central, western and northeast regions, coastal (eastern) regions are 
the main areas where innovation activities take place in China. Specifically, according to the 
China Science and Technology Statistical Yearbook, the intramural expenditure on R&D of 
provinces in coastal regions exceeds 146.14 million CNY, accounting for 66.00% of the 
national total (about 221.44 million CNY). 129  The provinces that have the highest R&D 
spending are Guangdong (30.98 million CNY), Jiangsu (27.80 million CNY), Beijing (22.34 
million CNY), Zhejiang (16.70 million CNY) and Shanghai (15.25 million CNY), all in coastal 
regions. The five provinces with the highest number of domestic patent applications are also 
located in coastal regions: Guangdong (807,700), Jiangsu (594,249), Zhejiang (435,883), 
Shandong (263,211) and Beijing (226,113). The unbalanced regional development of 
innovation is largely determined by the unbalanced development of China’s economy. Due to 
the significant fund demand for R&D projects, only firms with good access to finance could 
invest in R&D activities and most of these firms tend to be located in coastal regions. Therefore, 
China’s innovation t heavily rely on government supports and funding. For example, in 2019 
about 76.3% of China’s R&D funding is supported by governments and only 20.5% is financed 
by enterprises. In contrast in most of the developed countries, the proportion of R&D funding 
supported by governments is only about 30% and the proportion financed by enterprises 
                                                             








exceeds 50%.In 2019 only about 11.7% of R&D researches in China is applied research while 
the corresponding figure for the developed countries usually exceeds 30%. 
4.2.2. China’s financial system 
 Over the past 40 years, China has been experiencing very rapid financial development. 
Before the 1980s, there was no commercial bank in China. As the sole bank and the central 
bank in China, the People’s Bank of China (POBC) was responsible for all banking transactions 
in China. China’s reform on its financial system took place in the year 1984 when the ‘Big-
Four’ state-owned banks (SOBs) took over commercial banking business from the POBC and 
the POBC only functioned as the central bank. After that, there is an expansion of banking 
financial institutions and non-banking financial institutions. However, the financial system in 
China has been dominated by state-controlled banks, e.g. the ‘Big-Four’ banks, which has 
resulted in poor lending decisions made for SOEs and a  misallocation of financial resources.   
 Since 1994 China’s central government has carried out a series of financial reforms to 
make banking organizations less administrative and more independent. For example, three 
policy banks were established in 1994 and the Commercial Bank Law was promulgated in 
1995.130 Meanwhile, more and more types of banks have been established since 1994. For 
example, the China Minsheng Bank Corporation (CMBC), the first privately-owned bank in 
China, was established in 1996. Some urban commercial banks have taken the form of joint-
equity and conduct business in the cities where they are located. As the number of joint-equity 
commercial banks has gradually increased, the market share of the ‘Big-Four’ has declined but 
still dominated in China’s financial market. Additionally, as more firms have the motivation to 
go public, the central government also established two stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock 
                                                             
130 The three banks are China Development Bank, Export-Import Bank of China and Agricultural Development 
Bank of China. 
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Exchange in 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991 to construct the equity market in 
China. 
 At the end of 2001, China formally joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). To 
meet the WTO requirement of financial liberalization, China’s central government has adopted 
more policies. For example, more freedom is allowed to give to the capitals from foreign banks. 
In 1996, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) bought a stake of about 1.9% share from the 
China Everbright Bank, which is the first time that a foreign bank invests in a domestic bank 
in China. The China Banking Regulatory Commission（CBRC）also issued policies in 2003 
to promote the shareholdings of foreign banks. Since 2001, the central government gradually 
eased the geographical and client restrictions on Renminbi (RMB) businesses conducted by 
foreign banks. Specifically, in 2001 only 4 cities (Shenzhen, Shanghai, Tianjin and Dalian) 
were allowed to open up to foreign banks, while in 2006 foreign banks were allowed to set up 
branches and conduct RMB business in all cities. At the end of 2006, 312 foreign banks had 
set up branches and carried out RMB business in China, and the total assets of financial 
institutions controlled by foreign banks account for 2.11% of the total assets of China’s entire 
financial institutions. 
4.2.3. China’s political system  
With the economic reform starting from 1978, China also has gradually reformed its 
political system, such as the set-up of the ‘tenure system for leading cadres’. Before the 1980s, 
the ‘life tenure for leaders’ system was dominating in China. For example, Mao Zedong was 
the supreme leader of China from the year 1949 when the People’s Republic of China was 
founded until the year 1976 when he passed away. Starting from the speech in 1980 of Deng 
Xiaoping who is the pioneer of the reform and open up, China steadily abolished its system of 
 
Chapter 4 




‘life tenure for leaders’. In 1982, the fifth National People’s Congress incorporated the ‘tenure 
system for leading cadres’ for national leaders into the Chinese Constitution, which states that 
national leaders have a tenure period of five years and serve no more than two consecutive 
terms. Following the central government, local governments at all levels have gradually 
established the ‘tenure system for leading cadres’. Although the Chinese Constitution does not 
set term limits for cadres of the CPC (the sole ruling party in China), the document issued by 
the CPC Central Committee in 2006 claimed that CPC cadres at all levels of government 
typically serve the same five-year term as government officials.131 
Although China has gradually reformed its political system, it is still distinct from 
western countries. Unlike most western countries whose government top leaders can come 
from various political parties and are decided by votes, China is directly controlled by the CPC 
at all levels of government. Thus, the top leader of the Chinese government at all levels must 
be a member of the CPC, who is called the secretary of the party committee (hereafter referred 
to as party secretary), and all local government officials must follow the leadership of the local 
party secretary. Additionally, higher party organizations delegate power to subordinate party 
organizations, which causes local party secretaries to hold the supreme power of decision-
making and allocation of resources. Owing to the Chinese government’s unique promotion 
system, which is positively related to local GDP growth during their terms132, local party 
secretaries have incentives to use political tools to promote the local economic growth.  
Although CPC cadres typically have a five-year tenure in line with a party congress held every 
five years, the CPC has absolute authority to changes the local party secretary in a given region 
to achieve specific economic goals.133 However, the change in political leadership is likely to 
                                                             
131 The link of the document in Chinese version: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64387/4671315.html. 
132 Maskin et al. (2000) suggest that promotion is one of the most important career ambitions of a politician in 
China. 
133 It is also a common phenomenon that many local party secretaries serve less than five-year in office. 
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have a dramatic impact on firms’ business activities as firms become uncertain about future 
policies. Besides, some local party secretaries are removed from office or resign voluntarily 
due to particular political reasons e.g. corruption or public unrests. For example, due to the 
delay in reporting the COVID-19 outbreak that happened in Wuhan (the capital city of Hubei 
Province) in December 2019, the party secretary of Hubei Province (Jiang Chaoliang) and the 
party secretary of Wuhan City (Ma Guoqiang) resigned from their posts in February 2020. 
These unexpected turnovers of local party secretaries could create significant political 
uncertainty for the enterprises in local areas.   
 
4.3. Hypothesis development  
 In this section, we develop three testable hypotheses by discussing previous literature 
and economic theories. First, we test whether city-level financial development encourages 
firms’ innovation activities in China. Second, we examine whether local political turnover 
promotes firms’ innovation activities in China. Third, we test the moderating effect played by 
local political turnover on the relationship between financial development and corporate 
innovation.  
4.3.1. Financial development and corporate innovation 
Since the innovation process is long-term, idiosyncratic and unpredictable (Holmstrom, 
1989), firms are likely to prefer to invest in short-term projects than R&D projects. Even firms 
that have strong incentives to innovate may face a problem of financial constraints due to the 
large fund demand of R&D. Thus, firms’ innovation activities are not only limited by internal 
finance but also have to rely on external finance (Ayyagari et al., 2011). However, the 
information asymmetry between banks and firms leads to high costs of external financing, since 
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some firms are reluctant to completely expose their potential R&D projects to market and thus 
banks cannot fully understand the R&D projects (Aboody & Lev, 2000; Anton & Yao, 2002). 
Financial markets significantly affect firms’ decisions on how to finance their activities since 
a developed financial system can efficiently mobilize financial savings and allocate financial 
resources (Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Levine, 1991; Saint-Paul, 1992; Fisman & Love, 
2004). Thus, a higher financial development can overcome problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection and thus reduce firms’ costs of external finance,  which makes it easier for 
firms to finance their activities using bank loans or other forms of external finance (Rajan & 
Zingales, 1998; Love, 2003; Fisman & Love, 2003; Ge & Qiu, 2007). With an increasing 
number of financial institutions that have emerged in each city in China over the past decades, 
China’s financial market has been a tremendous development. A higher level of financial 
markets can provide more external financing sources to firms and reduce costs of firms’ 
external finance.  Firms in cities with a higher level of financial development are more likely 
to obtain external funds to achieve the fund demand of R&D projects. Based on the above 
conjectures, therefore, we hypothesize as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: City-level financial development encourages corporate innovation in China. 
4.3.2. Political turnover and corporate innovation 
In China, local officials with high political ranking can have huge benefits, such as 
privilege and social status. One of the local government officials’ goals in China is political 
promotion when they finish their terms. The final promotion decisions of local officials are 
usually made in the last year or the penultimate year of their terms, so the local GDP growth in 
the early years of their terms is heavily weighted (Ru, 2018). Thus, new appointed local 
government leaders tend to instantly use more policy tools such as tax reduction or patent 
subsidies to encourage corporate innovation to boost the local economy. Local political 
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turnover could stimulate local corporate innovation. This is also the interpretation that a lot of 
firms may not apply for patents even they have potential innovation outputs. Because the value 
of innovation investments may increase as political turnovers also create innovation 
opportunities in China’s particular political turnover system, firms would wait for the 
perfect time such as political turnovers to maximize their benefits from innovative products. 
Due to the unique political turnover system and the local government officials’ promotion 
ambitions in China, we propose our second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Local political turnover promotes corporate innovation in China. 
4.3.3. Financial development, political turnover and corporate innovation 
 Political turnovers of local government leaders could potentially lead to political 
uncertainty, which may attenuate the positive effect of financial development on innovation 
activities. First, in areas with political uncertainty, information asymmetry between external 
investors and firms is higher, which in turn imposes additional costs on the debt and loan 
contracts from banks (Francis et al., 2014; Nagar et al., 2019). Second, some previous studies 
have found the effect of political uncertainty on default risk, which could increase the premium 
of external funds (Campbell et al., 2001; Mei & Guo, 2004; Bloom et al., 2007; Vavra, 2014). 
Third, banks may intentionally reduce external funds to firms due to China’s unique 
government-intervention model. In China, most loans are still controlled by state banks such 
as the ‘Big-Four’, which are closely connected to their local governments. With a change in 
the local political environment, banks may ration credit to avoid potential political risks. Given 
the fact innovation investment is highly dependent on external finance, firms’ innovation 
activities are highly affected by credit rationing. Fourth, the risk of expropriation by the 
government could be higher during the period of political uncertainty, innovative firms might 
perceive the risk and invest less in R&D projects even they have access to finance. Therefore, 
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the relationship between financial development and innovation could be attenuated due to 
political uncertainty. Therefore, we put forward our third hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: Political uncertainty arising from local political turnovers reduces the positive 
effect of city-level financial development on corporate innovation. 
 
4.4. Variable measures 
 In this section, we introduce the measures of firms’ innovation activities, city-level 
financial development and local political turnover. Appendix D shows detailed information on 
variable definitions.  
4.4.1. Measure of innovation 
In the study, we use the number of patent applications submitted by a firm in a given 
year to measure firm-level innovation output. Many papers have used patents to measure firm-
level innovation (Liu & Qiu, 2016; Acharya & Xu, 2017; Fang et al., 2017). Using patents to 
measure innovation output has advantages (Bronzini & Piselli, 2016). Specifically, patents can 
better reflect firm-level innovative performance (Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 2003) because the 
patent application and grant require more stringent processes governed by government and 
specific experts. Griliches (1990) also suggests that patent activity can be a good measure of 
invention activity since patent activities are regarded as a growth indicator of economically 
valuable knowledge.  
Specifically, we construct a proxy, 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 , which represents the number of all three 
types of patent applications for a firm 𝑖 in a given year 𝑡. However, the majority of firms in the 
sample do not have patent applications, which means the value of 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 for most observations 
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equals 0. Specifically, approximately 93.81% of sample observations have no patent 
applications while the largest value of 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is 31,805. To avoid the problems of too many zero 
values and the big dispersion in 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡, we construct a new proxy, 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1), by using 
the natural logarithm of 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 . The explanation that we employ the number of patent 
applications instead of patents granted is application years can better reflect the actual time of 
innovation (Griliches et al., 1986). We use the number of patents granted as a robustness check. 
Besides patents, some papers use new product output value and R&D expenditure as 
alternative measures of firms’ innovation activities (Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 2003; Guariglia & 
Liu, 2014; Zhu et al., 2020). However, because the data of new product output value and R&D 
expenditure are incompletely recorded in the NBS firm-level dataset during the sample period, 
we do not choose them.134 
4.4.2. Measure of financial development  
To examine the extent to which financial development affects firms’ innovation 
activities in China, we construct a set of financial indicators to measure financial development. 
We measure financial development at the city-level, which should reflect the overall depth and 
size of financial intermediations across cities.135 
Previous papers have employed some indicators of financial development across 
countries. For example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) use the ratio of stock market capitalization 
plus domestic credit to GDP in one country to measure the country’s overall financial 
development. Levine et al. (2000) measure financial development by using the values of credits 
                                                             
134 Specifically, the data of new product output value and R&D expenditure in the NBS firm-level dataset are only 
recorded from 2003 to 2007 and missing in 2004, while our sample covers the period from 2003 to 2014. Thus, 
new product output value and R&D expenditure are not good proxies of firm’s innovation activities in the study. 
135 Appendix B shows the detailed information on the cities used in the study. 
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provided by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP. In the study, we 
construct a variable, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, to measure the financial development level of city 𝑐 where a 
firm 𝑖 is located in year 𝑡. Specifically, following Zhang et al. (2012) we use a set of indicators 
to measure financial development. The first is the credit ratio which is the ratio of overall loans 
in the city 𝑐 ’s financial system (including banking institutions and non-banking financial 
institutions) to the city 𝑐’s gross regional product (GRP) in year 𝑡. The credit ratio measures 
the overall depth of the city’s financial intermediaries. The second is the deposit ratio which is 
the ratio of overall deposits in the city 𝑐’s financial system to the city 𝑐’s GRP in year 𝑡. The 
deposit ratio measures the overall size of financial intermediations. The third is the saving ratio 
which is the ratio of overall household savings in the city 𝑐’s financial system to the city 𝑐’s 
GRP in year 𝑡 . The saving ratio measures financial development in terms of mobilizing 
household savings.  
4.4.3. Measure of political turnover  
Following An et al. (2016), Xu et al. (2016), Amore and Minichilli (2018), we use 
political turnovers of city government leaders, which also can capture local political uncertainty. 
Because the CPC is the sole ruling party in China, the city government leader in China is the 
city party secretary instead of the mayor who serves as vice city party secretary. The city party 
secretary has absolute authority in decision-making, no matter at which city level. When the 
current city party secretary is replaced, there is political uncertainty in the short run. Thus, we 
construct a dummy variable, 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, to indicate local political turnover, which takes a value of 
one when the city 𝑐  where a firm 𝑖 is located experiences an official turnover of city party 
secretary in year 𝑡 and zero otherwise. Additionally, since many official changes happen in the 
second half of the year, if we used a calendar year (from 1st January to 31st December) to 
capture the occurrence time of turnovers, an estimation error of political uncertainty potentially 
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exists. Thus, following An et a., (2016), Xu et al., (2016) and Chen et al., (2020), we adjust the 
variable 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 according to the exact dates of leaving office and taking office for each city 
party secretary. Specifically, if a political turnover of one city party secretary occurs in the first 
half (from 1st January to 30th June) of year 𝑡, we treat it as happening in year 𝑡; if a city party 
secretary change occurs in the second half (from 1st July to 31st December) of year 𝑡, we treat 
it as happening in next year 𝑡 + 1. For example, Wang Yang, Bo Xilai and Zhang Dejiang are 
the former city party secretaries of Chongqing (one of four municipalities). Wang left office 
and Bo took office in November 2007. Bo left office and Zhang took office in March 2012. 
Hence, we define the years 2008 and 2012 as the turnover years. Additionally, using exact 
dates could capture two changes of city party secretary in one calendar year for a small number 
of cities, while using calendar years would omit one change. For example, Xi Jinping was 
inaugurated as the city party secretary of Shanghai (one of four municipalities) in March 2007 
but was promoted to the central government in October 2007. If we use calendar years to 
capture the political turnovers, the value of 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 equals 1 only for the year 2007 but 0 for the 
year 2008. Thus, using exact dates instead of calendars years is a better measure. The 
occurrence of political turnover (𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 1) can reflect a spike of local political uncertainty. 
 
4.5. Data 
The paper uses consolidated data that includes information on firm-level financial 
variables from the NBS of China, firm-level patents from the CNRDS, city-level financial 
development from the China City Statistical Yearbook, and city-level political turnovers 








4.5.1. NBS firm-level data 
The first data for firm-level financial variables is from the China Annual Survey of 
industrial firms. Because the data is drawn from the annual accounting reports conducted by 
the NBS of China, the dataset is called the NBS firm-level data. The dataset can be briefly 
described as follows: First, the census firm-level dataset is the unique comprehensive coverage 
of rich information on all ‘above-scale’ enterprises, such as official names, industry 
classifications, years of founding and addresses.136 The dataset also records most items of each 
firms’ operation and financial performance, including the number of employees, total industrial 
output value, total asset, accumulated depreciation, main business income, etc. Second, the 
dataset is the largest longitudinal micro-level data available in China, especially for unlisted 
firms. In the dataset, 95% of the firms are unlisted firms and all firms are distributed in the 
whole 31 provincial administrative divisions (22 provinces, 4 provincial-level municipalities 
and 5 autonomous regions) and across all 39 sectors of mining, manufacturing, and public 
utility.137 The dataset has a unique legal identifier as the legal person code (fa ren dai ma) to 
each firm (Chang & Wu, 2014), which allows researchers to make a panel data by linking 
together the observations in years. Third, the big sample of the dataset accounts for the vast 
majority of China’s total industrial output (approximately 90%), 138  which can eliminate 
                                                             
136 According to the NBS of China, from 1998 to 2006 the ‘above-scale’ enterprises are all state-owned industrial 
enterprises and non-state-owned industrial enterprises with annual main business income (i.e., sales) above five 
million CNY. In 2007, the NBS of China revised the standard of ‘above-scale’ enterprises to only industrial 
enterprises with annual sales above five million CNY. In January 2011, the NBS raised the threshold for inclusion 
of the ‘above-scale’ enterprises from five million CNY to twenty million CNY of annual sales. 
137 We cannot distinguish the public listed firms from the NBS dataset as there is not an identifier for listed firms 
in the dataset. Additionally, the dataset does not report the information of firms in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. 
138 For example, according to the national economic census annual report in the year 2004 
(http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content_180438.htm), the sales of all industrial enterprises in China in 
that year is 2.184 trillion. As a comparison, in the database the sales of all sample enterprises in the dataset in 
2004 is 1.956 trillion yuan, accounting for approximately 89.5% of the national total. 
 
Chapter 4 




aggregation problems (Guariglia & Liu, 2014). Firms’ heterogeneity also can be taken into 
account (Bond & Van Reenen, 2007). Thus, the dataset can be a good representative of the 
broad Chinese industrial economy and many studies have used it in areas of economics and 
finance, such as economic development (Song et al., 2011), total factor productivity (Hsieh & 
Klenow, 2009), innovation (Hu & Jefferson, 2009; Liu & Qiu, 2016), and financial constraints 
(Guariglia et al., 2011; Ding et al., 2013), etc.  
In the study, we choose the NBS data from 2003 to 2014.139 To check the data reliability, 
we compare the number of firms each year in the dataset with those reported in the China 
Statistical Yearbook conducted by the NBS. Before matching with the patent data and the city-
level data, we clean the original data by following some steps. Appendix A shows the detailed 
information on the comparison and the data cleaning process.  
4.5.2. Patent data 
The second data for the firm-level patent is from the Chinese Research Data Services 
(CNRDS) (https://www.cnrds.com/Home/Index#/). The dataset is a comprehensive dataset of 
China’s economy, finance and business. As a comprehensive coverage of patent information 
in China, the information dataset can be used to explore China’s innovation. The dataset 
records the patent information of unlisted firms since the year 1985, covering the names of the 
applicant firms and the application years. The most important variable in the dataset is the 
number of each firm’s all types of patent applications (including invention, utility model and 
design), which can be used to measure firms’ innovation output in the study.140 Since about 95% 
                                                             
139 The NBS firm-level data is recorded from the year 1996 and now the dataset has been updated officially to 
2014. In the study we choose the data starting from 2003 to keep consistent with the data of city-level financial 
development in China which is recorded from the year 2003. 
140 The three types of patents are different in protection periods, approval requirements and applicable targets. 
 
Chapter 4 




of observations in the NBS firm-level dataset are unlisted firms, we can merge the information 
on the number of each firm’s patent applications from the CNRDS with the NBS firm-level 
data through firms’ official names.  
4.5.3. Financial development data 
The third data for city-level financial development is from the China City Statistical 
Yearbook maintained by the NBS of China. The yearbook is a comprehensive dataset that 
records detailed information on the social and economic development of each city (including 
municipalities, prefecture-level cities, and county-level cities). By the end of 2014, there are 
333 prefecture-level administrative divisions in China and 288 of them are prefecture-level 
cities.141 Thus, the China City Statistical Yearbook is suitable for researchers to explore the 
effect of local factors on enterprises’ economic behaviours in the area of the whole nation. The 
data of city-level loans, deposits, and household savings in the yearbook are used to measure 
financial development, which starts from the year 2003. The yearbook provides two kinds of 
statistical data: the first is collected from the whole administrative areas of cities (urban and 
rural regions) and the second is collected from the urban areas of cities. We choose the first 
kind of data, considering that economic activity may take place in any area of one city. Last, 
we collect a panel of 306 cities (including 4 municipalities, 287 prefecture-level cities, and 15 
county-level cities directly governed by provincial governments) from the year 2003 to 2014 
in China.142 In the rest of the paper, a ‘city’ refers to a municipality, a prefecture-level city, or 
                                                             
141 The data is from the China Statistical Yearbook 2015 (http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2015/indexch.htm). 
Except for prefecture-level cities the other 45 prefecture-level administrative divisions are prefecture-level areas, 
autonomous prefectures or leagues.  
142  Only a very few number of county-level cities are independently organized outside prefecture-level 
administrative divisions and directly governed by provincial governments. Thus, we use the data of these county-
level cities (available from the year 2011) to link with the firm-level data. During the sample period from 2003 to 
2014, one prefecture-level city (Wuhu in Anhui Province) is merged by other prefecture-level cities, so the number 
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a county-level city directly governed by its provincial government. Appendix B shows detailed 
information on these cities.  
4.5.4. Political turnover data 
The fourth data used in this study is about local political turnovers. We manually collect 
the data of each city party secretary over the period from 2003 to 2014 from the Peoples 
Network (http://www.people.com.cn/) and the Xinhua Network (http://www.xinhuanet.com/) 
which are official websites organized by the Chinese central government. We cross-check the 
collected data with the Baidu Wikipedia (http://baike.baidu.com) which is the most popular 
search engine in China and Zecheng database (https://www.hotelaah.com/) to ensure the data 
quality. The data contains the detailed demographics of 1,359 party secretaries in 365 local 
administrative divisions, including name, gender, age, education etc. We also collect the exact 
years and months of leaving office and taking office for each city party secretary, which is used 
to construct the indicator of local political turnover. Appendix C shows the detailed distribution 
of political turnovers of city party secretary by provincial administrative regions and years. 
4.5.5. Merging datasets 
We first link the NBS firm-level data with the CNRDS patent data through firms’ 
official names recorded in the datasets. After that, we obtain the information on the number of 
each firm’s patent applications in the NBS firm-level data. Second, we merge the adjusted NBS 
firm-level data with the city-level financial development data and the political turnover data 
through administrative codes of cities. Third, we drop the firm-level observations which are 
                                                             
of prefecture-level cities in Anhui Province is decreased from 17 in 2010 to 16 in 2011. Thus, at the end of 2014 
there are totally 305 cities in China while we collect the data of 306 cities.  
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not in the 306 cities collected from the City Statistical Yearbook.143 Combining and adjusting 
these datasets, we finally obtain a large sample which consists of 3,160,672 observations 
covering 739,672 firms across 305 cities from 2003 to 2014. 144  All firm-level financial 
variables are deflated using provincial ex-factory producer price indices (PPI) conducted by 
the NBS of China.145  
Table 4.1 shows the distribution of the sample observations in years from 2003 to 2011. 
The number of firms is the least (168,858) in 2003 and the most (397,721) in 2008 since a 
national Census on industrial firms happened in 2008. The number of firms decreases from 
311,945 in 2009 to 297,670 in 2011 since the threshold for inclusion of the ‘above-scale’ 
enterprises is increased from five million CNY to twenty million CNY in 2011. We find that 
only about 6.19% of observations have patent applications during the sample period, reflecting 
a low enthusiasm in applying for patents in China. However, the participation rate of patent 
applications grows steadily from 2.37% in 2003 to 15.00% in 2014, showing that Chinese firms’ 
enthusiasm in applying for patents is increasing. Innovation policies of China’s governments 
may account for the increasing enthusiasm for patent applications. The number of cities in the 
sample increases from 284 in 2003 to 304 in 2014 since some prefecture-level administrative 
divisions are adjusted to prefecture-level cities during the sample period.146 Additionally, from 
                                                             
143  Some administrative areas where these observations are located are not cities, so they do not have the 
information on city-level financial development. The number of these observations is 54,806, only around 1.704% 
of all observations in the NBS firm-level data, also showing that cities are the core components for enterprise 
activities in China. 
144 In Section 5.3, we collect city-level financial development of 306 cities. One county-level city in Hainan 
Province does not have ‘above-scale’ enterprise during the sample period, so final sample observations are 
distributed in 305 cities. 
145 The provincial ex-factory PPI data could be searched on: http://data.stats.gov.cn/. 
146 For example, Bijie City in Guizhou Province is a prefecture-level administrative area before 2011, which is 
called ‘Bijie Prefecture’. In 2011 Bijie is adjusted from a prefecture-level administrative area to a prefecture-level 
city, so the China City Statistical Yearbook starts to record the information on Bijie City. For the number of cities 
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the year 2011, the China City Statistical Yearbook starts to record information on county-level 
cities directly governed by provincial-level governments, so the number of cities increases from 
286 in 2010 to 302 in 2011.147 For weighted average city-level FD, although the three ratios of 
FD initially decrease before the financial crisis starting from the year 2007, they gradually 
recover after the year 2008.148 The sharp rise from the year 2008 to 2010 may be stimulated by 
the ‘4-Trillion-Yuan Stimulus Package’ proposed by the central government. 149  Fig. 4.1 
presents the trend line of FD level as described above. Fig. 4.2 and Fig. 4.3 are maps that show 
the FD level measured as credit ratio across cities in 2003 and 2014. The figures show that the 
FD level is highly unbalanced in cities. 4 municipalities, 15 sub-provincial cities, capital cities 
of provinces and some coastal cities have a higher FD level compared to the rest.  
[Insert Table 4.1 here] 
[Insert Fig. 4.1 here] 
[Insert Fig. 4.2 here] 
[Insert Fig. 4.3 here] 
The total ratio of political turnover is 25.97% during the sample period 2003 to 2014. 
The set of peaks are years 2003, 2008, and 2013 which are the three years following the 
National Congress of the CPC. The National Congress is held every five years in China (in 
                                                             
in 2010, we use the data in 2009 and 2011 to capture it. If one firm is recorded in both 2009 and 2011, we cover 
the city where the firm is located for 2010. 
147 The data of Lhasa City in 2010 is not recorded in the China City Statistical Yearbook so Lhasa City is not 
included in the sample in 2010. This is the reason that the number of cities in the sample decreases from 287 in 
2009 to 286 in 2010. 
148 The weight is the number of firms in cities divided by the number of firms nationwide in the sample. We 
choose to report the weighted average FD level in consideration of city size. Since we cannot calculate the weight 
in 2010, we replace the weight in 2010 by using the weight calculated in 2009.  
149 The detailed information on the investment plan: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/stimulus_page.html. 
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2002, 2007, and 2012) and around the Congress, there is a large probability of political turnover 
for local governments. This is the explanation that many political turnovers of city party sectary 
occur in the second half of the years 2002, 2007, and 2012, or the first half of the years 2003, 
2008, and 2013. For example, the two turnovers of city party secretary of Beijing in the first 
ten years of the 21st century occur in October 2002 and July 2007. This is also the rationale that 
party secretaries usually serve a five-year term. Fig. 4.4 shows the pattern and we find that 
there is an obvious five-year cycle of turnover time. Additionally, Fig. 4.5 is a map showing 
the distribution of political turnover of party secretary across cities in China over the period 
from 2003 to 2014.150 The least number is 1 time and the most number is 6 times, while only 
three cities and two cities experience 1 political turnover and 6 political turnovers, respectively. 
Nearly half of the cities (143/304) have 3 political turnovers, which keeps pace with the three 
times of Congress during the period from 2003 to 2014. We also find that cities with more 
times are mostly distributed in the central and western provinces. Specifically, in all 88 cities 
with more than 3 times, 31 cities are located in the central provinces and 30 in the western 
provinces. The finding may be decided by that higher party organizations frequently appoint 
talented party cadres to the central and western provinces to boost the local economy. 
Additionally, since the political environment in the central and western provinces is poorly 
regulated, the probability of corruption and public disaster is higher. For example, the most 
corrupt province in China is Shanxi Province which is one of the central provinces. The national 
                                                             
150 For Table 4.1 and Fig. 4.1, we use the number of cities each year in the sample to calculate the ratio of political 
turnovers. However, for Fig. 4.5, if we choose the number of cities each year in the sample to calculate the number 
of political turnovers for each city during the period from 2003 to 2014, a statistical error may occur. Specifically, 
in 2010 Lhasa is not included in the sample since the China City Statistical Yearbook does not record the data of 
Lhasa in 2010, while in other years Lhasa is included in the sample. Additionally, the data of county-level cities 
directly governed by provincial governments is available from 2011, so these county-level cities are not included 
in the sample before 2011. These cities (Lhasa and county-level cities) are not included in the sample in some 
years but may experience political turnovers in these years. Thus, as long as a city has been in the sample, we 
calculate the number of political turnovers of it during the period from 2003 to 2014 to make Fig. 4.5. 
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‘Antigraft Campaign’ in 2014 removed 15,450 government officials including seven provincial 
officials in Shanxi Province.151 
[Insert Fig. 4.4 here] 
[Insert Fig. 4.5 here] 
 
4.6. Model specifications and summary statistics 
4.6.1. Model specifications 
 In the study, we choose a modified Euler equation. The Euler equation has been widely 
used to test the existence of financial constraints on firms’ investments (Whited, 1992; Bond 
et al., 2003), which has an advantage of a dynamic structural model to control expected firms’ 
future profitability. We modify the Euler equation as shown in Eq. (4.1).  
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) = 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
                             𝛽4𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 
                                       𝑉𝑖 + 𝑉𝑡 + 𝑉𝑜 + 𝑉𝑗 + 𝑉𝑝 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡                                                       (4.1)  
where the dependent variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is the natural logarithm of the number 
of patent applications per firm. 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 and 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 are our main explanatory variables, 
representing city-level financial development and local political turnover. As regards other 
control variables, 𝑆𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 is the ratio of firms’ cash flows to total assets. 𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1  is the ratio of 
                                                             
151 The Quartz, ‘China’s corruption crackdown is so vast, top officials from every single province have been 








firms’ cash flows to total assets, showing the effect of firms’ internal financing on 
innovation.152 𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 can reflect the effect of long-term debts on innovation, measured by the 
ratio of firms’ new long-term debts to total assets (Guariglia & Liu, 2014).153 We choose lagged 
terms (𝑡 − 1) of the independent variables to avoid simultaneity issues, which can alleviate the 
reverse causality between 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) and the independent variables. Additionally, since 
R&D achievements need a long-term cycle, innovation is largely affected by previous financial 
variables. We winsorize all firm-level continuous regression variables at the 1% tails to 
minimize the potential influence of extreme values.154 𝑉𝑖 is a firm fixed effect. 𝑉𝑡 is a year fixed 
to control effect time-varying movements in the economic cycle. 𝑉𝑜 is a set of six ownership 
dummy variables to control the ownership effect.155 𝑉𝑗 and 𝑉𝑝 are industry dummy variables 
and geographical dummy variables.156 𝑒𝑖,𝑡  is an idiosyncratic error term. The subscripts 𝑖 is 
firm, c city, 𝑡 year, 𝑜 ownership, 𝑗 industry and 𝑝 province.  
According to our Hypothesis 1, if city-level financial development encourages firms’ 
innovation activities, the marginal effect of 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 , 𝛽6 , should be positive and 
                                                             
152 Cash flows is the sum of net profits and current depreciation. However, the data of current depreciation is 
missing in 2008 and 2009 in the NBS firm-level data. Considering that net profits is the main source of internal 
financing, we have to use net profits to replace cash flows in 2008 and 2009.  
153 Since R&D project has characteristics of a long-term investment cycle and a huge fund demand, it is obvious 
that innovation is affected more by long-term debts. We also cover new short-term debts to make a robustness test 
in Section 4.8.4.  
154 Since the innovation variable, 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1), is a left-censored variables at zero, we only winsorize it at the 
99% tail of the positive value. Considering that the number of patent applications per firm is a discrete variable, 
we make a robustness test if we do not winsorize the innovation variable and the estimation results keep consistent. 
155 The six ownership types are SOEs, foreign firms, private firms, collective firms, Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan 
(HMT) firms, and mixed ownership firms, which is calculated on the majority of paid-in capitals. 
156 We construct the industry-specific component and the location-specific component by using 40 two-digit codes 
and 31 provincial codes. We obtain qualitatively same estimation results when we employ three-digit codes or 








significant. If the marginal effect of 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, 𝛽7, is positive and significant, we could verify 
our Hypothesis 2 that local political turnover promotes firms’ innovation activities. To test our 
Hypothesis 3 whether political turnover affect the relationship between financial development 
and innovation, we augment Eq. (4.1) by adding the interaction term, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, 
to get Eq. (4.2). We expect  the marginal effect of 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, 𝛽8, is negative and 
significant according to Hypothesis 3. Other variables and subscripts in Eq. (4.2) are the same 
as those in Eq. (4.1).  
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) = 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
                             𝛽4𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 
                                       𝛽8𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑖 + 𝑉𝑡 + 𝑉𝑜 + 𝑉𝑗 + 𝑉𝑝 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡        (4.2)                                          
4.6.2. Summary statistics 
In the section, we summarize the main regression variables and other related variables 
for the full sample, firms with/without patent applications.157 Table 4.2 reports the means and 
medians (in parentheses) of the main regression variables and related variables. The number of 
firms with patent applications is 124,895, roughly 7.561% of the full sample, showing a low 
enthusiasm of Chinese firms in patenting activity. For financial development (𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1), 
we find that the average values of three ratios for firms with patent applications (117.646%, 
165.907% and 69.879%) are all higher than those for firms without patent applications 
(97.622%, 141.471% and 67.912%). This finding may indirectly prove a positive relationship 
between financial development and innovation. The average value of political turnover 
                                                             
157 We summarize the number of observations estimated into regressions. This is the reason that the number of 
total observations is 1,651,881. If we summarize the number of all observations in the panel (3,160,672), the 
findings keep qualitatively same. 
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(𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1) for firms with patent applications (28.622%) is greater than that for firms without 
patent applications (26.527%), suggesting that innovation activities may be positively 
correlated with local political turnover. The mean values of the ratio of sales to total assets 
(𝑆𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1) and the ratio of cash flows to total assets (𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1) are both lower for firms with patent 
applications (165.297% and 10.987%) than firms without patent applications (261.108% and 
13.600%), while the mean value of the ratio of new long-term debts to total assets (𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1) 
is higher for firms with patent applications (0.426%) than firms without patent applications 
(0.229%). The finding could be explained by that external finance plays an important role in 
innovation activities due to the high demand for external funds of R&D. As regards other 
variables, average values of real total assets and age are higher for innovative firms (729.123 
million CNY and 13.040 years old) than non-innovate counterparts (118.023 million CNY and 
10.693 years old), showing that innovate firms are larger and more mature. It is not surprising 
that large and mature firms generally have a greater ability to invest in R&D projects. The 
lower average value of political affiliation for firms with patent applications (78.104) shows 
innovative firms are more politically affiliated compared to non-innovate firms (whose 
corresponding value is 80.698).158 Firms with patent applications have more percentage of state 
shares (average value is 4.802%) than counterparts without patent applications (average value 
is 4.156%). Firms with patent applications are more likely to be distributed in the eastern region 
(average value is 1.290) compared to firms without patent applications (average value is 1.338). 
All variable definitions are shown in Appendix D. 
[Insert Table 4.2 here] 
                                                             
158 Appendix D shows that the index of political affiliation is a categorical variable. In the dataset, the Chinese 
appellation of political affiliation is ‘zhengzhilishu’. If the value of ‘zhengzhilishu’ for one firm is higher, the firm 
is politically affiliated at a lower level. 
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4.7. Estimation methodology and empirical results  
4.7.1. Estimation methodology 
In the study, considering that the dependent variable, 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a typical left-
censored variable (around 93.91% of sample firms have no patent applications), we use a Tobit 
estimation. Theoretically, we should employ the Random-effects Tobit estimator due to the 
firm heterogeneity (Tobin, 1958). However, due to a large panel of firms (the number of 
observations into estimation is 1,651,881), the processing time of a Random-effects estimation 
is very time-consuming159. We have to use the Pooled Tobit for time-saving instead. We then 
report marginal effects instead of coefficients for the Tobit estimation. According to Cong 
(2001), the marginal effect of the Tobit estimator includes three types: marginal effect on the 
probability of being uncensored with respect to the change of regressors; marginal effect on 
the quantity of truncated data with respect to the change of regressors; marginal effect on the 
quantity of censored data with respect to the change of regressors.160  
4.7.2. Empirical results 
 Table 4.3 shows the estimation results of baseline Eq. (4.1) using the Pooled Tobit for 
the full sample. Columns (1) to (9) correspond to the three indicators of city-level financial 
development, i.e., the credit ratio, the deposit ratio and the saving ratio. We find that city-level 
financial development encourages firms’ innovation activities in both the likelihood and 
                                                             
159 The processing time of a Random-effects estimation based on our sample is over ten hours, we thus have to 
employ the Pooled Tobit. To ensure robustness, we take some tests of the Random-effects estimation for the full 
sample and the results keep qualitatively to those of the Pooled Tobit estimation. 
160 Truncated data is the subsample whose dependent variables is not censored; censored data is all observations 
in the sample no matter the dependent variable is censored or not censored.  
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intensity. The average marginal effects of 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 on 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) are all positive 
and significant at the 1% level. Specifically, in columns (1) to (3), the marginal effect in the 
probability of 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1  is 1.149% (credit ratio), 1.034% (deposit ratio) and 0.960% 
(saving ratio) respectively, suggesting that an 10% increase in 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 is associated with 
an increase of 0.115%, 0.103% and 0.096% in the probability that firms have patent 
applications. In columns (4) to (6), the marginal effect in the quantity of truncated data of 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1  is 3.530% (credit ratio), 3.179% (deposit ratio) and 2.952% (saving ratio) 
respectively, which means that a 10% increase in 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 makes an increase of 0.353%, 
0.318% and 0.295% in 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) for only firms with patent applications. In columns (7) 
to (9), the marginal effect in the quantity of censored data of 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 is 1.859% (credit 
ratio), 1.674% (deposit ratio) and 1.555% (saving ratio) respectively, showing that as 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1  rises by 10%, 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1)  increases by 0.186%, 0.167% and 0.156% 
respectively for firms with/without patent applications. The estimation results confirm our 
Hypothesis 1 that there is a positive and significant relationship between city-level financial 
development and firms’ innovation activities in both probability and quantity. The financial 
market is positively associated with firms’ innovation activities in China. The results suggest 
that Chinese firms benefit from an increase in financial development by meeting their fund 
demands for R&D.  
[Insert Table 4.3 here] 
For political turnover, regardless of the measure of financial development, we observe 
that the average marginal effects of the political turnover variable, 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, are all positive and 
significant. Since 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 is a binary variable to indicate local political turnover, the marginal 
effect of 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 is the effect when 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 changes from 0 to 1. Specifically, in columns (1) 
to (3), the average marginal effect in the probability of 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 is 0.092%, 0.106% and 0.073% 
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respectively, which means as 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 becomes from 0 to 1, the probability that firms have 
patent applications would increase by 0.092%, 0.106% and 0.073%. In columns (4) to (6), the 
average marginal effect in the quantity of truncated data of 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 is 0.282%, 0.326% and 
0.225% respectively, suggesting that as 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 becomes from 0 to 1, 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) grows 
by 0.282%, 0.326% and 0.225% respectively for only firms with patent applications. In 
columns (7) to (9), the average marginal effect of 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 is 0.148%, 0.172% and 0.118% 
separately in the quantity of censored data, showing that when 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 transfers from 0 to 1, 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) rises by 0.148%, 0.172% and 0.118% separately for all observations in the 
estimation. The estimation results support our Hypothesis 2 according to which local political 
turnover promotes firms’ innovation activities in China in both probability and quantity. Local 
political turnover may create more innovation opportunities and stimulate firms to innovate.  
As regards control variables, the average marginal effects of 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) are all 
positive and significant at the 1% level and the average marginal effects of  𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +
1)2 are all negative and significant at the 1% level, which stays in step with the theoretical 
assumption. Short-sighted behaviours of firms in China may interpret the negative and 
significant marginal effects of 𝑆𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1, showing that firms may become more conservative with 
increased performance. The average marginal effects of 𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1  and 𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1  are all positive 
and significant, while the magnitude of the marginal effect of 𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 is greater than that of 
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 no matter in which column. The finding verifies the pecking order theory (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984) that internal finance is preferred when firms finance innovation. The positive 
and significant marginal effects of 𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 suggest that long-term external finance plays an 
important role in financing innovation due to the high demand funds of R&D.  
Table 4.4 reports the estimation results of Eq. (4.2) which includes the interaction term, 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, to test Hypothesis 3. No matter which proxy of financial development 
 
Chapter 4 




used in the regressions, we find that the average marginal effects of the interaction term, 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, are all negative and significant at the 1% level, showing that 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 
decreases the positive effect of 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 on 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1). The marginal effect of the 
interaction term is calculated as the difference between the average marginal effect of 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 evaluated at 0 of 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 and the average marginal effect of 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 fixed 
at 1 of 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1. Specifically, in columns (1) to (3), the marginal effect in the probability of the 
interaction term is -0.283%, -0.236% and -0.748% respectively, suggesting that as 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 
becomes from 0 to 1, the positive effect of 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 in the probability that firms have 
patent applications reduces by 0.283%, 0.236 and 0.748% respectively. In columns (4) to (6), 
the marginal effect in the quantity of truncated data of the interaction term is -0.892%, -0.747% 
and -2.307% respectively, showing that when 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 changes from 0 to 1, the positive effect 
of 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 on 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) decreases by 0.892%, 0.747% and 2.307% respectively 
for only firms with patent applications. In columns (7) to (9), the marginal effect in the quantity 
of censored data of the interaction term is -0.460%, -0.384% and -1.210% respectively, 
indicating that if 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1  moves from 0 to 1, the positive effect of 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1  on 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) drops by 0.460%, 0.384% and 1.210% respectively for all firms in the sample. 
The negative marginal effects of the interaction terms are in line with our Hypothesis 3 that the 
positive impact of financial development on innovation is reduced with political uncertainty. 
Additionally, we only focus on the marginal effect of the interaction term (𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗
𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1)  of Eq. (4.2) as the marginal effects of the two single terms, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1  and  
𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1,  are not meaningful. 








4.8. Endogeneity and robustness checks 
Thus far in our main estimations, we assume that city-level financial development and 
local political uncertainty are exogenous to firm-level innovation, and then we have tested the 
positive effects of both financial development and political uncertainty on firms’ innovation 
activities. However, it is still a concern that the estimation results face potential endogeneity 
issues caused by reverse causality, potential measurement errors and omitted variables. First, 
reverse causality could make that financial development and political uncertainty are 
endogenous to innovation if firms in one city become more involved in innovation activities. 
Specifically, a high level of innovation likely increases the amount of loans in the city due to 
the high funding demand of R&D. Innovative firms are more likely to make profits and have a 
stronger ability to deposit, which could increase the amount of deposits in the city. Additionally, 
local corporate innovation can promote economic performance, which is the most important 
evaluation indicator for local official’s performance in China. Thus, the success of corporate 
innovation may trigger political turnovers of party secretaries. Although in regressions we have 
employed the lagged values of the independent variables, e.g., city-level financial development 
and local political uncertainty, to avoid the simultaneity issue, our empirical framework is not 
completely immune to the potential reverse causality. Thus, we employ an instrumental 
variable (IV) estimation to confirm the causality between financial development, political 
uncertainty and innovation. Second, we use alternative measures of financial development, 
political uncertainty and innovation to estimate again to eliminate the potential measurement 
errors. Third, we also include the contemporaneous terms of independent variables into 
regressions to avoid the estimation bias of potential omitted variables. Finally, we make an 
extension to test whether the moderating effect of political uncertainty on the positive 
relationship between financial development and innovation varies across turnover types of 
local government heads, firms’ political connections and financial constraints.  
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4.8.1. Instrumental variable (IV) estimation 
For identifying the causal relationship between financial development and innovation 
and the causal relationship between political turnover and innovation, we employ an 
instrumental variable estimation. We apply the fraction of senior citizens in a given province-
year (𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑝,𝑡) as the instrumental variable for financial development (Becker, 2007; Butler 
& Cornaggia, 2011). Because seniors tend to consume less while deposit more compared to 
young people, a large fraction of seniors in a region probably leads to more financial supplies 
instead of financial demands. For the political turnover variable, we construct a dummy 
variable, 𝑃𝑇5𝑐,𝑡, as its instrumental variable. Specifically, 𝑃𝑇5𝑐,𝑡 takes a value of one for the 
fifth year after the year, 𝑡 − 5, when the city 𝑐 experiences an official turnover of city party 
secretary, and zero otherwise. Since city party secretaries usually have a five-year cycle, 𝑃𝑇5𝑐,𝑡 
can tease out economic factors and speculate only based on the past information of turnovers. 
For example, Shanghai, one of the four municipalities, experienced three turnovers of city party 
secretary in years 2003, 2007 and 2008, so 𝑃𝑇5𝑐,𝑡 for Shanghai equals 1 in years 2008 (2003 
plus 5), 2012 (2007 plus 5), 2013 (2008 plus 5), and equals 0 in other years. The instrumental 
variable, 𝑃𝑇5𝑐,𝑡 , is not related to the innovation variable, 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1), but positively 
related to the political turnover variable, 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡. Since we used the lagged values of independent 
variables in regressions, we instrument the financial development variable by employing the 
lagged values of 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑝,𝑡 and 𝑃𝑇5𝑐,𝑡 together. 
Table 4.6 shows the estimation results of IV Tobit. In columns (1) to (3), the average 
marginal effects of the instrumented financial development variable, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, and the 
average marginal effects of the instrumented political turnover variable, 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, are positive 
and significant. The findings confirm the positive causal effects of financial development and 
political turnover on innovation. In columns (4) to (6), the marginal effects of the instrumented 
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interaction term, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, are negative and significant. To check the validity 
of the instrumental variables, we make a set of tests. Specifically, the F-values in the first stage 
are much larger than the thumb of 10, suggesting that the estimation bias from potential weak 
instruments does not exist for the two instrumental variables (Stock & Yogo, 2005). Since we 
have two instrumented variables and the instrumented interaction term, for brevity we do not 
show the estimation results of the first-stage (Newey, 1987).161 The coefficient values of the 
instrumental variables 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑝,𝑡 and 𝑃𝑇5𝑐,𝑡 keep consistent with our theoretical assumptions. 
Next, we conduct a Wald test of exogeneity and an Anderson-Rubin (AR) test.162 We find that 
the p-value statistics of the Wald test are significant (0.000), suggesting that the regressors are 
endogenous and the adaption of IV estimation is essential. The p-value statistics of the AR test 
are also significant (0.000), showing that the model is identified and/or the instrumental 
variables are effective. Furthermore, the additional estimation results of a Hausman test and a 
Smith-Blundell test verify the existence of endogenous variables in the regressions. 
[Insert Table 4.5 here] 
4.8.2. Alternative measures of financial development, political turnovers and innovation 
In the section, we make robustness tests using alternative measures of financial 
development, political turnovers and innovation to alleviate potential measurement errors. For 
brevity, we only report the estimated average marginal effects in the quantity of censored data 
                                                             
161 For estimating the first-stage results, we have to use the code ‘ivtobit’ with the option of ‘twostep’ in STATA 
based on Newey’s two-step method. For the second-step estimation results, we adapt the default estimator of 
maximum likelihood without the option of ‘twostep’. 
162 Wald test examines whether the error terms in the structural equation are correlated to the residuals from the 
reduced-form equation for the endogenous variables. AR test is a joint test of the structural parameter and the 
exogeneity of instrumental variables. Its null hypothesis is that all regressors are exogenous and all the minimum 
canonical correlation is zero. Thus, if the results of Wald test and AR test are significant, suggesting the null 
hypothesis that all independent variables in regressions are exogenous is not accepted. 
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of the single terms, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1  and 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 , and the interaction term, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗
𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1. Panel A of Table 4.6 shows the estimation results of Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2) when we 
measure financial development, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, by using the three ratios (credit ratio, deposit 
ratio and saving ratio) based on the data of municipal districts for each city. Since municipal 
districts are the core components where economic activities including lending and borrowing 
events happen, the measure of financial development based on municipal districts can better 
reflect the influence of the main financial systems of cities. In columns (1) to (3), the average 
marginal effects of 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 and 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 are still positive and significant. In columns (4) 
to (6), the marginal effects of the interaction term, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, keep negative and 
significant. Our findings remain the same when the measure of financial development is based 
on municipal districts. 
[Insert Table 4.6 here] 
Panel B of Table 4.6 presents the estimation results of Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2) when we use 
political turnovers in calendar years to construct the dummy variable, 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 . Additionally, 
Panel C of Table 4.6 reports the estimation results of Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2) when we tease out 
predictable political turnovers to construct the dummy variable, 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 . Since city party 
secretaries usually serve one term (five years), the political turnovers that occur in the last year 
of terms can be largely predicted by market participates. These political turnovers may not 
affect corporate innovation. We can find that in both Panel B and Panel C, the average marginal 
effects of the single terms, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 and 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, in columns (1) to (3) are positive and 
significant, and the marginal effects of the interaction term, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 , in 
columns (4) to (6) hold negative and significant. The results keep qualitatively unchanged when 
we take alternative measures of local political turnover. 
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Table 4.7 reports the estimation results of Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2) when we use alternative 
measures of innovation. We only report the average marginal effects in the quantity of censored 
data of the variables, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, and 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1. Specifically, Panel 
A of Table 4.7 shows the estimation results when the innovation variable is measured by the 
number of invention patent applications, since invention patents are patents with good 
technology which require the most innovative efforts (Li, 2012). Panel B of Table 4.7 displays 
the estimation results when the innovation variable is measured by the number of patents 
applied independently. As compared to joint patent applications, independent patent 
applications can better reflect the innovation capability at the individual level and avoid 
disturbance from other firms’ innovation ability. Panel C of Table 4.7 exhibits the estimation 
results when the innovation variable is measured by the number of patents granted since not all 
patents applied can be granted. We can find that no matter which one measure of innovation, 
in columns (1) to (3) the marginal effects of the financial development variable, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, 
and the political turnover variable, 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, keep positive and significant; in columns (4) to (6) 
the marginal effects of the interaction term, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 maintain negative and 
significant. The estimation results remain consistent when we use other patent indicators to 
measure innovation. 
[Insert Table 4.7 here] 
4.8.3. Augmented specification with contemporaneous terms 
The last concern of endogeneity is the estimation bias of potential omitted variables in 
regressions. At the right side of regressions, we only cover the lagged terms as the independent 
variables to avoid the simultaneity issue. However, the contemporaneous terms of independent 
variables possibly affect the contemporaneous term of innovation at the left side of regressions. 
Hence, following Brown et al. (2009) and Guariglia and Liu (2014), we add the 
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contemporaneous terms of independent variables to augment regressions to address the concern 
of potential omitted variables. 
Table 4.8 provides the corresponding estimation results of Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2). For 
brevity, we only report the average marginal effects in the quantity of censored data. 
Specifically, we first include the contemporaneous terms of financial development variable, 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, and political turnover variable, 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, and into Eq. (4.1) to explore the effect of 
contemporaneous financial development and contemporaneous political turnover on 
innovation. In columns (1) to (3), the sum of the marginal effects of financial development 
variables (𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡  and 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ) and the sum of the marginal effects of political 
turnover variables (𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 and 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1) are both positive and significant. Additionally, we find 
that the positive marginal effects of the lagged financial development variable, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, 
and the lagged political turnover variable, 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, are all greater and more significant than 
those of the contemporaneous financial development variable, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 , and the 
contemporaneous political turnover variable, 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡. The finding indirectly verifies that R&D 
projects are largely affected by previous financial development and political turnover. Second, 
besides the two contemporaneous single terms, we further put the contemporaneous interaction 
term, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 , into Eq. (4.2) to capture the effect of contemporaneous political 
turnover on the relationship between contemporaneous financial development and innovation. 
However, in columns (4) to (6), the marginal effects of the interaction term, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗
𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 , are negative and significant, while the marginal effects of the interaction term, 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, are insignificant. The findings not only keep consistent with our main 
empirical findings but also confirm that innovation is mainly affected by past political turnover 
and past financial development. The contemporaneous terms of other financial variables are 
also included in regressions. 
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[Insert Table 4.8 here] 
4.8.4. Other robustness tests 
Besides the above tests, we make more robustness tests and the corresponding 
estimation results are shown in Table 4.9. For brevity, we only report the average marginal 
effects in the quantity of censored data when financial development is calculated as the credit 
ratio. First, in columns (1) and (2) we drop firms with sales of less than 20 million CNY to re-
estimate. Since the threshold for inclusion of the ‘above-scale’ enterprises is raised from 5 
million CNY to 20 million CNY in the year 2011, dropping observations with sales of less than 
20 million CNY could keep data consistency. Second, following Xu et al., (2016), in columns 
(3) and (4) we delete firms located in four municipalities and county-level cities to estimate 
since it could be argued that these cities are probably different from prefecture-level cities. 
Specifically, because four municipalities are directly governed by the central government 
instead of any provincial governments, political turnovers of city party sectary in four 
municipalities might be not decided by local factors but also by national political factors. 
Additionally, political turnovers of city party secretaries in county-level cities may have little 
impact on local enterprises due to a low administrative level. Since the information on county-
level cities in China City Statistical Yearbook is only available from 2011, dropping county-
level cities also can keep data of city consistency. Third, following An et al., (2016), in columns 
(5) and (6) we exclude firms in the years 2003, 2008, and 2013 to avoid the effect of the 
National Congress in the years 2002, 2007, and 2013. Dropping firms in the three years could 
address the concern that firms may adjust their innovation investments in anticipation of the 
National Congress and any resulting political turnovers.163 Fourth, short-term debts may have 
                                                             
163 An et al. (2016) remove the observations in the years 2002 and 2007 to avoid the national-election-year effect. 
However, considering that we use exact dates to capture political turnovers and the majority of political turnovers 
in national-election years (2002, 2007, and 2012) occur in the second half of the years or the first half of the 
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a potential effect on corporate innovation. To take the issue into account, in columns (7) and 
(8) we include the change of firms’ short-term debts into our regressions to estimate. We find 
that the marginal effects of new long-term debts (𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1) are greater than those of new short-
term debts (𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 ), which is in line with the characteristic of R&D projects that 
innovation is largely affected by long-term debts instead of short-term debts. Fifth, in columns 
(9) and (10) we choose the Zero-inflated Poisson method to estimate since the patent variable 
𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 (the number of patent applications per firm) is a count variable. In the main empirical 
results, we use the Tobit estimation method considering that more than 93% of firms in the 
sample do not have patent applications so the dependent variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a left-
censored variable. Last, in columns (11) and (12) we employ the Probit method to estimate if 
we use a binary variable to construct the innovation variable (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 equals 1 for firms with 
patent applications and equals 0 for firms without patent applications). The estimation results 
of the robustness tests remain qualitatively unchanged. 
[Insert Table 4.9 here] 
 
4.9. Further tests 
 In the section, we make additional analysis to test whether the moderating effect of 
political turnover on the positive impact of financial development on innovation would change 
across different turnover types, firms’ political connection and firms’ financial constraints. 
Table 4.10 reports the corresponding estimation results of Eq. (4.2). For brevity, we only report 
the average marginal effects in the quantity of censored data when financial development is 
                                                             
following years (2003, 2008, and 2013), we delete firms in the years 2003, 2008, and 2013 to better avoid the 
effect of National Congress. 
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proxied by credit ratio. Since we use lagged terms of independent variables in regressions, we 
also use lagged values of related variables to divide the sample into groups. All variable 
definitions and classification standards are shown in Appendix D. 
[Insert Table 4.10 here] 
4.9.1. Turnover types 
 We further explore the moderating effect of political turnover based on turnover types. 
Panel A of Table 4.10 shows the estimation results. Specifically, we expect the moderating 
effect should be more pronounced when an increase in political uncertainty, which is associated 
with unexpected turnover. First, we compare the group of firms in cities whose party secretaries 
are in around predicted turnover years of their terms and the group of firms in cities whose 
party secretaries are not in around predicted turnover years of their terms. Since the length of 
one term for one city party secretary is usually five years, we can regard the political turnovers 
when secretaries leave their posts in the years around the fifth year (4th, 5th, 6th) of their terms 
as normal turnovers and others as abnormal turnovers.164 In column (1) and (2), we find that 
the marginal effect of the interaction term, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 is negative and significant 
for firms in cities whose party secretaries are not in years around the 5th year of their terms (-
0.392%), while insignificant for firms in cities whose party secretaries are in years around the 
5th year of their terms. The results suggest that the negative effect of political turnover is more 
pronounced for firms facing abnormal turnovers. The interpretation is that compared to normal 
                                                             
164 For the judgement of tenure years, as similar as the construction of the political turnover dummy variable, 
𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, we use the exact dates of turnovers to determine the tenure years. For example, Yun Gongmin and Shen 
Weichen, are former city party secretaries of Taiyuan (capital city of Shanxi Province). Yun Gongmin took office 
in September 2001 and left office in January 2006. Shen Weichen took office in January 2006 and left office in 
September 2010. Their tenure lengths are 4 years and 4 months, and 4 years and 8 months respectively, so we 








turnovers, abnormal turnovers have a larger shock on the financial market, so innovative firms 
might perceive the risk and invest less in R&D projects even they have access to finance. 
Therefore, the relationship between financial development and innovation could be attenuated 
due to abnormal political turnover.   
Second, we test whether the moderating effect of political turnover is different between 
the group of firms in cities whose party secretaries are around predicted turnover ages and the 
group of firms in cities whose party secretaries are not around predicted turnover ages. 
According to an unwritten rule of the CPC, a party secretary of one prefecture-level city usually 
needs to promote or resign from a leading post when he reaches 55 years old, so there is a large 
probability of turnover when he is around 55 years old (54, 55 and 56).165 In columns (3) and 
(4), we find that the marginal effect of the interaction term, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 is negative 
and significant for firms in cities whose party secretary turnover are not around predicted 
turnover ages (-0.701%) but insignificant for firms in cities whose party secretary turnover are 
around predicted turnover ages.  
Third, we explore what changes to the moderating effect of political uncertainty across 
tenure lengths of party secretaries. We divide the full sample into the group of firms in cities 
whose party secretaries have been working with a short tenure length and the group of firms in 
cities whose party secretaries have been working with a long tenure length. We classify a 
position period within 3 years as a short tenure and a position period of more than 3 years as a 
                                                             
165 According to the regulation of the CPC, city party secretaries of four municipalities are not only provincial-
level leaders but also deputy national-level leaders, so their retirement ages are normally around 65 years old; 
party secretaries of county-level cities directly governed by provincial governments usually promotes or moves 
to other posts at 50 years old. Thus, we use the ages around 65 years old (64, 65 and 66) as the predicted turnover 








long tenure due to the regulation of the CPC.166 In column (5) and (6), we find that the marginal 
effect of the interaction term, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 is negative and significant for firms in 
cities whose party secretaries have been working with a short tenure while insignificant for 
firms in cities whose party secretaries have been working with a long tenure. 
The results suggest that the moderating effect of political turnover is greater if party 
secretary turnover is not around predicted turnover ages or during the early years of their terms. 
We can consider party secretaries leaving their posts away from 55 years old or within three 
years of current terms as abnormal turnovers, which leads to a higher degree of political 
uncertainty. According to Hypothesis 3 that political uncertainty can distort the positive 
relationship between financial development and innovation  
4.9.2. Firms’ political connections 
We further test the moderating effect of political turnover based on firms’ political 
connections. We expect that moderating effect of political turnover is more pronounced for 
politically connected firms as political connections can attenuate the positive relationship 
between financial development and innovation.   
To this end, we divide the full sample into the group of firms with political connections 
and the group of firms without political connections based on ownership structure, political 
affiliation, and state shares. Panel B of Table 4.10 reports the estimation results and the detailed 
classification standards are shown in Appendix D. We find that the marginal effect of the 
interaction term, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, is negative and significant for all types of firms, 
while its magnitude for SOEs (-0.925%), firms with political affiliation (-0.497%) and firms 
                                                             
166 One document issued by the CPC in 2006 states that if one official moves to a new position within three years 
of his current position, the tenure years cannot be regarded as one term. Only more than three years can be recorded 
as one term. The document could be viewed via: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64387/4671315.html. 
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with state shares (-0.845%) is greater than that for non-SOEs (-0.343%), firms without political 
connection (-0.402%) and firms without state shares (-0.319%). SOEs, firms with political 
affiliation and firms with state shares tend to be more politically connected with governments 
than non-SOEs, firms without political affiliation and firms without state shares. The results 
show that for firms with political connections, political turnover reduces more the positive 
effect of financial development on innovation activities. Thus, for these firms, local political 
uncertainty can distort more the positive effect of financial development on R&D.  
4.9.3. Firms’ financial constraints 
We last investigate the moderating effect of political turnover based on firms’ financial 
constraints. We divide the full sample into the group of firms with low financial constraints 
and high financial constraints according to firms’ size, firms’ age and firms’ SA index.167 Panel 
C of Table 4.10 reports the corresponding estimation results. We find that the marginal effect 
of the interaction term, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1, is more negative for large firms (-0.412%), 
mature firms (-0.538%) and firms with a low SA index (-0.504%) than small firms (-0.336%), 
young firms (-0.333%) and firms with a high SA index (-0.254%). Compare to large firms, 
mature firms and firms with a low SA index, small firms, young firms and firms with a high 
SA index tend to be financially constrained. The results suggest that the moderating effect of 
political turnover is more pronounced for low financially constrained firms than high 
financially constrained firms. This could be interpreted as the fact low financially constrained 
firms gain more access to external finance. Political uncertainty caused by political turnovers 
of local leaders could harm these firms’ access to finance for their R&D. In contrast, firms with 
                                                             
167 SA index is an indicator to measure firms’ financial constraints from Hadlock and Pierce (2010). The detailed 
information on the classification standards is shown in Appendix D.  
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more financial constraints have difficulties in accessing finance and the negative impact of 
political uncertainty should have less influence on these firms.   
 
4.10. Conclusions 
 Employing a large panel of 739,672 industrial-firms linked with the data of 305 cities 
over the period from 2003 to 2014, we show that there is a positive relationship between city-
level financial development and firms’ innovation activities in China. We also find that local 
political turnover facilitates corporate innovation, while attenuates the positive effect of 
financial development on corporate innovation. The results keep consistent with those of 
various robustness tests. Further evidence shows that the negative effect of political uncertainty 
on the positive relationship between financial development and innovation is various according 
to turnover types, firms’ political connections and firms’ financial constraints. 
 The findings provide many policy implications. First, due to the significant and positive 
effect of financial development on corporate innovation, Chinese governments should deepen 
the reform of the financial system to efficiently allocate financial sources. Since innovation is 
one important factor to boost the economy, regional balance in financial development 
contributes to the innovation development in the central and western regions then promotes 
economic development. For example, in 2001 the central government issued the strategy for 
‘large-scale development of western China’, which states to increase the fraction of 
concessional loans used in the western regions to boost the financial development in the 
western regions. The central government can use more similar regional favourable policies to 
boost financial development. Second, considering that political turnover promotes firms’ 
innovation activities, it may be important for policymakers to find mechanisms to increase 
necessary political turnovers to stimulate corporate innovation. For example, in 2006 the CPC 
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central committee issued a document that clearly states that officials at the county-level or 
above who have worked for a long time in current positions must be moved to new positions.168 
Third, political uncertainty arising from local political turnover could hurt the positive effect 
of financial development on corporate innovation, there should be more attention paid to 
changes in the political economy. Fourth, because the negative effect of political turnover on 
the positive relationship between financial development and innovation is strong for firms 
facing abnormal political turnovers, firms with political connections and firms are less 
financially constrained, governments should use some policy tools to monitor the borrowing 
and lending market to keep financial stability during the periods of political turnovers and 
implement policy schemes to ensure these firms’ external financing sources stable. 
Additionally, governments should use policies to encourage these firms to reduce their 






                                                             
168 The official name of the document is ‘Interim provisions on the term of office of Party and government cadres’. 
The Chinese source text could be view via:  http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64387/4671315.html. 
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Figure 4.1. Trend line of weighted average city-level FD in China from 2003 to 2014 
 
Figure 4.2. City-level financial development in China in 2003 
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Figure 4.3. City-level financial development in China in 2014 
 
Figure 4.4. Trend line of turnover ratio of city party secretary in China from 2003 to 2014 
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Number of observations 
with patent applications 
Percentage of observations 
with patent applications (%) 
Weighted average city-level FD 














2003 168,858 4,006 2.37 109.45 148.72 75.94 284 114 40.14 
2004 257,138 5,625 2.19 104.65 146.27 72.45 286 48 16.78 
2005 253,646 6,221 2.45 93.26 140.28 71.00 286 64 22.38 
2006 284,613 7,780 2.73 90.93 135.57 68.73 286 60 20.98 
2007 323,672 9,468 2.93 89.87 129.64 61.09 287 79 27.53 
2008 397,721 14,361 3.61 87.87 132.35 64.72 287 126 43.90 
2009 311,945 15,405 4.94 105.09 151.36 69.80 287 33 11.50 
2010 / / / 108.41 153.16 68.07 286 36 12.59 
2011 297,670 26,804 9.00 95.55 136.75 63.42 302 81 26.82 
2012 318,424 34,897 10.96 96.61 139.10 66.02 302 106 35.10 
2013 337,343 39,568 11.73 99.81 144.66 67.71 303 116 38.28 
2014 209,642 31,438 15.00 120.90 164.44 70.45 304 46 15.13 
Total 3,160,672 195,573 6.19 100.20 143.52 68.28 3,500 909 25.97 
Notes: At the last row, the total percentage of observations with patent applications is the value of the total number of observations with patent applications (195,573) 
divided by the total number of observations (3,160,672); the total weighted average city-level FD is the mean value of weighted average city-level FD each year; the total 












Summary statistics-sample means and medians (in parentheses) 
 
Full sample 
Firms with patent 
applications 
[𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) > 0] 
Firms without patent 
applications 
[𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) = 0] 
Diff 
Main regression variables     
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1 − 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 99.136 117.646 97.622 0.000 
 (84.287) (111.270) (83.446)  
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 143.318 165.907 141.471 0.000 
 (128.515) (149.158) (125.876)  
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑐,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 68.061 69.879 67.912 0.000 
 (64.780) (66.115) (64.610)  
𝑃𝑇𝑐,𝑡−1 26.686 28.622 26.527 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) 10.190 83.372 4.204 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 18.546 161.610 6.845 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
𝑆𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 253.864 165.297 261.108 0.000 
 (154.808) (113.442) (159.574)  
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 13.40 10.987 13.600 0.000 
 (6.890) (6.981) (6.881)  
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 0.244 0.426 0.229 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Other related variables      
Real total assets 164.226 729.123 118.023 0.000 
 (25.892) (95.587) (23.621)  
Age 10.871 13.040 10.693 0.000 
 (9.000) (10.000) (8.000)  
Political affiliation 80.502 78.104 80.698 0.000 
 (90.000) (90.000) (90.000)  
Percentage of state shares 4.205 4.802 4.156 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Region 1.334 1.290 1.338 0.000 
 (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)  
Observations 1,651,881 124,895 1,526,986  
Notes: All main regression variables and percentage of state shares are shown in percentage terms. Real total 
assets are expressed in millions of CNY. All monetary variables are deflated using provincial PPI. The last 
column shows the p-values associated with the mean-equality test between the group of firms with patent 
applications and the group of firms without patent applications (Diff). Complete definitions of all the variables 









Modified baseline Euler equation (4.1) for the full sample 
 Credit ratio Deposit ratio Saving ratio  Credit ratio Deposit ratio Saving ratio  Credit ratio Deposit ratio Saving ratio 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
 Probability Probability Probability 
 Truncated Truncated Truncated  Censored Censored Censored 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 1.150*** 1.038*** 0.959*** 
 3.535*** 3.191*** 2.948***  1.862*** 1.680*** 1.552*** 
 [0.049] [0.047] [0.119] 
 [0.150] [0.143] [0.366]  [0.079] [0.075] [0.193] 
𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 0.092** 0.106*** 0.073* 
 0.282** 0.326*** 0.225*  0.148** 0.172*** 0.118* 
 [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] 
 [0.120] [0.120] [0.120]  [0.063] [0.063] [0.063] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) 15.790*** 15.791*** 15.846*** 
 48.528*** 48.534*** 48.704***  25.560*** 25.562*** 25.648*** 
 [0.097] [0.097] [0.097]  [0.280] [0.281] [0.281]  [0.154] [0.154] [0.154] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 -3.390*** -3.389*** -3.403***  -10.418*** -10.415*** -10.458***  -5.487*** -5.486*** -5.507*** 
 [0.042] [0.042] [0.042]  [0.128] [0.128] [0.129]  [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] 
𝑆𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.759*** -0.761*** -0.772*** 
 -2.334*** -2.339*** -2.372***  -1.229*** -1.232*** -1.249*** 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]  [0.043] [0.043] [0.043]  [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] 
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 2.777*** 2.778*** 2.666*** 
 8.534*** 8.539*** 8.194***  4.495*** 4.498*** 4.315*** 
 [0.134] [0.134] [0.135]  [0.411] [0.411] [0.412]  [0.217] [0.217] [0.218] 
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 1.211*** 1.206*** 1.170*** 
 3.722*** 3.706*** 3.596***  1.961*** 1.952*** 1.894*** 
 [0.224] [0.224] [0.224] 
 [0.689] [0.689] [0.687]  [0.363] [0.363] [0.362] 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.223 0.223 0.222  0.223 0.223 0.222  0.223 0.223 0.222 
Firms 440,383 440,383 440,382 
 440,383 440,383 440,382  440,383 440,383 440,382 
Observations 1,651,881 1,651,881 1,651,862 
 1,651,881 1,651,881 1,651,862  1,651,881 1,651,881 1,651,862 
Left-censored 1,526,986 1,526,986 1,526,972  1,526,986 1,526,986 1,526,972  1,526,986 1,526,986 1,526,972 
Uncensored 124,895 124,895 124,890  124,895 124,895 124,890  124,895 124,895 124,890 
Notes: This table reports the average marginal effects in the percentage of the modified baseline Euler equation (4.1) using the Pooled Tobit. The dependent variable 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a censored variable that takes its real value if the firm 𝑖 has patent applications (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Year, ownership, industry, and location dummies are included in all specifications but not reported. 
Prob > F is the test of joint significance for parameters and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. Pseudo R2 is 
McFadden’s pseudo-R-squared in the Pooled Tobit regressions. Complete definitions of all variables are in Appendix D. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is 









Modified baseline Euler equation (4.2) for the full sample 
 Credit ratio Deposit ratio Saving ratio  Credit ratio Deposit ratio Saving ratio  Credit ratio Deposit ratio Saving ratio 
.  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6)   (7) (8) (9) 
 Probability Probability Probability  Truncated Truncated Truncated  Censored Censored Censored 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 1.151*** 1.031*** 0.922*** 
 3.541*** 3.173*** 2.841***  1.859*** 1.666*** 1.480*** 
 [0.049] [0.047] [0.117] 
 [0.151] [0.143] [0.360]  [0.079] [0.075] [0.190] 
𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 0.085** 0.096** 0.068* 
 0.315*** 0.346*** 0.222*  0.111* 0.127** 0.105* 
 [0.039] [0.039] [0.039]  [0.120] [0.120] [0.120]  [0.064] [0.064] [0.064] 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 -0.283*** -0.236*** -0.748*** 
 -0.892*** -0.747*** -2.307***  -0.460*** -0.384*** -1.210*** 
 [0.067] [0.051] [0.186]  [0.208] [0.156] [0.569]  [0.110] [0.083] [0.301] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) 15.788*** 15.790*** 15.847*** 
 48.522*** 48.531*** 48.704***  25.557*** 25.560*** 25.649*** 
 [0.097] [0.097] [0.097]  [0.280] [0.281] [0.280]  [0.154] [0.154] [0.154] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 -3.389*** -3.389*** -3.403***  -10.416*** -10.415*** -10.459***  -5.486*** -5.485*** -5.508*** 
 [0.042] [0.042] [0.042]  [0.128] [0.128] [0.129]  [0.068] [0.068] [0.068] 
𝑆𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.759*** -0.761*** -0.772*** 
 -2.333*** -2.338*** -2.372***  -1.229*** -1.231*** -1.249*** 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]  [0.043] [0.043] [0.043]  [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] 
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 2.780*** 2.781*** 2.666*** 
 8.545*** 8.546*** 8.192***  4.501*** 4.501*** 4.314*** 
 [0.134] [0.134] [0.135]  [0.410] [0.411] [0.412]  [0.217] [0.217] [0.218] 
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 1.211*** 1.204*** 1.166*** 
 3.721*** 3.702*** 3.584***  1.960*** 1.950*** 1.887*** 
 [0.224] [0.224] [0.224] 
 [0.690] [0.690] [0.687]  [0.363] [0.363] [0.362] 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.223 0.223 0.222  0.223 0.223 0.222  0.223 0.223 0.222 
Firms 440,383 440,383 440,382  440,383 440,383 440,382  440,383 440,383 440,382 
Observations 1,651,881 1,651,881 1,651,862  1,651,881 1,651,881 1,651,862  1,651,881 1,651,881 1,651,862 
Left-censored 1,526,986 1,526,986 1,526,972  1,526,986 1,526,986 1,526,972  1,526,986 1,526,986 1,526,972 
Uncensored 124,895 124,895 124,890  124,895 124,895 124,890  124,895 124,895 124,890 
Notes: This table reports the average marginal effects in the percentage of the modified baseline Euler equation (4.2) using the Pooled Tobit. The dependent variable 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a censored variable that takes its real value if the firm 𝑖 has patent applications (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). 
The marginal effect associated with the 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 interaction is computed based on the difference of the average marginal effects relative to 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 
evaluated at 0 and 1 of 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Year, ownership, industry, and location dummies are included in 
all specifications but not reported. Prob > F is the test of joint significance for parameters and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously 
equal to zero. Pseudo R2 is McFadden’s pseudo-R-squared in the Pooled Tobit regressions. Complete definitions of all variables are in Appendix D. Significance at the 1%, 























.  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 
Censored Censored Censored  Censored Censored Censored 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 1.952*** 0.859*** 0.356** 
 1.950*** 0.842*** 0.320** 
 
[0.258] [0.048] [0.129]  [0.256] [0.048] [0.128] 
𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 0.068** 0.085** 0.066* 
 0.060** 0.096** 0.064* 
 [0.031] [0.038] [0.033]  [0.030] [0.039] [0.032] 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 
    -0.452*** -0.352*** -1.021*** 
     [0.075] [0.068] [0.268] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) 18.913*** 18.954*** 18.959***  18.910*** 18.978*** 18.958*** 
 [0.098] [0.098] [0.098]  [0.098] [0.098] [0.098] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 -2.123*** -2.135*** -2.168***  -2.122*** -2.134*** -2.167*** 
 [0.101] [0.101] [0.101]  [0.101] [0.101] [0.101] 
𝑆𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 -1.312*** -1.315*** -1.335*** 
 -1.311*** -1.315*** -1.334*** 
 [0.045] [0.045] [0.045]  [0.045] [0.045] [0.045] 
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 5.053*** 5.055*** 5.049***  5.054*** 5.056*** 5.048*** 
 [0.310] [0.310] [0.310]  [0.310] [0.310] [0.310] 
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 1.926*** 1.923*** 1.902*** 
 1.928*** 1.922*** 1.895*** 
 
[0.359] [0.359] [0.358]  [0.359] [0.359] [0.357] 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald test of exogeneity 
(p−value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Anderson−Rubin 
(p−value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firms 408,809 408,809 408,809 
 408,809 408,809 408,809 
Observations 1,509,647 1,509,647 1,509,647 
 1,509,647 1,509,647 1,509,647 
Left-censored 1,399,056 1,399,056 1,399,056 
 1,399,056 1,399,056 1,399,056 
Uncensored 110,591 110,591 110,591 
 110,591 110,591 110,591 
Notes: This table reports the average marginal effects in the percentage of the modified baseline Euler equations (4.1) 
and (4.2) using the IV Tobit. The dependent variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a censored variable that takes its real value 
if the firm has patent applications (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Year, ownership, industry and location 
dummies are included in all specifications but not reported. Prob > F is the test of joint significance for parameters 
and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero. Wald test of exogeneity 
is distributed as chi-square under the null hypothesis of exogeneity. Anderson-Rubin is under the null hypothesis that 
the minimum canonical correlation is zero. Complete definitions of all variables are shown in Appendix D. 











Modified baseline Euler equations (4.1) and (4.2) for the full sample with alternative measures of financial development 
and political turnover 
  Panel A: an alternative measure of FD based on municipal districts 
 Credit ratio Deposit ratio Saving ratio  Credit ratio Deposit ratio Saving ratio 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 Censored Censored Censored 
 Censored Censored Censored 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 0.855*** 0.915*** 0.046  0.848*** 0.906*** 0.029 
 [0.064] [0.064] [0.163] 
 [0.064] [0.064] [0.163] 
𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 0.129** 0.137** 0.129**  0.129** 0.110* 0.130** 
 [0.064] [0.063] [0.063]  [0.064] [0.064] [0.064] 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 
    -0.088 -0.309*** -0.796*** 
 
    [0.107] [0.083] [0.250] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.223 0.223 0.222  0.223 0.223 0.222 
Firms 439,134 439,134 439,120  439,134 439,134 439,120 
Observations 1,647,580 1,647,580 1,647,120  1,647,580 1,647,580 1,647,120 
Left-censored 1,523,175 1,523,175 1,522,733  1,523,175 1,523,175 1,522,733 
Uncensored 124,405 124,405 124,387   124,405 124,405 124,387 
 Panel B: an alternative measure of political turnover in calendar years 
 Credit ratio Deposit ratio Saving ratio 
 Credit ratio Deposit ratio Saving ratio 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 Censored Censored Censored 
 Censored Censored Censored 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 1.878*** 1.694*** 1.564*** 
 1.874*** 1.692*** 1.508*** 
 [0.079] [0.075] [0.193] 
 [0.079] [0.076] [0.194] 
𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 0.244*** 0.244*** 0.136** 
 0.213*** 0.242*** 0.127* 
 [0.065] [0.065] [0.065]  [0.066] [0.066] [0.065] 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 
    -0.320*** 0.242 -0.656** 
 
    [0.118] [0.066] [0.338] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.223 0.223 0.222  0.223 0.223 0.222 
Firms 440,383 440,383 440,382  440,383 440,383 440,382 
Observations 1,651,881 1,651,881 1,651,862  1,651,881 1,651,881 1,651,862 
Left-censored 1,526,986 1,526,986 1,526,972  1,526,986 1,526,986 1,526,972 
Uncensored 124,895 124,895 124,890   124,895 124,895 124,890 
 Panel C: an alternative measure of political turnover without tenures of five years 
 Credit ratio Deposit ratio Saving ratio 
 Credit ratio Deposit ratio Saving ratio 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 Censored Censored Censored 
 Censored Censored Censored 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 1.866*** 1.682*** 1.557*** 
 1.869*** 1.687*** 1.536*** 
 [0.079] [0.075] [0.193] 
 [0.079] [0.076] [0.193] 
𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 0.186** 0.191*** 0.114 
 0.167** 0.211*** 0.112 
 [0.073] [0.073] [0.073]  [0.074] [0.075] [0.073] 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1     -0.225* 0.186 -0.422* 
 
    [0.128] [0.112] [0.241] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.223 0.223 0.222  0.223 0.223 0.222 
Firms 440,383 440,383 440,382  440,383 440,383 440,382 
Observations 1,651,881 1,651,881 1,651,862  1,651,881 1,651,881 1,651,862 
Left-censored 1,526,986 1,526,986 1,526,972  1,526,986 1,526,986 1,526,972 
Uncensored 124,895 124,895 124,890   124,895 124,895 124,890 
Notes: This table reports the average marginal effects in the percentage of the modified baseline Euler equations (4.1) and 
(4.2) using the Pooled Tobit. The dependent variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a censored variable that takes its real value if the 
firm 𝑖 has patent applications (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). The marginal 
effect associated with the 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 interaction is computed based on the difference of the average marginal 
effects relative to 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 evaluated at 0 and 1 of 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. Year, ownership, industry and location dummies are included in all specifications but not reported.  Prob >
F  is the test of joint significance for parameters and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are 
simultaneously equal to zero. Pseudo R2 is McFadden’s pseudo-R-squared in the Pooled Tobit regressions. Complete 











Modified baseline Euler equations (4.1) and (4.2) for the full sample with alternative measures of innovation activities 
 Panel A: innovation is measured by the number of invention patent applications 
 Credit ratio Deposit ratio Saving ratio  Credit ratio Deposit ratio Saving ratio 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 Censored Censored Censored 
 Censored Censored Censored 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 0.693*** 0.615*** 0.244** 
 0.694*** 0.606*** 0.206** 
 [0.039] [0.038] [0.109] 
 [0.039] [0.038] [0.104] 
𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 0.064** 0.074** 0.056*  0.050 0.052 0.049 
 [0.031] [0.031] [0.031]  [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1     -0.185*** -0.193*** -0.809*** 
 
    [0.054] [0.041] [0.152] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.235 0.235 0.235  0.235 0.235 0.235 
Firms 440,383 440,383 440,382  440,383 440,383 440,382 
Observations 1,651,881 1,651,881 1,651,862  1,651,881 1,651,881 1,651,862 
Left-censored 1,584,463 1,584,463 1,584,448  1,584,463 1,584,463 1,584,448 
Uncensored 67,418 67,418 67,414  67,418 67,418 67,414 
 Panel B: innovation is measured by the number of patents applied by individuals 
 Credit ratio Deposit ratio Saving ratio 
 Credit ratio Deposit ratio Saving ratio 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 Censored Censored Censored  Censored Censored Censored 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 1.819*** 1.643*** 1.558***  1.816*** 1.630*** 1.488*** 
 [0.078] [0.074] [0.190]  [0.078] [0.074] [0.187] 
𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 0.163*** 0.186*** 0.133**  0.132** 0.148** 0.121* 
 [0.062] [0.062] [0.062]  [0.063] [0.063] [0.063] 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1     -0.395*** -0.333*** -1.142*** 
 
   
 [0.109] [0.083] [0.298] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.220 0.220 0.219  0.220 0.220 0.219 
Firms 440,383 440,383 440,382  440,383 440,383 440,382 
Observations 1,651,881 1,651,881 1,651,862  1,651,881 1,651,881 1,651,862 
Left-censored 1,532,489 1,532,489 1,532,473  1,532,489 1,532,489 1,532,473 
Uncensored 119,392 119,392 119,389   119,392 119,392 119,389 
 Panel C: innovation is measured by the number of patents granted 
 Credit ratio Deposit ratio Saving ratio 
 Credit ratio Deposit ratio Saving ratio 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 Censored Censored Censored 
 Censored Censored Censored 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 1.518*** 1.331*** 1.314***  1.517*** 1.320*** 1.242*** 
 [0.064] [0.061] [0.154] 
 [0.065] [0.061] [0.152] 
𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 0.097* 0.116** 0.074  0.071 0.087 0.062 
 [0.052] [0.052] [0.052]  [0.053] [0.053] [0.052] 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1     -0.319*** -0.257*** -1.110*** 
 
    [0.091] [0.070] [0.249] 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.248 0.248 0.247  0.248 0.248 0.247 
Firms 440,383 440,383 440,382  440,383 440,383 440,382 
Observations 1,651,881 1,651,881 1,651,862  1,651,881 1,651,881 1,651,862 
Left-censored 1,537,965 1,537,965 1,537,947  1,537,965 1,537,965 1,537,947 
Uncensored 113,916 113,916 113,915  113,916 113,916 113,915 
Notes: This table reports the average marginal effects in the percentage of the modified baseline Euler equations (4.1) and 
(4.2) using the Pooled Tobit. The dependent variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a censored variable that takes its real value if the 
firm 𝑖  has patent applications/granted (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). The 
marginal effect associated with the 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 interaction is computed based on the difference of the average 
marginal effects relative to 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 evaluated at 0 and 1 of 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Year, ownership, industry and location dummies are included in all specifications but not reported. 
Prob > F is the test of joint significance for parameters and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are 
simultaneously equal to zero. Pseudo R2 is McFadden’s pseudo-R-squared in the Pooled Tobit regressions. Complete 




























 (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 Censored Censored Censored  Censored Censored Censored 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 0.366** 0.360** 0.113  0.264 0.440*** 0.337 
 [0.170] [0.161] [0.283]  [0.175] [0.160] [0.278] 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 1.473*** 1.302*** 1.489***  1.572*** 1.225*** 1.272*** 
 [0.166] [0.152] [0.235]  [0.171] [0.151] [0.232] 
SUM (𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 and 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1) 
1.839*** 1.663*** 1.602*** 
 
1.837*** 1.665*** 1.609*** 
 [0.084] [0.081] [0.235]  [0.084] [0.081] [0.234] 
𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 0.109 0.121* -0.003  0.134** 0.148** -0.003 
 [0.066] [0.066] [0.066]  [0.067] [0.067] [0.066] 
𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 0.179*** 0.205*** 0.114**  0.150** 0.165** 0.099 
 [0.065] [0.065] [0.065]  [0.066] [0.066] [0.065] 
SUM (𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 and 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1) 0.288*** 0.326*** 0.112  0.284*** 0.312*** 0.096 
 [0.103] [0.103] [0.103]  [0.103] [0.103] [0.103] 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡     0.192 0.115 0.108 
 
   
 [0.115] [0.090] [0.334] 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1     -0.358*** -0.357*** -1.133*** 
 
   
 [0.113] [0.086] [0.315] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) 25.473*** 25.473*** 25.556***  25.470*** 25.471*** 25.556*** 
 [0.155] [0.155] [0.155]  [0.155] [0.155] [0.155] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 -5.464*** -5.461*** -5.482***  -5.463*** -5.461*** -5.482*** 
 [0.069] [0.069] [0.069]  [0.069] [0.069] [0.069] 
𝑆𝑎𝑖,𝑡 -0.804*** -0.806*** -0.820***  -0.804*** -0.806*** -0.820*** 
 [0.027] [0.027] [0.027]  [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] 
𝑆𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 -0.632*** -0.632*** -0.636***  -0.631*** -0.632*** -0.636*** 
 [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]  [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] 
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡 3.402*** 3.403*** 3.245***  3.415*** 3.422*** 3.256*** 
 [0.252] [0.252] [0.253]  [0.252] [0.252] [0.253] 
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 2.776*** 2.783*** 2.708***  2.773*** 2.778*** 2.702*** 
 [0.259] [0.260] [0.260]  [0.259] [0.260] [0.260] 
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡 3.063*** 3.059*** 2.984***  3.056*** 3.052*** 2.983*** 
 [0.358] [0.358] [0.357]  [0.358] [0.358] [0.357] 
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1  2.832*** 2.825*** 2.757***  2.827*** 2.819*** 2.749*** 
 [0.380] [0.380] [0.378]  [0.380] [0.380] [0.378] 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.224 0.224 0.224  0.224 0.224 0.224 
Firms 436,173 436,173 436,161  436,173 436,173 436,161 
Observations 1,632,507 1,632,507 1,632,462  1,632,507 1,632,507 1,632,462 
Left-censored 1,508,656 1,508,656 1,508,617  1,508,656 1,508,656 1,508,617 
Uncensored 123,851 123,851 123,845  123,851 123,851 123,845 
Notes: This table reports the average marginal effects in the percentage of the modified baseline Euler equations (4.1) and 
(4.2) using the Pooled Tobit. The dependent variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a censored variable that takes its real value if the 
firm 𝑖  has patent applications (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). SUM 
(𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 and 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1) is the sum of the marginal effects of the contemporaneous financial development variable, 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, and the lagged financial development variable, 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1. SUM (𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 and 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1) is the sum of the 
marginal effects of the contemporaneous political turnover variable, 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 , and the lagged political turnover variable, 
𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1. The marginal effect associated with the 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 interaction is computed based on the difference of 
the average marginal effects relative to 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 evaluated at 0 and 1 of 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡. The marginal effect associated with the 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1  interaction is computed based on the difference of the average marginal effects relative to 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 evaluated at 0 and 1 of 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Year, ownership, industry, and location dummies are included in all specifications but not reported. Prob > F is the test of 
joint significance for parameters and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to 
zero. Pseudo R2 is McFadden’s pseudo-R-squared in the Pooled Tobit regressions. Complete definitions of all variables 










Modified baseline Euler equations (4.1) and (4.2) of more robustness tests 
  
Drop firms with sales 
less than 20 million 
CNY 
  
Drop firms not located  
in prefecture-level cities 
  
Drop firms in years 
2003, 2008 and 2013 
  Adding Short-term debts   Zero-inflated Poisson 
  
Probit 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10)   (11) (12) 
 Censored Censored  Censored Censored  Censored Censored  Censored Censored  Censored Censored 
 
Censored Censored 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 2.014*** 2.009*** 




[0.098] [0.099]  [0.079] [0.079]  [0.087] [0.087]  [0.079] [0.079]  [0.319] [0.320] 
 
[0.049] [0.049] 
𝑃𝑇𝑖 ,𝑐,𝑡−1 0.159** 0.115 
 0.245*** 0.232***  0.214*** 0.180**  0.149** 0.111*  1.094*** 1.085*** 
 
0.069* 0.058 
 [0.079] [0.080]  [0.065] [0.067]  [0.074] [0.075]  [0.063] [0.064]  [0.275] [0.278] 
 
[0.040] [0.040] 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖 ,𝑐,𝑡−1 
 -0.543***   -0.149*   -0.482***  
 
-0.467***   -1.050** 
 
 -0.302*** 
  [0.138]   [0.075]   [0.126]  
 
[0.110]   [0.492] 
 
 [0.070] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1) 29.360*** 29.357*** 
 24.947*** 24.946***  24.481*** 24.458***  25.541*** 25.538***  23.214*** 23.212*** 
 
15.644*** 15.642*** 
 [0.185] [0.185]  [0.160] [0.160]  [0.172] [0.172]  [0.154] [0.154]  [0.139] [0.139] 
 
[0.056] [0.056] 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 + 1)
2 -6.163*** -6.162***  -5.499*** -5.498***  -5.308*** -5.304***  -5.485*** -5.484***  -1.278*** -1.278*** 
 
  
 [0.082] [0.082]  [0.071] [0.071]  [0.077] [0.077]  [0.068] [0.068]  [0.011] [0.011] 
 
  
𝑆𝑎𝑖 ,𝑡−1 -1.500*** -1.499*** 
 -1.166*** -1.166***  -1.179*** -1.156***  -1.209*** -1.208***  -5.834*** -5.831*** 
 
-0.745*** -0.745*** 
 [0.028] [0.028]  [0.023] [0.023]  [0.026] [0.026]  [0.023] [0.023]  [0.117] [0.117] 
 
[0.014] [0.014] 
𝐶𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 4.626*** 4.633*** 
 3.836*** 3.838***  4.727*** 4.853***  4.612*** 4.618***  25.067*** 25.070*** 
 
2.722*** 2.726*** 
 [0.266] [0.266]  [0.221] [0.221]  [0.249] [0.249]  [0.217] [0.217]  [0.990] [0.990] 
 
[0.132] [0.132] 
𝐷𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 2.005*** 2.004*** 












         [0.117] [0.117]    
 
  
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.213 0.213 
 0.223 0.223  0.222 0.222  0.223 0.223  0.358 0.358 
 
0.301 0.3011 
Firms 363,110 363,110 
 400,591 400,591  381,729 381,727  440,379 440,379  440,383 440,383 
 
440,383 440,383 
Observations 1,312,747 1,312,747 
 1,490,899 1,490,899  1,216,287 1,216,287  1,651,874 1,651,874  1,651,881 1,651,881 
 
1,651,881 1,651,881 
Left-censored 1,193,371 1,193,371 
 1,383,443 1,383,443  1,130,509 1,130,509  1,526,980 1,526,980  / / 
 
/ / 
Uncensored 119,376 119,376 
 107,456 107,456  85,778 85,778  124,894 124,894  / / 
 
/ / 
Notes: This table reports the average marginal effects in the percentage of the modified baseline Euler equations (4.1) and (4.2) using the Pooled Tobit. The dependent variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖 ,𝑡 + 1) is a censored variable 
that takes its real value if the firm 𝑖 has patent applications (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). The marginal effect associated with the 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖 ,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 interaction is 
computed based on the difference of the average marginal effects relative to 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 evaluated at 0 and 1 of 𝑃𝑇𝑖 ,𝑐,𝑡−1. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Year, ownership, 
industry and location dummies are included in all specifications but not reported. Prob > F is the test of joint significance for parameters and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are simultaneously 
equal to zero. Pseudo R2 is McFadden’s pseudo-R-squared in the Pooled Tobit regressions. Complete definitions of all variables are in Appendix D. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** 
and * respectively. 
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Modified baseline Euler equation (4.2) of further tests  
 Panel A: Turnover types 
 Predicted turnover years  Predicted turnover ages   Tenure lengths 
 
(1)              
Around 5th  




(3)               
Around 55 




(3)               
Short 
(4)                       
Long 
 Censored Censored 
 Censored Censored  Censored Censored 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 -0.062 -0.392**  0.291 -0.701***  -0.743*** 0.170 
 [0.183] [0.171] 
 [0.222] [0.133]  [0.221] [0.163] 
Diff(p-value) (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.217 0.226  0.223 0.223  0.226 0.218 
Firms 300,300 383,409  247,847 392,922  362,948 321,339 
Observations 548,079 1,098,591  480,081 1,169,465  980,358 666,312 
Left-censored 506,523 1,015,504  441,426 1,083,275  909,629 612,398 
Uncensored 41,556 83,087   38,655 86,190  70,729 53,914 
 Panel B: Firms’ political connection 
 Ownership 
 Political affiliation  State shares 
 
(1)               
Non-SOEs 
(2)                       
SOEs 
  
(3)              
Without 
(4)               
With 
  
(5)         
Without 
(6)             
With 
 Censored Censored 
 Censored Censored  Censored Censored 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 -0.343*** -0.925** 
 -0.402*** -0.497***  -0.319*** -0.845** 
 [0.116] [0.385] 
 [0.140] [0.181]  [0.117] [0.374] 
Diff(p-value) (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.223 0.279  0.218 0.248  0.222 0.270 
Firms 425,982 23,415  370,374 140,207  423,355 30,827 
Observations 1,535,703 68,191  1,251,360 400,521  1,513,187 90,700 
Left-censored 1,420,150 62,654  1,157,207 369,779  1,400,371 82,426 
Uncensored 115,553 5,537   94,153 30,742   112,816 8,274 
 Panel C: Firms’ financial constraints 
 Size 
 Age  SA index 
 
(3)          
Small 
(4)            
Large 
  
(5)          
Young 
(6)      
Mature 
  




 Censored Censored 
 Censored Censored  Censored Censored 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 -0.336*** -0.412** 
 -0.333** -0.538***  -0.504*** -0.254** 
 [0.119] [0.172] 
 [0.153] [0.161]  [0.168] [0.125] 
Diff(p-value) (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Control variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.202 0.214  0.215 0.227  0.215 0.204 
Firms 269,690 268,719  315,376 239,158  264,808 274,107 
Observations 694,414 957,341  781,303 870,280  972,799 679,010 
Left-censored 671,079 855,793  731,761 794,997  871,706 655,212 
Uncensored 23,335 101,548  49,542 75,283  101,093 23,798 
Notes: This table reports the average marginal effects in the percentage of the modified baseline Euler equation (4.2) using 
the Pooled Tobit. The dependent variable 𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 1) is a censored variable that takes its real value if the firm 𝑖 has 
patent applications (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). The marginal effect 
associated with the 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 interaction is computed based on the difference of the average marginal effects 
relative to 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1 evaluated at 0 and 1 of 𝑃𝑇𝑖,𝑐,𝑡−1. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Diff (p-value) is the p-value for the difference of the marginal effects of the interaction term between two 
comparative groups. Year, ownership, industry, and location dummies are included in all specifications but not reported. 
Prob > F is the test of joint significance for parameters and the null hypothesis is that all the regression coefficients are 
simultaneously equal to zero. Pseudo R2 is McFadden’s pseudo-R-squared in the Pooled Tobit regressions. Complete 











Appendix A. NBS firm-level data 
To check the data reliability, we compare the numbers of enterprises each year recorded 
in the NBS firm-level data with those in the China Statistical Yearbook. The results are reported 
in Table 4.A1. The statistics for all years before 2008 in the dataset are identical with those in 
the China Statistical Yearbook, verifying the data used in the study are also the basis of the 
statistics in the China Statistical Yearbook. The statistics starting from the year 2008 are less 
than those in the China Statistical Yearbook, while the discrepancies are acceptable. However, 
we drop the observations starting from the year 2008 to estimate again to enhance robustness. 
The estimation results keep qualitatively unchanged and the robustness method can avoid the 
influence of the financial crisis starting from the year 2007 on firms’ behaviours. Since the data 
in the year 2010 lose too many variables, we do not cover the data in the year 2010 in the study 
to secure data quality and assume the year 2009 and the year 2011 as two consecutive years. 
We also find that the number of enterprises has uninterrupted growth before the year 2011 
while decreases afterwards. The decrease is caused by the revision of the standard of the 
‘above-scale’ enterprises in the year 2011, which raises the threshold for inclusion of the 















Comparison of the NBS firm-level data with the China Statistical Yearbook 
Year NBS firm-level data China Statistical Yearbook 
2003 196,222 196,222 
2004 276,474 276,474 
2005 271,835 271,835 
2006 301,961 301,961 
2007 336,768 336,768 
2008 412,165 426,113 
2009 434,682 434,364 
2011 302,593 325,609 
2012 324,604 343,769 
2013 344,875 369,813 
2014 309,052 377,888 


















We process the NBS-firm level data by following the next steps. First, since we use the 
legal person code (fa ren dai ma) to construct a panel, we adjust firms’ legal person codes. We 
supplement some observations’ legal person codes to nine digits and capitalize all English 
letters in some observations’ legal person codes which include lower case letters.169 Since some 
observations in the years 2008 and 2009 do not record legal person codes and firms’ names, 
we use the information in other years to retrieve them. We then remove the observations whose 
legal person codes are missing or duplicated since these observations could not be used to 
construct a panel. Second, we update all industry codes in the dataset to keep consistent with 
the revision of the ‘National Industries Classification’ in 2012 and then remove the 
observations in the industries transferred from or disappeared in manufacturing sectors. Third, 
we do not cover some observations to eliminate potential errors caused by misreporting or 
mismeasurement of accounting data. Specifically, we drop the observations in the year 2010 
since too many variables in that year are missing, and then treat the years 2009 and 2011 as 
two consecutive years. We next delete the observations without annual sales of more than 5 
million CNY to avoid the influence of non-‘above scale’ enterprises. We finally exclude the 
observations which do not follow the basic rules of the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP), including the observations whose total fixed assets are greater than total 
assets; liquid assets are greater than total assets; current depreciation is greater than 
accumulated depreciation. After the above adjustments, the dataset includes 3,215,479 
observations. Table 4.A2 shows the detailed distribution of observations in the dataset. 
 
 
                                                             
169 According to the regulations of the General Administration of Quality Supervision (AQSIQ), the legal person 
codes of Chinese firms must be nine digits and Arabic numerals or uppercase English letters.  
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Distribution of firm-level observations by years 
Year Number of observations Per cent (%) Cumulative (%) 
2003 172,374 5.36 5.36 
2004 261,491 8.13 13.49 
2005 258,347 8.03 21.53 
2006 289,931 9.02 30.54 
2007 329,586 10.25 40.79 
2008 404,212 12.57 53.37 
2009 316,911 9.86 63.22 
2010 / / / 
2011 302,386 9.40 72.62 
2012 323,822 10.07 82.70 
2013 343,194 10.67 93.37 
2014 213,224 6.63 100.00 
Total 3,215,478 100.00  
    
Number of years per firm Number of observations Per cent (%) Cumulative (%) 
1 153,433 4.77 4.77 
2 235,384 7.32 12.09 
3 323,019 10.05 22.14 
4 307,468 9.56 31.70 
5 315,095 9.80 41.50 
6 389,658 12.12 53.62 
7 341,852 10.63 64.25 
8 216,416 6.73 70.98 
9 279,000 8.68 79.66 
10 372,850 11.60 91.25 
11 281,303 8.75 100.00 











Appendix B. Detailed information on the sample cities  
According to China’s constitution, there are three administration levels of cities in 
China: province-level, prefecture-level, and county-level. Municipalities are the first-level 
(province-level) administrative divisions which are directly governed by the central 
government and administratively equivalent to the other 30 provinces, autonomous regions, 
and special administrative regions (including Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan). Sub-provincial 
cities and ordinary prefecture-level cities are the secondary-level (prefecture-level) 
administrative divisions and directly governed by the provincial governments. Prefecture-level 
cities are ranked below province-level cities while above county-level cities in China, and 
occupy 88% of all prefecture-level administrative divisions. The difference between sub-
provincial cities and ordinary prefecture-level cities is that sub-provincial cities are a half level 
higher than ordinary prefecture-level cities. County-level cities are the third-level (county-level) 
administrative divisions and governed by the prefecture-level governments. Only a very small 
number of county-level cities are independently organized outside prefecture-level 
administrative divisions and directly governed by the provincial governments. County-level 
cities are the lowest-ranking cities in China. With the rapid development of urbanization 
during the last decades in China, more prefecture-level administrative divisions (including 
areas, autonomous prefectures) and county-level administrative divisions (including counties, 
autonomous counties) become prefecture-level cities and county-level cities. Thus, the number 
of cities in China increases steadily each year.  
At the end of 2014, there are 4 municipalities, 15 sub-provincial cities, 273 prefecture-
level cities, and 361 county-level cities in China. Our sample includes all 4 municipalities, 15 
sub-provincial cities, 273 prefecture-level cities, and 15 county-level cities directly governed 
by provincial governments. The four municipalities are Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and 
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Chongqing, which are all metropolises with a developed economy and huge population. The 
15 sub-provincial cities include 10 provincial capital cities and 5 cities with independent 
planning status, which are Shenyang, Dalian, Changchun, Harbin, Nanjing, Hangzhou, Ningbo, 
Xiamen, Jinan, Qingdao, Wuhan, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Chengdu, and Xi’an. The 15 county-
level cities directly governed by provincial governments are Jiyuan in Henan Province, Xiantao, 
Qianjiang, and Tianmen in Hubei Province, Danzhou, Wuzhishan, Qionghai, Wenchang, 
Wanning and Dongfang in Hainan Province, Shihezi, Aral, Tumxuk, Wujiaqu, and Beitun in 
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Table 4.A3 shows the distribution of the sampled cities 
by provincial administrative areas and Table 4.A4 presents the distribution of the sampled cities 














































Beijing 1    1 
Tianjin 1    1 
Hebei   11  11 
Shanxi   11  11 
Inner Mongolia   9  9 
Liaoning  2 12  14 
Jilin  1 7  8 
Heilongjiang  1 11  12 
Shanghai 1    1 
Jiangsu  1 12  13 
Zhejiang  2 9  11 
Anhui   17  17 
Fujian  1 8  9 
Jiangxi   11  11 
Shandong  2 15  17 
Henan   17 1 18 
Hubei  1 11 3 15 
Hunan   13  13 
Guangdong  2 19  21 
Guangxi   14  14 
Hainan   3 6 9 
Chongqing 1    1 
Sichuan  1 17  18 
Guizhou   6  6 
Yunnan   8  8 
Tibet   1  1 
Shaanxi  1 9  10 
Gansu   12  12 
Qinghai   2  2 
Ningxia   5  5 
Xinjiang   2 5 7 













Distribution of the sample cities by years 
Year 





















2003 4 15 265  284 
2004 4 15 267  286 
2005 4 15 267  286 
2006 4 15 267  286 
2007 4 15 268  287 
2008 4 15 268  287 
2009 4 15 268  287 
2010 4 15 268  287 
2011 4 15 269 14 302 
2012 4 15 270 15 304 
2013 4 15 271 15 305 
2014 4 15 271 15 305 
Total 4 15 271 15 305 
 
 
Figure 4.A1. Distribution of the sample cities in China 
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Appendix C. Distribution of turnovers of city party secretary by provinces and years  
Table 4.A5 
Distribution of the number of political turnovers by provincial administrative areas and years over the period 2003 to 2014 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Beijing 1 





    
1 




Hebei 5 2 2 1 7 5 4 2 2 4 6 2 42 
Shanxi 4 
 
2 9 2 6 3 
 
5 5 3 1 40 
Inner Mongolia 8  
5 
 
5 4 1 4 7 4 1 4 43 
Liaoning 4 4 4 6 1 6 1 2 7 3 5 3 46 
Jilin 4 
 
4 1 5 3 1 1 5 1 2 
 
27 
Heilongjiang 4 6 5 1 2 6 1 5 7 2 1 2 42 
Shanghai 1 
   
1 1 








4 1 2 4 5 4 2 35 
Zhejiang 3 4 3 1 1 6 1 1 4 3 7 2 36 
Anhui 8 1 3 3 
 
10 3 2 1 5 9 2 47 
Fujian 1 2 6 
 
2 4 1 
 
1 4 4 1 26 
Jiangxi 4 2 2 2 4 4 2 1 2 5 1 5 34 
Shandong 8 1 
 
2 10 5 
  
5 8 5 2 46 
Henan 7 5 
 
3 7 7 
  
11 6 9 1 56 
Hubei 12 1 3 5 7 6 4 3 3 4 13 
 
61 
Hunan 5 2 
 
3 5 8 2 1 1 4 10 1 42 
Guangdong 8 5 3 5 8 6 1 4 6 12 5 1 64 
Guangxi 6 1 1 1 4 10 4 3 
 
5 8 3 46 















4 5 1 
 
2 1 7 2 28 
Yunnan 8 2 4 1 5 6 
 
4 2 4 10 2 48 
Tibet 5 
  
1 3 3 
  
3 3 1 1 20 
Shaanxi 6 2 2 3 2 5 
 
1 3 3 4 3 34 
Gansu 2 2 6 4 1 10 3 2 
 
8 4 3 45 




1 3 1 4 1 22 




3 1 1 
 
14 
Xinjiang 2 4 8 5 3 5 2 2 1 11 7 4 54 
National total  143 57 83 69 104 154 41 46 97 127 144 53 1,118 
 
Chapter 4 





Appendix D. Variable definitions and classification standards 
Log (Pat + 1): natural logarithm of the number of a firm’s patent applications plus one 
Credit ratio: the ratio of overall loans in a city’s financial system (including both banking 
institutions and non-banking financial institutions) to the city’s gross regional product (GRP). 
Deposit ratio: the ratio of overall deposits in a city’s financial system to the city’s GRP.  
Saving ratio: the ratio of overall household savings in the city’s financial system to the city’s 
GRP. 
Political turnover: the change of city party secretary. 
Sales: firms’ total sales including domestic and overseas sales. 
Cash flows: firms’ net income plus current depreciation. 
New long-term debt issue: the difference between long-term debt in year t and t-1. 
Total assets: the sum of firms’ long-term assets and current assets. Long-term assets 
comprise fixed assets(tangible assets), intangible assets, deferred assets, long-term investments, 
and other long-term assets. Current assets include accounts receivable, inventories, short-
term investments, and other current assets. 
Real total assets: firms’ Total assets are deflated using provincial ex-factory producer price 
indices (PPI) conducted by the NBS of China. 
Age: Firms’ age is calculated by the difference between accounting years and the years when 
firms were established. 
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Political affiliation: an index of a firm’s political affiliation (lishu) whose categories are – 10, 
firms are politically affiliated at central level; 20, firms are politically affiliated at the provincial 
level; 40, firms are politically affiliated at the prefecture-level; 50, firms are politically 
affiliated at the county-level; 61, 62 and 63, firms are politically affiliated at sub-district, town 
or township level; 71, 72 and 73, firms are politically affiliated at community or village level; 
90, firms have no political affiliation. 
State shares: the percentage of paid-in capitals controlled by the State. 
SA Index: An index of firms’ financial constraints is from Hadlock and Pierce (2010) based on 
firms’ size and age. The calculation method of the index is S𝐴 = (−0.737 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) +
(0.043 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒2) − (0.040 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒). At this equation, size is the log of real total assets. Size is 
replaced with a log of $4.5 billion when firms’ real total assets are converted into more than 
$4.5 billion. Age is replaced with 37 years when the actual values of age exceed 37 years. The 
value of the SA index would increase steadily with more financial constraints. 
Region: three regions are divided by the central government. – coastal (eastern) region equals 
1, including Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, 
Guangdong, and Hainan; central region equals 2, including Shanxi, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Anhui, 
Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan; western region equals 3, including Inner Mongolia, 



















Around 5th  
Not around 5th  
If a city party secretary is in the 4th, 5th, or 6th years of his term; 





Not around 55 
If a city party secretary is 54, 55, or 56 years old during his term; 
If a city party secretary is not 54, 55, or 56 years old during his 
term; 
Tenure length Short  
Long 
If a city party secretary has been working within 3 years; 
If a city party secretary has been working for more than 3 years. 
Firms’ political connection 
Ownership (the 




At least 50% of paid-in capitals are state-owned; 
More than 50% of paid-in capitals are not state-owned. 
Political affiliation No 
With 
If a firm has no political affiliation (lishu = 90); 
If a firm is affiliated at a level of village, community, township, 
town, sub-district, county, prefecture, province, and central 
government (lishu <90). 
State Shares No 
Yes 
If a firm has no state shares; 
If a firm has some state shares. 





If a firm’s real total assets are in the lower quartiles (<=50%) of 
the distribution of real total assets of all firms in the same GB/T 
Two-digit industry in the same ownership type in a given year; 
If a firm’s real total assets are in the highest quartile (>50%) of 
the distribution of real total assets of all firms in the same GB/T 






If a firm’s age is in the lower quartiles (<=50%) of all firms’ age 
in the same GB/T Two-digit industry in the same ownership type 
in a given year; 
If a firm’s age is in the highest quartile (>50%) of all firms’ age 
in the same GB/T Two-digit industry in the same ownership type 
in a given year. 




If a firm’s SA index is in the lower half distribution (<50%) of 
all firms’ SA indexes in the same GB/T Two-digit industry in 
the same ownership type in a given year; 
If a firm’s SA index is in the highest quartiles (>=50%)  of all 
firms’ SA indexes in the same GB/T Two-digit industry in the 































5.1. Summary of the main findings 
 The main object of the thesis is to explore China’s innovation challenge from industry 
competition, government subsidies, and political turnover. Our study contributes to the related 
literature on innovation in the Chinese context by using a panel of unlisted firms collected by 
the NBS of China over the period from 1998 to 2014. In this section, we summarize the main 
findings of the thesis and put forward some policy implications related to the findings. 
5.1.1. Chapter 2 
 In chapter 2, by employing a large panel of 555,124 industrial firms, we explore the 
effect of industry competition on firms’ innovation activities in China over the period from 
1998 to 2007. We find that no matter by which proxy of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 
the Entropy Index (EI), the Lerner Index (LI)/Profit-Cost Margin (PCM), and the natural 
logarithm of the number of firms (FI), increased industry competition negatively affects firms’ 
innovation activities measured by firms’ new product output value. The finding confirms the 
existence of the ‘Schumpeterian effect’ in China. Due to the rapid impressive economic 
development over the past few decades, China’s market is facing increasingly severe 
competition. This finding is important as it enables us to understand the role of industry 
competition on corporate innovation in China, which is complementary to the literature on 
innovation in the context of emerging markets. 
 We also find the negative effect of industry competition on firms’ innovation activities 
is stronger in industries that are more dependent on external finance. Since firms in industries 
with higher EFD tend to rely more on external finance, their innovation activities are more 
vulnerable to higher external finance premiums caused by the increased competition. 






industries with higher EFD have to reduce inputs into innovation investments due to the larger 
pressure of external finance. 
 Furthermore, we find that financing constraints will tighten the negative impact of 
competition on innovation in industries with greater EFD. Specifically, the strengthened 
negative effect of increased competition is more pronounced for firms with more financial 
constraints, such as private firms, small firms, young firms, firms without state shares, and 
firms located in central and western regions. Additionally, firms with more financial constraints 
depend more on internal finance to innovate and show a higher sensitivity of R&D investment 
to cash flow. Because financially healthier firms might have better access to bank loans or other 
forms of external finance, the negative effect of increased competition can be alleviated to 
some extent. 
 We also make more robustness tests. First, we use the revision of the 
‘Catalogue of Industries to Guide Foreign Investment’ in 2002 to make a quasi-natural 
experiment test. We make more tests to check the test validity. Second, we choose the number 
of application procedures that a firm has to go through to enter an industry as the instrumental 
variable for competition. The estimation results of the two tests successfully confirm the causal 
relationship between competition and innovation since high competition possibly crowds out 
firms’ innovation activities. Third, considering potential measurement errors, we choose 
alternative measures of firms’’ innovation activities by the number of firms’ patent applications 
and R&D expenditure to estimate again. Fourth, to eliminate the potential omitted regression 
variables, we cover the contemporaneous terms of independent variables to estimate. Fifth, we 
take more robustness tests including dividing the domestic market, employing the Random-
effects Probit estimation, selecting a long sample period from 2001 to 2016 based on aggregate 






 Last, we make some extensions. First, although some previous papers have found that 
there is an inverted U-shape relationship between competition and innovation in western 
countries (Levin et al., 1985; Aghion et al., 2005; Hashmi, 2013), we find that the inverted U-
shape does not apply to the Chinese context. Second, we find that the negative effect of 
competition on innovation is stronger in provinces with low scores of Intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) protection. Third, we find that increased competition leads to more financial 
constraints on firms’ innovation activities. 
5.1.2. Chapter 3 
 In Chapter 3, we investigate the extent to which corporate innovation can be affected 
by government subsidies in China. Using a large panel of 663,699 industrial firms over the 
period from 1998 to 2008, we find that government subsidies directly boost firms’ innovation 
activities measured by the number of patents filed by firms. The finding verifies the existence 
of the ‘supplement effect’ of subsidies to firms’ innovation funds in China. As one of the most 
four important financing sources for firms in China (Allen et al., 2005), subsidies play a directly 
promoting role in the impressive surge of China’s innovation during recent decades. 
 Next, to alleviate the endogeneity issue between government subsidies and corporation 
innovation we take more robustness tests. First, since a firm with a large number of patent 
applications is more likely to obtain subsidies, to ensure the causality between subsidies and 
innovation we choose the amount of annual public finance revenue divided by the number of 
firms in each city-year level and the median value of subsidies in each year-city level as the 
instrumental variables for the subsidy variable. Additionally, we make a quasi-natural 
experiment by employing a subsample of firms in Suzhou since the revision of subsidy policy 
for patent applications in one county-level city of Suzhou in 2006 provides an external shock 






the validity of the difference-in-differences (DID) setting. The estimation results confirm the 
causal effect of subsidies on innovation. Second, considering the potential omitted variables in 
regressions, we add the contemporaneous terms of independent variables into regressions to 
estimate. Third, taking the potential measurement errors into estimations into account, we use 
alternative measures of firms’ innovation activities by firms’ new product output value and 
R&D expenditure. Last, we take more robustness tests such as using the number of invention 
patent applications to measure innovation and changing the estimation method to the Zero-
inflated Poisson. The results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
 Further, we extend the direct and positive effect of subsidies to other factors based on 
firm-level, industry-level, and city-level. First, we check whether the positive effect of 
subsidies on innovation is varying in different types of ownership structure and financial 
constraints. We find that the positive effect of subsidies is stronger for private firms and small 
firms, young firms, firms without political affiliation, firms without state shares, and firms with 
a high SA index. The finding suggests that subsidies can encourage more innovation activities 
of these firms as subsidies have a more supplement effect on these firms’ innovation funds. 
Second, we test the positive effect of subsidies based on industry-level. We find that greater 
industry external finance dependence (EFD) would reduce the positive effect of subsidies while 
higher industry high tech-intensiveness would enhance the positive effect of subsidies. A 
higher EFD for firms may reflect a greater borrowing capacity from the financial market, which 
can eliminate the supplement effect of subsidies on innovation funds. A greater high tech-
intensiveness for firms may show more incentives of firms to innovate, so the subsidies 
obtained could meet the required fund demand of these firms’ innovation investments. Third, 
we explore the positive effect of subsidies in collaboration with city-level factors. We find that 
higher-level financial development (FD) and higher-level foreign direct investment (FDI) 






FD and FDI are similar. Firms in cities with higher-level FD or higher-level FDI are more 
likely to get external funds from the banking system or foreign investors, which leads to that 
the positive effect of subsidies is reduced to some extent. 
 Last, we investigate the indirect effect of subsidies on corporate innovation. We find 
that as the proportion of firms with subsidies in one industry-city cluster increases, the positive 
effect of subsidies on innovation is reduced. As the number of firms obtaining subsidies 
increases, the amount of subsidies allocated to each firm would be reduced. Thus, the 
stimulating effect of subsidies on innovation decreases. Additionally, we find that the 
proportion of firms with subsidies in one industry-city cluster has a significant and positive 
effect on innovation activities of firms without subsidies instead of firms with subsidies. The 
finding suggests that subsidies have an spillover effect on the innovation activities of firms 
without subsidies. 
5.1.3. Chapter 4 
 In chapter 4, we test the extent to which local political turnover affects the finance-
innovation nexus in China. Using a large panel of 739,672 industrial firms in 305 cities over 
the period from 2003 to 2014, we find that city-level financial development can encourage 
corporation innovation in China. The finding shows that firms can easily obtain external funds 
with lower costs to innovate from a greater financial development, suggesting that the 
increasingly higher level of the financial market in China plays an important role in the 
dramatic surge of China’s innovation over the last decades. 
Next, we find political turnover of local government leaders has a positive effect on 
corporate innovation, which can be explained by the unique political turnover system and 
government leaders’ promotion ambitions in China. However, political uncertainty arising 






financial development and firms’ innovation activities. The finding reflects that local political 
turnover will make higher costs of external finance although political turnover itself can 
promote corporate innovation. In the Chinese context where political influence in the social 
and economic life is pervasive, political turnover greatly affects firms’ decisions of innovation 
investments including the external financing sources of R&D. 
 We take more tests to check robustness. First, we use an IV Tobit estimation to solve 
the issue of reverse causality. We choose the fraction of senior citizens as the instrumental 
variable for financial development since seniors are more likely to consume less but deposit 
more compared to young people. We choose the predicted political turnovers as the 
instrumental variable for political turnovers. The estimation results confirm the causality 
between financial development and innovation and the causality between political turnover and 
innovation. Second, we choose alternative measures of financial development, political 
turnover, and innovation to estimate again, considering potential measurement errors of the 
regression variables. Third, we augment our regression models by covering the 
contemporaneous terms of regression variables to avoid the issue of potential omitted variables. 
Fourth, we make more robustness tests by dropping firms with sales of less than 20 million 
CNY, dropping firms in four municipalities and county-level cities, changing estimation 
methods to the Zero-inflated Poisson or the Pooled Probit. All estimation results keep 
qualitatively consistent. 
 Furthermore, we make extensions to other factors. First, we find that the negative effect 
of political uncertainty arising from local political turnovers on the positive relationship 
between financial development and corporation innovation is stronger for firms facing 
abnormal political turnovers than firms with normal political turnovers. Second, we find that 






is more pronounced for firms with political connections since local political turnover would 
hurt more to these firms’ external financing sources from the banking system mainly controlled 
by state capitals. Third, we find the negative effect of local political turnover is more 
pronounced for firms with less financial constraints instead of firms with more financial 
constraints, as local political turnover would harm more to external financing sources of firms 
less financial constraints which rely more on external finance. 
 
5.2. Policy implications 
 First of all, the findings in the thesis suggest that industry competition, government 
subsidies, and political turnover play critical roles in China’s corporate innovation. First, due 
to the negative effect of severe industry competition in China, governments need to deepen 
structural reforms to eliminate over-competition. Chinese governments also need to continue 
to upgrade low-end manufacturing to high-tech industries to develop the quality of goods 
‘made in China’. For example, governments should use policies to strengthen IPRs and tax 
relief, which benefits to stimulate corporate innovation and upgrade industry structure. Since 
EFD can amplify the negative effect of competition on innovation and firms with higher 
financial constraints suffer more, governments need to deepen the financial system reform and 
further open the financial market in China, which can alleviate the issues of the ‘lending bias’ 
and the ‘institutional discrimination’ to financially constrained firms. Additionally, 
governments need to issue more policies to help firms to avoid overwhelming dependence on 
external finance and lower leverage ratios, which also can promote corporate innovation.  
Second, since subsidies could promote firms’ innovation activities by supplementing 
innovation funds, governments should use more subsidy policies to encourage firms’ 






corporate innovation is various, governments should further adjust the objective mechanism of 
subsidy policies. More subsidies should be allocated to private firms and financially 
constrained firms as the positive effect of subsidies on innovation activities is stronger for these 
firms. Furthermore, for the industry-level, more subsidies should be allocated to firms in 
industries with lower EFD since these firms usually do not get a strong ability to get external 
funds to innovate; more subsidies should be distributed to firms in industries with greater high 
tech-intensiveness to meet the fund demand of these firms’ large innovation investments. For 
the city-level, more subsidies should be given to firms located in cities with lower levels of 
financial development and foreign direct investment as more types of external financing 
sources will alleviate the positive effect of subsidies on innovation. Governments also need to 
increase the proportion of firms obtaining subsidies rather than allocate a large amount of 
subsidies to some specific firms, which also can motivate firms without subsidies to innovate. 
Third, because financial development has a significant and positive effect on corporate 
innovation, governments in China should deepen the financial system reform to efficiently 
allocate financial sources to firms, which can encourage firms’ innovation investments then 
boost economic development. Second, due to the promoting effect of local political turnover 
on innovation, governments should establish and improve a political turnover system based on 
local development needs, which can stimulate corporate innovation through necessary political 
turnovers. Additionally, since political uncertainty caused by local political turnover reduces 
the positive effect of financial development on corporate innovation, governments also need to 
implement some policy tools to ensure financial market stability when the local political 
environment changes. Meanwhile, as the negative effect of local political turnover on the 
positive effect of financial development on innovation is more pronounced for firms with 
abnormal political turnovers, firms with political connections, and firms with lower financial 






schemes such as subsidies to ensure their external financing capitals stable. Governments also 
need to encourage firms to reduce their overwhelming dependence on external finance. 
 
5.3. Suggestions for future research 
In chapter 2, we focus on a large panel of industrial firms in China over the period from 
1998 to 2007. However, after the 2008 financial crisis and the economic development in the 
past ten years, China’s economy also changed a lot. If we have opportunities, further research 
should try to extend the data period based on unlisted and listed firms to observe whether the 
negative effect of competition on innovation could hold for a long period in China. 
 In chapter 3, we first find a direct and positive effect of subsidies on corporate 
innovation in China. Subsequently, we successfully test a spillover effect of subsidies on 
innovation activities of firms without subsidies. We could make further research to investigate 
the spillover effect of subsidies in more detail and observe what is the difference between the 
direct effect and the spillover effect of subsidies in some classifications. 
In chapter 4, we find that local political turnover reduces the positive effect of financial 
development on corporate innovation, and further explore the negative effect of political 
turnover based on some other aspects. Future research could explore the negative effect of 
political turnover to link with more aspects of political turnovers, e.g. the places where 
appointed leaders come, the ways of political turnovers for outgoing leaders (promotion, equal 
position transfer, resign voluntarily, retirement or prison), or for appointed leaders (promotion 
or equal position transfer). We also can search for some exogenous policy shocks to financial 
development or political turnover, to set up a DID test, which may better confirm the causality 






The thesis focuses all “above-scale” enterprises including unlisted firms and listed firms. 
However, there is a big difference in firms’ investment decisions, financing ability, governance 
structure, and management level between listed firms and unlisted firms. Some studies show 
that compared to unlisted firms listed firms may not face higher financial constraints due to 
their strong financing capacity from the equity market (Allen et al., 2005), thus the negative 
effect of increased competition is possibly weaker for listed firms. Additionally, because listed 
firms have to face supervision from equity investors, own a relatively higher governance level 
compared to unlisted firms, listed firms may have a potential strong ability to eliminate the 
negative effect of competition, efficiently use subsidies or the funds from the banking system 
to innovation, and avoid the negative effect of political turnover caused by local political 
turnover on their external financing sources. In the future we can try to find some identifiers to 
distinguish listed firms and unlisted firms in the NBS firm-level dataset. It is worth exploring 
the difference between unlisted firms and listed firms in the effect of competition, subsidies, 
and political turnover on innovation, which can provide new insight into the understanding of 
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